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Globalization along with the creation of  free trade regions has amplified the
presence of  foreign owned firms in many economies in search of  competitive
advantages offered by the lack of  tariffs and nontariff  barriers, free flow of
goods, services, factors of  production and access to larger markets. Asides from
the numerous advantages seized from internationalization and the regional
integration of  host countries, there is a plethora of  issues which foreign
companies encounter in regionally integrated environments. Such issues range
from institutional antecedents and differences between home and host countries
to the specificities of  the host political, legal, and social systems (Beck et al., 2001;
Hillman, 2003; Hymer, 1976; Zaheer, 2002; Miller & Richards, 2002). In regionally
integrated countries these issues are amplified by the interplay of  national and
supranational institutions and forces which regulate foreign owned firms’
activities and even favor domestic firms (Miller & Richards, 2002). As a result
foreign owned firms augment their exposure and vulnerability to host
uncertainties and pressures (Miller, 1991; Dean & Brown, 1995). Regardless of
the sources of  these pressures, whether national or supranational, they amplify
the competitive disadvantage (or liability of  foreignness) faced by foreign owned
firms vis-à-vis indigenous firms (Hymer, 1976; Zaheer, 2002; Miller & Richards,
2002). This disadvantage can even cause foreign firms to under-perform domestic
firms (Miller & Richards, 2002) due to wide range of  unfamiliarity costs vis-à-vis
market (economic) and nonmarket issues (social, legal, and cultural related)
(Hennart, 1982; Buckley & Casson, 1976).
According to Boddewyn (2003, p. 299) ‘Nonmarket refers to internal and external
organizing and correcting factors that provide order to market and other types
of  institutions and organizations so that they may function efficiently and
effectively as well as repair their failures.’ While market issues and institutions
have fairly economic intents, nonmarket institutions entail social, political, and  
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1.1.    research background and objective
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legal arrangements that complement market arrangements but are additionally
concerned with collective interests and core values that go beyond pure market
objectives (Baron, 1995). Such nonmarket matters are not related to the market
arena but they can influence firm performance and competitive advantage
(through what can often be regarded as conflicting nonmarket vs. market
demands) especially in host integrated contexts where the interplay of  national
and supranational institutions amplify these conflicting demands (Rosenzweig &
Singh, 1991). Few studies provide empirical evidence for the contribution of
nonmarket matters to competitive advantage and implications for firm
performance. Firms that undertake nonmarket actions are more likely to
experience above-normal performance (Shaffer & Hillman, 2000). Shaffer’s study
was however limited to government directed actions. However, corporate political
actions were also proved to have a positive effect on firm performance (Bonardi,
Hillman and Keim, 2005; Blumentritt and Nigh, 2002). Furthermore, according
to Tian and Gao (2006), nonmarket behavior can also have a great influence on
organizational legitimacy and reputation and, when absent, the ability of  the firm
to pursue its goals and accumulate resources can be substantially reduced. 
Moreover, Usero and Fernández (2009) found a comparable dissimilarity between
market and nonmarket actions in the effect on firm performance in an
international environment. Their study reveals that in a host economy firms
which opt for a follower strategy, in pursuit of  eroding competitors’s first mover
advantage by undertaking more market actions, do not succeed in this abrasion.
However, in the same global context followers that undertake more nonmarket
actions were successful at taking back market share from the pioneers in a host
economy (Usero & Fernandez, 2009). Their findings sustain the
complementariness of  nonmarket strategies to the market ones and their
contribution to competitive advantage. Ma (2004) also links the use of  nonmarket
strategies to a more global corporate competitive advantage by attempts to align
other parties’ interests with that of  the focal firm, providing possible competitive
advantages by opening windows of  opportunities, removing external obstacles
or neutralizing threats. Thus, nonmarket strategies not only can help realize
competitive advantage, they can also help offset competitive disadvantage and
open up opportunities for foreign owned firms facing a liability towards the host
firm (Baron, 1995). Therefore, foreign owned firms should go beyond
formulating host market strategies and thoroughly consider complementary
matters and strategies to encounter complex influences outside the market spam,
to increase their competitive position in the host environment and reduce their
liability of  foreignness (Baron, 1995; Bonardi, Holburn & Van den Berg, 2004;
Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Prakash, 2002). 
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These strategies entail actions carried out in public arenas (Baron, 1995; Schaffer
& Hillman, 2000) to encounter influences from various nonmarket institutions,
national or supranational, such as interest groups, political institutions, the media,
regulatory institutions, standards agencies, which all constitute the nonmarket
business environment (North, 1990). Furthermore, the nonmarket environment
is characterized in terms of  institutions, issues, interests, and information (Baron,
1995). These various nonmarket components, issues and interests, vary across
countries. Some nonmarket issues and interests can be less salient in one country,
while public opinion can regard same issues as more emerging and salient in
another host setting. The institutional system in regionally integrated countries
is governed by a different set of  transactions than in countries which are not
members of  supranational entities. 
The objective of  this thesis is to investigate and explain the nonmarket behavior
and strategies of  foreign owned firms in an open and regionally integrated
economy. This study further explains why firms undertake nonmarket actions
and formulate nonmarket strategies. To better understand this behavior more
insight into the nonmarket forces and environment constitutes a starting point.
While market forces are taught worldwide, and the relevance of  the market
environment is undisputed (Porter, 1980), a holistic approach towards a
nonmarket framework is yet absent. Scholars emphasize the need to understand
the dynamics and determinants behind nonmarket behavior and strategic
implementation (Bonardi & Keim, 2005; Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994; Getz, 1997;
Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Hillman, 2003). However, to date the field literature is
underdeveloped and merely enumerates an inventory of  different actions to be
used in diverse situations. Diverse determinants of  such behavior are proposed
in a number of  studies, nonetheless barely any have been empirically tested (e.g.
Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Baron, 1995; Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994). So far, the field
has focused on large countries, such as United States (US), where different
nonmarket strategies are expected to be used or are considered ethically
appropriate than in open economies members of  supranational entities (Getz,
1997). Therefore, this study will focus on the nonmarket behavior of  foreign
owned firms in a small open economy.  A number of  pertinent research questions
guide us in achieving our objective and are further presented in the following
section. 
Introduction CHAPTER 1
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1.2.    research questions 
As we discussed in the previous section, in open regionally integrated host economies
the interplay between national and supranational tiers and institutional framework
amplify the market and nonmarket complexity and challenges faced by the foreign
owned firm. In these host contexts, in addition to the supranational-national
institutional interplay, simultaneously foreign owned firms have to manage various
dynamics of  this environment albeit economic, political, social, legal, and cultural.
These factors trigger foreign firms to utilize various nonmarket actions or to
design specific strategies to manage these influences. In order to better
understand this behavior, we need to elaborate this vast range of  underlying
influences, actions and determinants leading up to this nonmarket conduct.
Therefore, the central question guiding this study is:
Research question: What explains the nonmarket behavior and strategies
of  foreign owned firms in an open and regionally integrated host
economy? 
Before commencing with the examination of  nonmarket matters, we will firstly
become acquainted with the foreign owned firms which are present in a particular
host economy, with the characteristics of  these firms and their market behavior.
For this purpose we tap into market aspects such as idiosyncratic types of  firms,
location decisions and the colocation or agglomeration patterns which they
exhibit in the host country. The literature indentifies different advantages brought
by colocation, such as increasing returns, technical externalities and knowledge
spillovers (Marshall, 1890; Venables, 1996), transportation costs (Fujita & Thisse,
2002), location attractiveness and investment’s expected profitability (Shaver,
1998). However, numerous disadvantages have also been acknowledged such as
an increased competition (Head, Ries & Swenson, 1995) and spillover risks
(Shaver, 1998). As prior studies highlight various forces for and against
colocation, our interest falls on how different firms’ characteristics relate to
location decisions and the colocation patterns exhibited by various types of
foreign owned firms present in the open and regionally integrated host economy.
Consequently, the following research sub-question becomes relevant:
Research sub-question 1:  What are the colocation patterns exhibited by various types of  foreign
owned firms in an open and regionally integrated host economy? 
Once we have formed a clear overview on the types of  foreign owned firms
present in the particular host country and on certain market aspects of  these   
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firms, we will commence our exploration of  nonmarket matters by conductinga
thorough literature examination. As the nonmarket field is underdeveloped and
many scholars sustain that academic theory grew out of  the (management)
practice (Collins & Porras, 1994), it is important to discuss the main nonmarket
perspectives and to further utilize these perspectives into our future analysis. The
nonmarket environment explanation is built on various theoretical perspectives
regarding its nonmarket components. For this purpose, we formulate the
following sub-question:
Research sub-question 2:  What explains the nonmarket environment? 
After becoming acquainted to the theoretical status quo of  the field, we proceed
with our exploration by investigating the nonmarket institutional framework. We
investigate the background and the complexity of  nonmarket institutional
pressures and how foreign companies are dealing with these influences. We study
the nonmarket institutional pressures in relation to the nonmarket actions utilized
to manage these influences in a regionally integrated host economy (Hymer, 1976;
Zaheer, 2002; Miller & Richards, 2002). Based on institutional, international
business and corporate political strategy literature, we explore institutional
pressures from national regulatory institutions, supranational regulators, political
institutions, standards agencies, interest groups and the media and the nonmarket
responses or actions to these pressures. Therefore, we formulate the following
research sub-question: 
Research sub-question 3: What explains the relation between nonmarket institutional pressures
and the increase in nonmarket actions undertaken by foreign owned firms in an open regionally
integrated economy? 
Uncovering the nonmarket institutional pressures improves the understanding
of  the nonmarket framework and provides further input to study the type of
nonmarket strategies that can be implemented to cope with such institutional
effects (Baron, 1995; Bonardi et al., 2006; Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Prakash, 2002).
Thus, in order to manage or minimize the effects of  the various nonmarket
institutions in the host environment, foreign owned firms can develop and utilize
specific nonmarket strategies. The type of  such strategies can be determined by
firm characteristics, their internal resources and previous international experience
(Bonardi & Keim, 2005; Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994; Getz, 1997; Hillman & Hitt,
1999; Hillman, 2003). These strategies reduce the foreign owned firms’ exposure
to nonmarket pressures and can improve their competitive advantage (Mezias,
2002). Thus, the following research sub-question is appropriate:
Introduction CHAPTER 1
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Research sub-question 4:  What are the determinants and the types of  nonmarket strategies
implemented by foreign owned firms in an open and regionally integrated host economy?
Out of  the plethora of  nonmarket institutions affecting foreign owned firms’
business operations, a reputable significance is attributed to the media which acts
as the watchdog for the other institutions. Once we have explored the overall
nonmarket strategies undertaken by foreign owned firms to generally manage
influences from the multitude of  nonmarket institutions, we select one of  the
most important nonmarket institutions, namely the media and we further study
from a resource base perspective specific actions utilized by these firms to manage
its complex impact. Foreign owned firms develop tools and actions to manage
the influence of  media and to capture maximum benefits brought by media’s
functions in the host country. Therefore, the following research sub-question is
appropriate:
Research sub-question 5:  What types of  actions do foreign owned firms utilize to deal with the
media in an open and regionally integrated host economy? 
The research questions formulated above represent the mass of  elements which
need to be considered and investigated in order to understand the overall
nonmarket behavior of  the foreign owned firms in a regionally integrated
economy. Each research question will be separately elaborated and answered in
a different essay or chapter of  the thesis. After presenting the research questions
and their relevance for the overall goal of  this thesis, in the following section we
proceed to describing the research setting.
1.3.    research setting: the netherlands
The present section explains the rationale behind choosing the Netherlands as
the appropriate research setting for this study by describing its relevant
characteristics as a host economy. The choice for the Netherlands as a suitable
research setting for studying the nonmarket behavior of  foreign owned firms has
multiple grounds: (a) the open economy character; (b) the high inward and
importance of  foreign direct investment (FDI) flows; (c) the ‘Polder’ Model
background; and (d) active role in the European Union (EU). 
The Netherlands is a small open economy with a population of  16.5 million and
a labor force of  7.86 million (Eurostat, 2010; Walsh 1988, Hogenbirk 2002). After
26 years of  uninterrupted economic growth, the Dutch economy is highly open 
22
and dependent on foreign trade and financial services. In 2010 exports amounted
to €451.3 billion, placing the country on rank 9 in the world, while imports
amounted to €408.4 billion which ranks 11 worldwide (Eurostat, 2010). The
country has been one of  the leading European nations in attracting FDI and it
is one of  the four largest investors in the US. While in 2009 the stocks of  outward
FDI amounted to €932.2 billion, in 2010 the outward FDI totaled €950.8 billion
making Netherlands the fifth largest investor in the world. The main destinations
of  its investments were predominantly US, Germany, France, UK, India and
China (Eurostat, 2010). 
However, the Netherlands is not only an important investor abroad but also one
of  the countries that receive highest FDI flows. For this reason over the past
decades the number of  foreign owned firms in the Netherlands has increased
significantly. This development coincides with a worldwide sprint in foreign
investments made by multinational enterprises (MNEs) (Bartlett & Ghoshal,
1989; United Nations, 1998, 1999, 2000; Hogenbirk, 2002). The stock of  inward
FDI in 2009 amounted to €654.6 billion which confers the Netherlands the fifth
rank in the world, while in 2010 the Netherlands received an inward FDI of
€687.8 billion placing the country on the seventh position in the world (Eurostat,
2010). Therefore, the Netherlands represents a suitable country for the study of
foreign owned firms.
Foreign companies deliver 30 percent of  the total volume of  business in the
Netherlands and account for 21 percent of  overall investments. Additionally, they
are responsible for 22 percent of  investments in research and development
(NFIA, 2010). The total turnover rendered by these foreign firms sums to €366
billion, representing 30 percent of  the total turnover in the Netherlands (NFIA,
2010). The top five sectors where foreign owned firms operate are energy – oil,
gas, and coal; energy – bio-fuels; healthcare; chemicals; and food and nutrition
(NFIA, 2010). 
Foreign firms employ more than 1.179 million people, almost 15 percent of  the
total Dutch labor market size (EVD – Holland Trade, 2008). While 61 percent
of  the foreign owned firms’ employees work for an EU owned enterprise, almost
half  of  the total foreign firms turnover is given by EU owned firms. This entails
that the revenue of  EU owned firms is relatively more labor intensive than non-
EU owned firms. Moreover, the Netherlands is the biggest beneficiary of
non-EU foreign investment of  all 27 EU countries (Eurostat, 2010). The top ten
home countries of  the foreign owned firms operating in the Netherlands are:
US, United Kingdom, Germany, Belgium, Luxemburg, France, Switzerland,
Ireland, Japan, Spain (DNB, 2009). 
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Another characteristic of  the Netherlands which makes it a suitable setting for
our study is the ‘Polder’ Model society. The underlying operating assumptions
of  the ‘Polder’ Model are: consensus policy in economics, consensus decision-
making, pragmatic recognition of  pluriformity, and cooperation despite
differences. The ‘Polder’ Model is characterized by the tri-partite cooperation
between employers' organizations, labor unions, and the government. As a result,
abundant negotiations take place between government, businesses (domestic and
foreign owned firms) and society. Therefore, the existence of  this model in the
Netherlands becomes relevant for the study of  nonmarket implications brought
by the numerous negotiations and consensus seeking between employers’
organizations, labor unions, government, or how foreign firms operating in this
environment cope with such implications. The ‘Polder’ Model also implies
numerous rules and regulations which oversee an extensive welfare state. This
provides us with the opportunity to investigate the influences triggered by the
abundant rules and regulations on the frequency of  nonmarket actions and the
strategies chosen by foreign companies to counteract these influences. 
As mentioned earlier, the Netherlands is also a founding member of  the EU. In
the case of  the Netherlands, the membership to the EU counteracts the adverse
scale effects of  small size economy by extending the domestic market (Armstrong
& Read, 1998). Even though the Netherlands is a small size market, due to its
EU membership (which insures free flow/ access to the EU market size of  5.02
billion inhabitants) and geographical location (as an access-gate to the EU area),
the potential market of  the Netherlands becomes enormous. For this reason,
multinational enterprises (MNEs) have chosen this host country as strategic
orientation. However, they do have to cope with the implications brought by the
existence, functions and interplay of  supranational institutions on the host
context. Doh and Guay (2006) sustain that the European parliamentary systems
are more cooperative and less confrontational than the US parliamentary system.
As a result, more input from nonmarket institutions, actors and businesses is
allowed in the EU decision making processes. 
Therefore, this host setting becomes a suitable and worthy example of  a host
economy belonging to a larger supranational entity in which to investigate the
impact of  various institutional factors/ implications including supranational ones
on business activities of  foreign companies.
After having an overview of  the main reasons for choosing the Netherlands as
a suitable research setting for our study, the next section presents an overview
of  the chapters which segment this thesis. 
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1.4.    outline of the study
This dissertation is structured into seven separate chapters which independently
elaborate on a specific research (nonmarket) issue illustrated by each sub-question
(see Figure 1.1). Chapter 1 explained the background of  the study, the research
objective, questions and setting. Chapter 2 presents the types of  foreign owned
firms operating in the Netherlands according to various firm characteristics and
their market behaviour. We use firm specific data, as well as meso and regional
data to investigate which types of  foreign owned firms operate in the Netherlands
and to explain their colocation decisions and patterns. For a deeper understanding
of  our sample of  foreign firms and their collocation decisions and agglomeration
patterns, we also compare the collocation blueprints of  the foreign firms to the
ones of  the domestic companies. Once a clear overview on these firms is formed,
Chapter 3 begins the study of  the nonmarket framework by presenting an outlook
over the generic literature and theoretical explorations of  the nonmarket
environment. Thereafter, Chapter 4 analyzes the background and complexity of
nonmarket institutional pressures in relation with the nonmarket actions utilized
by the foreign firms to cope with these pressures. Having a clear grasp on the
most significant nonmarket institutions and how they can influence the activities
of  foreign firms, we proceed in Chapter 5 with the types of  nonmarket strategies
implemented by foreign owned firms to manage nonmarket influences. The type
of  nonmarket strategy implemented may be determined by firms’ characteristics,
their internal resources and previous international experience. Furthermore,
Chapter 6 investigates the effects of  one of  the most important nonmarket
institutions, namely the media and, from a resource base perspective, which
actions can be undertaken by these firms to manage its complex impact. Chapter
7 presents a summary of  our overall findings, it discusses the limitations of  our
study and it provides future research avenues.
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ChApter 2
ColoCAtIon pAtterns of foreIgn
owned fIrms In A smAll open eConomy
1
This chapter addresses the colocation or agglomeration patterns of  foreign
owned firms in the small open economy of  the Netherlands. The empirical
evidence shows that foreign owned firms exhibit different regional colocation
patterns than domestic firms for the following industries: mining, construction,
transport and communications, services, and trade industry across the twelve
Dutch provinces. In the agriculture industry, forestry and fishing industry, and
the manufacturing industry the colocation patterns of  the domestics and foreign
owned firms are similar. Empirical results also validate that firm size affects the
agglomeration behavior of  foreign owned firms; large foreign companies exhibit
different collocation blueprints than smaller and, medium size enterprises. Related
to industry, large foreign owned firms target mainly the trade industry and the
manufacturing industry. Results confirm that young established foreign owned
firms exhibit similar colocation patterns around older, more experienced foreign
counterparts in the host economy. Furthermore, the colocation patterns of
foreign owned firms vary also according to different home countries. Firms
coming from countries in proximity with the host economy reveal different
colocation patterns than firms coming from more distanced countries. Our
results strengthen the theoretical argumentation line that foreign owned firms 
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value location attributes differently depending on firm characteristics and they
also exhibit a different location pattern than domestic counterparts.
2.1.    Introduction
The location of  a foreign owned firm in the host country is an important strategic
decision which is determined by cost factors, infrastructure, and/or the proximity
to other domestic or foreign firms, so called colocation or agglomeration
phenomenon (Wheeler & Ashoka, 1992; Head et al., 1995; Crozet at al., 2004).
Various studies have shown that the decision to colocate is a deliberate strategy
to compensate for a lack of  resources related either to firm size, to
internationalization experience or to specific country experience (Yu, 1990;
Benito et al., 2003; Barkema et al., 1996). The literature indentifies different
advantages brought by the colocation phenomenon, namely increasing returns,
technical externalities and knowledge spillovers (Marshall, 1890; Venables, 1996),
transportation costs (Fujita & Thisse, 2002), location attractiveness and
investment’s expected profitability (Shaver, 1998). Conversely, many disadvantages
have also been acknowledged such as increased competition (Head, Ries &
Swenson, 1995) and spillover risks (Shaver, 1998). While the tendency in the
economic literature was to singularly focus on geographic-specific factors leading
to colocations, more recently the international business literature forwards firm
specific characteristics as highly relevant as well (Ottaviano & Puga, 1998; Benito
& Gripsrud, 1992; Chung & Song, 2004). As prior studies highlight various forces
for and against colocation, our interest falls on how different firm specific
characteristics affect the propensity to colocate and the colocation patterns or
blueprints created by firms with idiosyncratic firm characteristics. 
Although some studies focus on the heterogeneity of  colocating firms (Shaver
& Flyer, 2000; Chung & Song, 2004), most of  these studies examine merely a
subset of  the firms in a region and often consider only one industry. Despite the
continuous efforts to study the agglomeration trend, there are no attempts to
identify which industries mostly contribute to this phenomenon. With the
exception of  Shearmur and Coffey (2002) studies on colocation have mostly
ignored variations among the types of  firms that make up an agglomeration or
colocation area. Furthermore, studies revealing either similarities or differences
in colocation behavior are mainly focused on classically external determinants
of  colocations in large economies. Smaller open economies generally offer an
above average level of  specific advantages, such as infrastructure, skills, and
technological knowledge, which make them potentially attractive markets for  
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foreign direct investment (FDI) (Hogenbirk & Kranenburg, 2006). Consequently,
the presence of  foreign owned firms in a small economy can trigger various
benefits such as additional labor, skills spillovers, and capital flows. Many small
economies are nowadays members of  trading blocks; this membership increases
their location attractiveness as they become free gateways to a larger economic
entity or market. As a result, the number of  foreign firms has significantly
increased in many small open economies (Hogenbirk et al., 2009).
Therefore, the aim of  this study is to exmine the colocation patterns exhibited
by foreign owned firms with different firm characteristics in a small open
economy which is part of  a larger economic entity. We argue that depending of
firm specific characteristics foreign companies assess differently the (strategic)
colocation benefits. This study provides a deeper understanding of  the
relationships between firm characteristics and colocation or agglomeration
patterns. The setting for this investigation is the Netherlands, a small industrialized
country which is member of  a larger economic entity, the European Union (EU).
Following Walsh (1988) and Hogenbirk (2002), the Netherlands is classified as a
small open economy, due to its various characteristics: population, aggregate
economic activity, geographic area, availability of  natural resources, technological
level, and growth rate. The Netherlands represents the fifth largest beneficiary
of  foreign investment in the world and, due to its favorable location and active
role within the EU, many multinational enterprises (MNEs) have chosen the
Netherlands as strategic orientation. We selected more than 12.000 foreign owned
firms present in the Netherlands in 2008, operating in eight main industries which
reveal both a notable export-orientation and a host-market focus (Carlton, 1983;
Bartik, 1985; Feldman, 2003; Head et al., 1995; Waddell et al., 2003).
The structure of  the study is as follows. Section 2 presents different colocation
perspectives along with the advantages and disadvantages brought by the
agglomeration phenomenon. Section 3 discusses the colocation patterns of
foreign owned firms according to different firm specific characteristics. In
addition, we present our expectations with respect to the particular discussed
firm characteristic and the propensity to colocate. Section 4 gives an overview
of  the sample population, research data and methods of  analysis. Section 5
presents our empirical findings regarding the colocation patterns among foreign
owned firms both at regional level and across all Dutch industries. Section 6
discusses the empirical results and explains the colocation blueprints depending
of  firm characteristics. Section 7 concludes with the implications for policy
makers, firms, it discusses the managerial connotations of  our study and provides
ideas for future research.  
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2.2.    Colocation perspectives
Colocation is a topic broadly discussed in the literature (Head, Ries, & Swenson,
1995; Krugman, 1991; McCann & Mudambi, 2004; Wu & Strange, 2000). It refers
to the physical proximity of  firms, agglomeration of  firms (Rafii, 1995; Akgüngur,
2006; Hatfield, Lamb, & Tegarden, 2007; Huang, Shekhar, & Xiong, 2004) or
bunching (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1997; Ghemawat & Thomas, 2003).
Success in economic development is closely related to the development of
colocations or concentration areas and related institutions. This dates back to
Alfred Marshall’s notion of  industrial regions where he contends that industries
tend to colocate in distinct geographical districts (Marshall, 1890; Akgüngür,
2006). The most relevant aspect of  the Marshallian theory is that long-term
competitiveness is based on the evolution of  aggregated skills and competencies,
which depends on cooperation as well as competence. Colocation areas lead to
scale economies, increased specialization, division of  labor and greater access to
information (Luo, 1999; Britton, 2003). Schumpeter (1934) further elaborated
on the significance of  colocations in creating revolutionary technology through
shared knowledge where the main stimulus for fundamental economic change
was innovation. Evolving out of  Fordism and mass production, Piore and Sabel
(1984) placed a new focus on industrial colocations through the merits of
vertically disintegrated and location fixed production. Along similar
argumentation lines Post-Schumpeterian researchers also complement the
discussion of  colocation activity (Hirschman, 1958; Akungur et al, 2003).
Dahmen’s idea (1991) of  development blocks and Perroux’s (1950) growth pole
premise emphasize the importance of  inter-firm locational linkages in the
development process. Such theories are further complemented by evolutionary
economics pioneered by Nelson and Winter (1982) and studies on colocation
dynamics (Andersen, 1994).
Overall the economic development and regional cluster literature stresses that
colocations enhance firms’ performance through the diffusion of  new
technologies, use of  advanced techniques, business strategies, informal exchange
of  information, transfer of  skills and knowledge that occurs via shared labor
markets. Knowledge spillovers are phenomena of  close proximity, especially
when knowledge is tacit in nature and when technological know-how is
specialized to a particular region (Autant-Bernard, 2000). As knowledge spillovers
increase the motivation to colocate (Feldman, 2003), the economic rationale
emphasizes that agglomeration economies are associated with spillovers and
linkages. Conversely, the more grounded literature underlines bounded rationality
and information asymmetries as some of  the main reasons driving firms to 
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colocate (Chung & Kalnins, 2001, Shaver et al., 1997, Barkema et al., 1996).
Given that firms choose locations that seem to best fit their strategic goals, the
specific location decision inside the country can be more essential than the
decision at the country level (Brandenburger & Nallebuff, 1997). Furthermore,
firms’ location decisions could also be influenced by the presence of  other firms
in a region. For instance, foreign and local incumbents within a region can pose
great threats and challenges to new entrants. Simultaneously, they can constitute
great sources for complementary resources and learning opportunities (Chang
& Sekeun, 2005).
Colocation can also be viewed as a value adding web, with a series of  linkages
between domestic and foreign owned firms in relation to a specific business
sector. These linkages are often interdependencies of  different strength and
quality which define the boundaries of  the colocation area which may entail
domestic firms, foreign owned ones or a combination of  the two. These firms
constitute the actors in a colocation area, actors which can be categorized into
horizontal, vertical and lateral. The horizontal actors are represented by the firms
with a common industrial background which perform activities related to the
central industry in the colocation area. The vertical actors encompass the supply
related firms of  the products or services delivered by the horizontal ones. In a
colocation area entailing the presence of  FDI, the lateral actors are represented
by diverse auxiliary agencies or institutions which guide and support the foreign
firms in the area (regulatory institutions or economic development agencies). 
Classical and neo-classical location theory prescribes that the choice for
colocation is also determined by cost factors and infrastructure in the region
(Christensen & Drejer, 2005). These cost reducing factors lead firms to colocate
close to main customers or suppliers, thus, reducing costs of  inter-firm
transactions through this proximity. Colocating firms benefit from access to
shared resources like infrastructure, and a local, specialized labor market.
Transportation infrastructure is often considered a main factor in firms’
colocation choices and agglomeration behavior (McCann & Shefer; 2004).
Dunning (1977) upholds that foreign owned firms participate to colocations in
order to gain access to context specific resources, such as production factors and
natural resources of  the area. Valuable industry resources also echo attractive
markets for the multinational companies. Through colocation, foreign owned
firms benefit from an increased availability of  complementary products and
services and have better access to suppliers, specialized employees in the local
labor pool, specific information and public institutions. They have a higher
motivated workforce due to the localized competitive environment (Pinch et al., 
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2003). Studies also show that foreign firms active in colocation areas tend to be
even more innovative than isolated firms (Smith & Smith, 1998). From a
resource-based perspective the combination of  resources that are only available
in specific areas enable colocating firms to develop additional competencies that
are inaccessible to other firms. These competencies are specific to the colocation
areas and they result from the combination of  resources available within the
respective regions; such network competecies are not owned by a single firm but
they are hosted in all firms or institutions of  the colocation area. Overall, the
main advantages brought by colocating entail a higher innovation, growth,
productivity, competitiveness, higher new firm formation and higher job growth
rates.
2.3.    Colocation patterns: similarity and dissimilarity 
The totality of  location choices made by firms or a group of  firms within a
country constitutes a certain location pattern or blueprint, whereas mentioned
earlier often unequal location distributions are found (Shaver, 1998). An
assessment of  location and density patterns becomes the first phase in the
identification of  potential colocation patterns or regions (Hatfield et al, 2007).
Similarity and dissimilarity reasons in colocation patterns within and between
group of  firms arise from the geographical concentration of  production factors,
government policies, and infrastructure implications for both domestic and
foreign owned firms (Shaver, 1998; Steinle & Shiele, 2002). Apart from the
external reasons guiding firms to colocate and exhibit a certain colocation pattern,
there are also similarities and dissimilarities in firms’ collocating behavior which
are internally grounded, i.e. firm specific characteristics (Glückler, 2007). These
characteristics diverge not only within the foreign owned bunch but also when
studies in contrast to their domestic counterparts.
An increasing number of  studies show an important liaison between firm
characteristics and colocation patterns, liaison explained by the argument that
depending on their specific firm characteristics, companies assess colocation
attributes in different ways. A prime characteristic which may lead to dissimilar
colocation pattern among firms is their foreign vs. domestic origin. Shaver (1998)
proves that domestic firms exhibit different colocation patterns than foreign
owned firms in the United States. Foreign owned firms coming from countries
in proximity with the host economy show different colocation patterns than firms
coming from more distanced countries (Chung & Song, 2004). Crozet et al. 
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(2004) combine data on regional economic characteristics with basic firm
characteristics such as investor nationality. Results hint to a variation in the
assessment of  regional economic characteristics according to investors’
nationality. Other studies show that colocation patterns can also vary accoding
to firm size. Dominant and large firms exhibit a different colocation behavior
and patterns than smaller firms (Hatfield, Lamb & Tegarden, 2007). Gordon &
McCann (2000) debates that foreign owned firms tend to imitate other firms
whose industry affiliation, age, experience, or origin is relevant to their own
situation. Generally, studies which analyzed the relationship between firm
characteristics and the propensity to colocate consider only one singular firm
characteristic at a time overlooking the vast variety and interactions of  firm
characteristics. Therefore, this section discusses the colocation patterns of  foreign
firms in a host country according to firm characteristics and the interactions of
these characteristics which may lead to diverse agglomeration patterns. 
2.3.1.    Colocations of foreign vs. domestic owned ﬁrms
Various studies on FDI explain why foreign owned firms decide to locate in the
same areas where domestic firms are operating, phenomenon causing similar
colocation patterns of  domestic and foreign firms (Hansen, 1987). Similar
colocation patterns cam be caused by the geographic concentration of
production factors or by a similar assessment of  other specific location
advantages between both foreign and domestic firms. Furthermore, industry
agglomeration economies may exist where positive externalities are arising from
the geographic colocation of  industry (Head et al., 1995). Industrial areas or
forces may encourage both foreign and domestic firms from the same industry
to cluster together resulting in similar colocation choices (Hogenbirk, 2002). 
On the other hand, many studies show the dissimilarity in colocation behavior
between domestic and foreign owned firms (Harrison et al., 2004a). Dissimilar
colocation patterns arise from differences among foreign and domestic firms
with respect to their technologies or customer bases; the existence of
agglomeration economies among foreign owned firms that motivate also other
foreign companies to colocate together; changes in colocation attractiveness over
time that motivate foreign firms to value locations in a different way than
incumbent local firms (Hogenbirk, 2002). Foreign owned firms might estimate
certain regional characteristics more advantageous than their domestic
counterparts or they might even assess these regional characteristics in a different
manner than other foreign owned firms (Gordon & McCann, 2000; Harrison et  
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al., 2004b). Import intensive foreign firms might favor colocations around easy
access to imports (Shaver, 1998; Maoh & Kanaroglou, 2007). Shaver argues that
‘there might be agglomeration economies among foreign owned firms regardless
of  where domestic firms colocate’ (Shaver, 1998: 473), referring to colocations
of  (specialized) foreign capital and the importance of  colocation externalities for
these firms. Hymer (1976) and Dunning (1977) debate that in case of  foreign
owned firms it is mainly the characteristics of  these firms which will lead to a
different location pattern than the domestic ones. Due to the assets that foreign
firms poses or due to the liabilities they face (which differ from the domestic
ones), they are attracted to regions with different characteristics than the ones
domestic firms tend to favor (Holmes & Stevens, 2002, 2004). Additionally,
foreign owned firms can exhibit different colocation patterns if  they are late
comers to an already established industry or the optimal location choice for that
industry changed over time (Shaver, Mitchell & Yeung, 1997). Furthermore,
similar colocation tendencies among foreign firms regardless of  where the
domestic ones are established can be sustained by liability of  foreignness
arguments (Caves, 1992). They offset these disadvantages through skills and
knowledge which is not available in the host country but shared by the foreign
network. They make use and share knowledge through colocation linkages and
further spillovers. Glickman and Woodward (1988) acknowledge that the location
decision made by a foreign firm to a certain region is often followed by other
foreign companies, phenomenon frequently resulting in colocations of  foreign
capital (Ghemawat & Thomas, 2003). Although foreign firms face certain
liabilities in a host country compared to indigenous firms, they are able to offset
these disadvantages by relying on firm-specific intangible assets and networks
which may differ from the domestic ones. Therefore, we expect that the
colocation patterns of  foreign owned firms differ from their domestic
counterparts. 
2.3.2.    Colocations according to country of origin 
Another firm characteristic which can explain colocation patterns among foreign
owned firms is country of  origin. Economic geography literature focusing on
the location choices made by foreign investors supports the stream of
agglomeration forces among firms from the same home country (Devereux &
Griffith, 1998; Javorcik, 2004). Groups of  firms coming from a certain home
country have different location strategies than their counterparts from another
home country (Crozet et al., 2004). Erken et al. (2004) also confirm the
dominance of  colocation effects among firms with same home country of  origin  
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after studying the location choices of  French multinationals in different EU
regions. Furthermore, Mayer and Mucchielli (1999) observe the same colocation
phenomenon of  Japanese firms in Europe on both a national and regional level.
Shaver (1998) also found that Japanese firms exhibit different location patterns
than US domestic firms in the manufacturing industry. Head et al. (1995) show
that new Japanese firms entering the US replicate the location choices of  other
Japanese firms which are already operating in the host country. 
Foreign owned firms coming from the same country of  origin may derive
stronger network externalities from their co-nationals than from other firms
coming from different countries (Suarez-Villa & Walrod, 1997). He (2002)
emphasized that firms from the same country prefer to colocate to have
immediately access to the needed information to do business in the host
environment and to reduce the search costs for information. Firms may also be
attracted to the actions of  other co-national firms than to those of  different
nations, revealing a type of  trait-based imitation. Chen et al. (2010) and Yang and
Hsia (2007) stress the importance of  organizational dynamics of  production
networks and the asymmetrical power of  relations within the supply chains of
firms as significant driving forces of  similar colocation patterns among firms
from the same country of  origin. Smaller suppliers from the same country of
origin could be forced to establish oversees facilities in close proximity to their
key clients’ plants abroad to retain their business. Duranton and Overman (2008)
also show that vertically-linked firms prefer to colocate at the same regional scale
in a host country. This colocation tendency may even be stronger among firms
from countries of  ethnocentric orientations; Korean and Japanese firms
frequently emulate each other (Anas et al., 1998; Chung & Song, 2004; Head et
al., 1995; Gorman & Kautonen, 2004). Network externalities and marginal
benefits from colocation might then be higher when firms from the same country
of  origin colocate, than when firms with different origins colocate. The marginal
benefits such as spillovers of  nation-specific experience or knowledge (especially
for firms coming from countries where ethnocentrism is strong) increase the
incentives for firms to colocate with other co-nationals. The colocation difference
is further supported by studies of  Hansen (1987), Head and Ries (1995), and
Guimarães et al. (2000), When referring to plural nationalities of  foreign owned
firms present in the host country, we expect that foreign owned companies reveal
different colocation patterns according to different home countries.
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2.3.3.    Colocations according to size
Another firm characteristic which may relate to colocation propensity is size.
Large firms are seen as an important source of  colocation benefits, amongst
which the most important is knowledge spillovers (Feldman, 2003; Harrison et
al., 2004a). As many researchers have noted large firms have the potential to
provide significant agglomeration benefits to the colocated establishments
(Collinson, 2000; Shaver & Flyer, 2000; Feldman, 2003; Gorman & Kautonen,
2004; Malmberg & Maskell, 2006; Piore & Sabel, 1984). Hatfield et al (2007)
studied the propensity to colocate with dominant firms (defined as large,
economically and technologically powerful firms that enter emerging markets
from related markets) as well as the strategic ramifications of  colocation with
dominant firms; their study shows that both small and medium sized firms are
similarly likely to colocate with dominant firms. Kim (1995) also reported positive
correlations between colocation behavior and average firm size, as well as
between colocation and the intensity of  raw materials across U.S. manufacturing
industries. Holmes and Stevens (2002) found that firms located in areas with
higher industry colocation are on average larger than those located outside such
areas, especially in the manufacturing industry. Holmes and Stevens (2002) extend
Kim's findings by emphasizing that this positive relationship is robust and
controls for firm size effects on concentration. In particular, large firms play an
important role in the development of  technical standards or dominant designs
that are necessary for creating economic value. Due to the benefits that large
firms can bring to the colocation areas, small and medium sized firms have a
strong incentive to colocate with these generally dominant firms. Therefore, we
expect that the colocation patterns of  small foreign owned firms to be similar to
those of  large firms.  
2.3.4.    Colocations according to age 
Firm’s age can further deepen the insight into colocation patterns among foreign
owned firms. The literature regarding the predisposition to colocate according
to age is divided into two opposite streams. One literature stream supports the
idea that no matter the age, both types of  firms have significant benefits from
colocations and that, due to these potential benefits, they will exhibit similar
colocation patterns (Aldrich & Auster, 1986; Shaver, 1998; Shaver & Flyer, 2000;
Stinchcombe, 1965). Another stream reports that young established foreign
owned firms have more to gain from colocating than older, more established
firms and, therefore, will exhibit different colocation patterns (Bhide, 2000; 
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Harrison et al., 2004b; Smith and Smith, 1998). Younger firms, due to weaker
knowledge and resource base, would exhibit different colocation patterns than
older foreign firms. Prime advantages from colocation for young established
foreign owned firms would be an enhanced awareness of  customer leads,
increased exposure to potential customers, as well as knowledge sharing and
spillovers (Javorcik, 2004). Through colocations the young ones are more likely
to acquire intangible resources which they do not posses due to their liability of
newness (Smith & Smith, 1998). Through colocations the younger firms will have
instant access to an already developed customer perspective. By colocating with
other firms they might enhance their ability to create and nurture partnerships
which fill their resource voids (Christensen & Drejer, 2004; Chung & Kalnins,
2001).. Younger foreign owned firms also have to overcome the liability of
foreignness, in particular in the development of  legitimacy and trusting
relationships with potential transaction partners (Harrison et al., 2004b). Older
established firms, particularly those with substantial experience, size and
resources, serve as colocation magnets for younger companies (Shaver & Flyer,
2000). Shaver and Flyer (2000) found that older, more established foreign firms
in US industries indeed have a past tendency to locate away from agglomeration
areas, but this tendency disappears in time due to an increase in the potential
benefits brought by colocating. This finding suggests that firms are balancing
their potential gains from knowledge sharing against the risks of  knowledge
leaking to other firms in the industry (Davidsson & Klofsten, 2003). Colocating
with older firms may provide benefits to all firms, but will be especially attractive
for the younger companies due to resource constraints and other survival
challenges brought by their liability of  newness (Shaver, 1998; Stinchcombe,
1965). We expect that the mutual benefits from colocating shared by all firms
regardless of  age increase the likelihood that young firms similarly colocate to
older, more established ones; consequently, we expect similar colocation patterns
among young and old established foreign owned firms in the host economy
(Aldrich & Auster, 1986; Shaver, 1998; Shaver & Flyer; 2000).
2.4.    methodology
2.4.1.    The Netherlands
It is generally assumed that the Netherlands is among those small economies that
attract FDI due to their favorable geographic location As the Netherlands was
also among the countries initiating the European customs union in 1957, foreign
owned firms located here have benefited from the process of  increasing economic 
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and political integration from the early start. Strategically located within the EU
and at the North Sea, MNEs frequently use their Dutch establishments to supply
not only the (relatively small) Dutch market, but also other (European) markets.
Being a small country that is part of  a larger regional economic entity (EU) it is
expected that many foreign owned firms located in this particular host country
will serve a larger market with their products and services. Due to regional
integration, MNEs can rationalize their European activities to exploit economies
of  scale and scope (Benito, Grogaard & Narula, 2003; Hogenbirk & Kranenburg,
2006). 
The Netherlands is the fifth largest outward investor in the world (UNCTAD,
2006), an extraordinary position for a small country. Although always a net-
outward investor, the Netherlands also quickly recognized that incoming FDI
could contribute to the economic well-being of  the country, since FDI not only
involves financial flows, but also transfers of  materials, components, finished
products, and intangible assets (Hogenbirk et al., 2009). Worldwide, the
Netherlands is the sixth largest recipient of  FDI (UNCTAD, 2006). Table 2.1
presents an overview of  the top ten of  largest foreign investors in The
Netherlands. 
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Table 2.1: FDI Stock in the Netherlands by top ten countries,
2005 - Million EUR at year-end
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The Netherlands consists of  twelve provinces, namely Friesland, Groningen,
Drenthe, Overijssel, Gelderland, Limburg, Noord-Brabant, Zeeland, Utrecht,
Zuid-Holland, Noord-Holland, and Flevoland. Figure 2.1 presents the map of
the Netherlands including the provinces and their main cities, and the neighboring
countries.
Figure 2.1:  Map of the Netherlands
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The Dutch provinces differ from each other with respect to economic
development, culture and history. Provinces Noord-Holland, Zuid-Holland, and
Utrecht, together often labeled the ‘Randstad’, are regarded as being quite distinct
from the other provinces. These three provinces are located close to the sea, they
hold major business centers in the cities of  Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Den Haag,
and Utrecht; and encompass the main gateways of  Schiphol Airport and the
harbor of  Rotterdam. Provinces Groningen, Drenthe, Overijssel, Gelderland,
Limburg, Noord-Branbant, and Zeeland are provinces bordering Germany and
Belgium. Additionally, Limburg borders both Belgium and Germany. The
province Noord-Brabant is known for the technological knowledge and
innovation potential, which is essential for resource-seeking foreign owned firms
as shown by Biermans and Poort (2007). Furthermore, the Overijssel region has
a large manufacturing base and excellent infrastructure enabling easy
communication with major Eastern European markets.
2.4.2.    Data sources and sample
This research uses several datasets namely the Dunn and Bradstreet dataset,
Dutch Invest, De Nederlandse Bank (DNB), and the Statline from Central
Bureau of  Statistics (CBS). The DNB country-level dataset provides an overview
on the inward FDI in the Netherlands and the origin of  the inward investment
per countries and regions worldwide. The Dunn and Bradstreet dataset and
Dutch Invest dataset contain firm-level and detailed information on foreign
owned firms doing business in the Netherlands: company specific information,
number of  employees, year of  establishment, size, assets, financial reports,
location, industry codes, organizational structure, mother company, subsidiary
information (number, industry, location). The CBS dataset contains all firms in
the Netherlands, without making a distinction between foreign owned and
domestic firms and it allows us to select firms based on industry and
region/province. 
The databases use different industry classification systems, namely SIC 1987
(Standard Industrial Classification) and SBI 1993 (Standaard Bedrijfsindeling).
Therefore, we had to synchronize the two classification systems in order to refer
to the same type of  firms (i.e. firms active in the same industry). The CBS
database uses the SBI 1993 classification to distinguish between industries; SBI
1993 is referred to as the Dutch SIC system (Broersma & Gautier, 1997). The
Dunn and Bradstreet and Dutch Invest datasets use the SIC 1987 classification
system. It was necessary to verify which SIC 1987 classification codes correspond
to the SBI 1993 codes and to validly synchronize the databases
(www.siccode.com). Therefore, in this research all industries under division A to
J in the SIC 1987 system will be regarded similar to all firms in division D in the
SBI 1993 system. From the Statline database, which contains all firms (both
domestic and foreign) active in the Netherlands on the 1st of  January 2008 we
selected a total of  94625 domestic firms. 
The research sample population consists of  12.632 economically active foreign
owned firms in the Netherlands at the beginning of  2008. The data regards a
foreign owned firm as a legally existing entity relating strategically to a parent
company of  foreign origin but existing independently as a juridical form. This
entails that legal responsibilities and legal consequences are placed directly on
the company itself. We excluded from the sample the companies which were out
of  business or non-marketable even though location information was present in
the dataset. The foreign owned firm sample for this research consists of  11.614
small and medium sized and 1.018 large sized firms. We classify as being small
and medium sized the firms with a number of  employees up to 250 headcounts.
Large firms employ more than 250 people (European Commission, 2010).
Furthermore, our sample consists of  3970 young foreign owned firms and of
8662 older firms. The young foreign owned firms started their operations in the
Netherlands in the last ten years and the old companies initiated their activities
in the Netherlands more than ten years ago (Davidsson & Klofsten, 2003). 
With regards to the origin of  the foreign owned firms, 8.099 firms are owned by
EU countries, and 4.533 firms are non-EU. We classified the foreign owned firms
using the Standard Industrial Classification SIC code into the following industries:
agriculture, forestry and fishing; mining; construction; manufacturing;
transportation, communications, electric, gas, and sanitary services; trade;
services; public administration. We excluded the public administration industry
from the sample because only two units were active in this industry. 
2.4.3.    Method 
To assess the distributions of  firms, distribution tables and Chi-square tests were
applied on the tables with the rows representing foreign and domestic owned
firm counts and the columns representing each province. The tables can be
analyzed by comparing the domestic- and foreign distributions over the provinces.
For the complementary Chi-square tests, the null hypothesis, stating that the
colocation patterns do not significantly differ from each other, was tested.
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We also tested the interaction of  two or multiple firm characteristics and their
propensity to colocate in order to gain a more in-depth multi-dimension view
over the similarity or dissimilarity in colocation blueprints. For this purpose, two-
way and three-way factor tests were conducted.
To determine where domestic firms are located and which Dutch provinces
foreign owned firms favor, the analysis will also focus on the difference in the
number of  foreign owned firms present in each [province], and the expected
number of  foreign owned firms if  they would have followed the same
distribution pattern as [domestic firms] (Shaver, 1998). To calculate which
province do the foreign owned firms favor (FAVOR), we use the difference in
the number of  firms that are foreign owned in a province and the expected
number if  the foreign owned would have followed the same distribution patterns
as the domestic ones. The expected number of  foreign owned firms is calculated
by multiplying the actual number of  foreign firms per province with the shares
of  the total domestic firms per province. The variable was calculated in the
following manner:
Fi,s  is the number of  foreign owned firms in industry i and province s;
Ui,s is the number of  domestic firms in industry i and province s; 
Fi is the total number of  foreign owned firms in industry i; 
Ui is the total number of  domestic firms in industry i. 
FAVORs indicates the extent to which foreign owned firms prefer to locate in a
province relative to domestic firms. Positive values of  FAVOR indicate provinces
that foreign firms favor, and negative values highlight provinces that foreign
owned firms disfavor. 
In exploring the distribution across the regions and their relative importance, we
use the location quotient: measure of  the industry’s concentration in an area
relative to the rest of  the nation. As the Netherlands the first two digits of  the
postal code indicate the same city or region, firms are considered to be colocating
if  they are located within the same first two digits of  the postal code. 
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2.5.    empirical ﬁndings
2.5.1.    Colocation patterns considering provinces favored
In order to provide an accurate analysis of  the colocation patterns of  foreign
owned firms in the Netherlands, the first step is analyze the regional distribution
of  foreign owned firms as compared to domestic enterprises across the twelve
provinces and industries. Table 2.2 shows the distribution of  domestic and
foreign owned firms per province and across industries. Domestic firms favor
the provinces Noord-Brabant (18.89%), Zuid-Holland (16.23%), Noord-Holland
(15.99%), and Gelderland (13.38%). Similar to the domestic firms’ distribution,
the provinces Noord-Brabant (20.19%), Zuid-Holland (17.23%), Noord-Holland
(16.12%), and Gelderland (12.53%) are highly favored by foreign owned firms.
We also conduct a chi-square test to determine if  domestic and foreign firms
favor the same provinces. The Chi-square test has a value of  27.00 and a p-value
of  0.25 meaning that we cannot reject the null-hypothesis, therefore, the domestic
and foreign owned firms favor the same provinces. When comparing the
distribution pattern of  both domestic and foreign owned firms, our results are
consistent with the above, namely that the provinces favored by foreign owned
firms are, to a large extent, similar to the ones favored by domestic firms except
for two provinces, Limburg and Friesland. Different from the domestic firms’
distribution, the province Limburg is highly favored by foreign owned firms and
the province Friesland is less favored by foreign firms compared to domestic
ones. 
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In order to objectify the above statistics we will determine which provinces are
favored by foreign owned firms by comparing their colocation patterns with the
location patterns of  the domestic ones. To calculate which provinces are favored
by the foreign firms we need to focus on the difference in the number of  firms
that foreign owned firms control in a [province], and the expected number of
firms that foreign owned firms would have controlled if  they followed the same
distribution pattern as [domestic firms] (Shaver, 1998). Therefore, table 2.3
provides the actual number of  foreign owned firms per province, the expected
number of  foreign firms per province if  they would have followed the colocation
pattern of  the domestic ones, and the difference between these two numbers
(actual – expected), implying favoring or disfavoring of  the province considered. 
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The evidence shows that the provinces of  Noord-Holland, Zuid-Holland,
Noord-Brabant, Limburg and Utrecht are favored by foreign owned firms across
all industries. Drenthe, Friesland, Gelderland, and Overijssel are not favored by
foreign owned firms. 
2.5.2.    Colocation patterns considering foreign vs. domestic
foreign owned ﬁrms
In order to see the colocation patterns of  the foreign owned firms in the
Netherlands we continue our analysis by investigating whether foreign owned
firms exhibit the same colocation behavior as domestic ones. Hogenbirk (2002)
found that domestic and foreign firms located dissimilarly in the Netherlands in
1997. Although this research is based on data from a decade later, we also expect
that foreign owned firms colocate differently from their domestic counterparts,
mostly based on their different characteristics, as emphasized by Shaver (1998).
In table 2.2 we noticed a high similarity among the distribution of  domestic and
foreign owned firms per province without considering the industry context.
Provinces with a relatively high number of  domestic firms, like Noord-Brabant
(18.89%), Noord-Holland (15.99%) and Zuid-Holland (16.23%), also present
high number of  foreign owned firms (respectively 20.19%, 16.12%, and 17.23%).
The same stands for provinces with relatively low domestic firm counts, like
Flevoland, Drenthe, and Zeeland. It seems that, the share of  domestic firms per
province and the share of  foreign owned firms per province are very much alike.
We also conducted Chi-square tests to determine if  the colocation pattern of
foreign owned firms differs statistically from the colocation patterns of  domestic
firms for each industry. Table 2.4 presents the number of  foreign owned firms,
the values of  Chi –square tests, and significance level of  colocation patterns
formed by foreign firms according to each industry. 
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Table 2.4: The total number of foreign owned ﬁrms and the results
of the Chi-Square tests for the colocation patterns according to
industries
The evidence shows that the industrial colocation patterns do significantly differ
across the twelve Dutch provinces (when considering industry). The results
indicate that for the industries of  mining, construction, transport and
communications, services, and trade industry the null-hypothesis of  identical
colocation patterns is rejected. Therefore, across these industries the foreign
owned firms exhibit a different colocation pattern than the domestic ones. For
the agriculture, forestry and fishing industry and the manufacturing industry the
null-hypothesis cannot be rejected. Thus the foreign owned and domestic firms
operating in these industries have similar colocation patterns. 
2.5.3.    Colocation patterns considering foreign owned ﬁrms’
characteristics
In order to deepen our insight into the colocation patterns of  foreign owned
firms we will consider firm characteristics, namely country of  origin, size, age
and industry and analyze colocation patterns according to these characteristics.
Firstly, we investigate the propensity to colocate across provinces according to
the nationality or country of  origin of  the foreign owned firms. Furthermore,
we look at the distribution per each province according to the main investors
(De Nederlandse Bank, 2009). Table 2.5 presents the distribution of  foreign
owned firms and the shares per province according to country of  origin.  
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The evidence shows a high distribution of  Belgium firms in the regions of
Limburg, Noord-Brabant and Zeeland. By means of  a Chi-square test, we analyze
whether the location pattern of  Belgium firms significantly differs from the
overall foreign firms location patterns. Table 2.6 shows the chi-square results of
the colocation patterns exhibited by foreign owned firms according to firm’s
characteristics. 
Table 2.6: The results of the Chi-Square tests of colocation patterns
according to ﬁrm’s characteristics  
The Chi-square value of  140.00 and the p-value of  0.00 (table 2.6) confirm that
foreign owned firms coming from Belgium show different colocation pattern
than other foreign firms. Moreover, foreign owned firms coming from Belgium
colocate in the Dutch provinces bordering Belgium. The same results (table 2.5) 
stand for the German owned firms which highly concentrate across the provinces
bordering Germany namely: Limburg, Gelderland, and  Overijssel. Empirical
testing shows a Chi-square value of  146.00 and a p-value of  0.00 which implies
that the null hypothesis is rejected and confirms that foreign owned firms coming
from Germany exhibit a different colocation patterns than other foreign owned
firms. 
We also test how the interactions between various firm characteristics variables
impact colocations. In order to observe the interaction of  multiple firm
characteristics and the effect on the propensity to collocate we performed two-
way factors tests. When considering colocation patterns according to country of
origin and industry, the Chi-square value of  27.00 and the p-value of  0.26 show
that we cannot reject the null-hypothesis and that foreign owned firms coming
from different countries do not show different industry colocation patterns.
Related to firm size, Rugman and Verbeke (2002) strengthen the idea that
company size plays an important role in firms colocation choices and patterns.
Table 2.7 presents an overview of  the distribution of  large and small and medium
sized firms and the shares per province.
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Table 2.7: Distribution of number of foreign owned ﬁrms (foreign
owned ﬁrm) and shares per province according to size
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The evidence shows the existence of  a similar regional distribution of  foreign
owned firms regardless of  size across all twelve provinces. We also conducted the
Chi-square test to determine if  the colocation patterns of  large, small and medium
sized foreign owned firms are the same statistically for the provinces. The Chi-
square test (see table 2.6) has a value of  23.33, and a p-value of  0.26 meaning that
we cannot reject the null-hypothesis. 
When investigating colocation patterns according to size and country of  origin,
the Chi-square value of  23.00 and the p-value of  0.25 also show that we cannot
reject the null-hypothesis. Thus, there is an equal distribution of  both large and 
small and medium foreign owned firms regardless of  country of  origin. 
Regarding colocations according to size and industry the results show a significant
difference among colocation patterns. The statistical test has a value of  42.00, and
a p-value of  0.00 which means that the null-hypothesis of  similar colocation
patterns is rejected. The colocation patterns of  small and medium sized foreign
owned firms significantly differ from the ones of  large firms across industries.
Large foreign owned firms are targeting two main industries in the Netherlands
namely trade (wholesale and retail) and manufacturing. 
The analysis of  colocation patterns with respect to age of  firms reveals that there
are 3970 (31.43%) foreign owned firms which operate for less than ten years in
the Netherlands, and 8662 (68.57%) foreign firms launched their activities in this
host setting more than ten years ago. Table 2.8 shows the regional distribution in
the Netherlands of  both young and older foreign owned firms.
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Table 2.8: Number of foreign owned ﬁrms and shares per province
according to years of establishment in the Netherlands 
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A high number of  young foreign owned firms are present in provinces Noord-
Holland (30.09%), Zuid-Holland (22.63%) and Noord-Brabant (13.03%);
whereas for older, more established foreign owned firms these regions are also
most popular, respectively 28.61%, 21.64%, and 14.55% of  the old firms located
in these provinces. Younger established foreign owned firms exhibit low presence
in Friesland (1.35%), Drenthe (1.41%), Zeeland (1.60%), and Flevoland (1.89%),
whereas old foreign owned firms similarly show low counts for these provinces
(respectively 1.65%; 1.52%; 1.57%; and 1.34%).
The Chi-square test statistics show a value of  31.82, with eleven degrees of
freedom and a p-value of  0.26 (see table 2.6). This implies that the null-hypothesis
of  identical colocation patterns cannot be rejected. Consequently, the colocation
patterns of  young firms versus old, more established foreign owned companies
do not significantly differ. Thus, empirical results confirm our initial expectation
that both young and older established foreign owned firms exhibit similar
colocation patterns. 
The same result is shown by the two-way factor test of  country of  origin and
age, namely the interaction of  these two firm characteristics shows no
dissimilarity in colocation patterns. The Chi-square value of  36.00 and p-value
of  0.46 reject the possibility of  any dissimilarity in the colocation patterns among
old vs. younger foreign owned firms coming from different countries of  origin.
Furthermore, when analyzing colocation patterns according to interactions of
age and size of  foreign owned firms, the Chi-square value of  36.00 and the p-
value of  0.28 show that we also cannot reject the null-hypothesis. Accordingly,
the colocation patterns of  young vs. old established foreign owned firms given
their size are similar. The same result stands for the interplay between age and
industry of  foreign owned firms; there are no dissimilar colocation patterns
among foreign owned firms taking into consideration the Chi-square value of
40.00 and p-value of  0.50. 
The inter-relationships between multiple firm characteristics and colocation
patterns or agglomeration behavior were analyzed by three way factor Chi-square
tests (see table 2.6).  The Chi square test values show no inter-relationship
between the different firm characteristics to explain differences in colocation
patterns, except for the interaction between firm size, industry and origin (foreign
vs. domestic). The Chi-square value of  22.01 and p-value of  0.00 reveal that in
the trade industry, large foreign owned firms follow the same colocation pattern
as large domestic firms. 
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2.6.    discussion 
Many studies focus on the advantages of  being geographically colocated and on
the development of  geographically concentrated areas within large countries
(Saxenian, 1994; Porter, 1998) especially for firms engaged in innovative activities
(Pouder and St. John, 1996; Klepper and Simons, 2000; Tallman et al., 2004).
However, in small open economies the agglomerative benefits remain unclear
(Malmberg and Maskell, 2002; Pinch et al., 2003). A better understanding of
firms’ location choices, as well as the strategic impact of  these choices, can help
advance theories of  entrepreneurship, agglomeration, industrial development,
and international business (Branderburger & Nalebuff, 1997). In this study we
investigate, in the context of  small open economy the colocation patterns of
foreign owned firms according to various firm characteristics. To commence the
understanding of  these patterns we explored the agglomeration behavior of  the
foreign vs. the domestic firms. Thereafter, we examined the propensity to
colocate among foreign owned firms with different characteristics such as country
of  origin, size, age, and industry. 
Our empirical results show that foreign owned firms exhibit different regional
colocation patterns than domestic firms for the following industries: mining,
construction, transport and communications, services and trade industry. These
findings are consistent with Head et al. (1995), Shearmur & Coffey (2002) and
Hogenbirk (2002). The dissimilar colocation patterns can be explained by the
differences among foreign and domestic firms concerning their technological
and customer base. The existence of  agglomeration economies among foreign
owned firms can be another reason for these different patterns, explicitly foreign
owned firms might be motivated to colocate around foreign agglomerations
(Britton, 2003; Simmie, 1998). Moreover, changes in agglomeration benefits over
time could trigger foreign owned firms to exhibit a different agglomeration
behavior than domestic firms (Head et al., 1995). Overarching, Shaver (1998)
also argues that there might exist agglomeration economies among foreign owned
firms regardless of  where domestic counterparts are located.
Empirical findings also illustrate similar colocation patterns between foreign and
domestic firms operating in the following industries: agriculture, forestry and
fishing, and manufacturing. These findings are in line with Head et al. (1995),
Mariotti and Piscitello (1995), Marshall (1890) and Shaver (1998). A first
justification for the similarity in location behavior relates to knowledge spillovers
between competitors in the same industry which attract them to the same region
(Scott, 1988). When manufacturing costs, taxation and location attractiveness
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differ across regions, foreign owned firms have the tendency to agglomerate
where costs are lower (Waddell et al., 2003). Foreign manufacturing firms might
favor colocations around easy access to imports (Krugman, 1991). However, in
the Netherlands government policy and taxation are very similar across the twelve
Dutch provinces. This explains the similar location tendencies in the regional
distribution of  foreign owned and domestic firms operating in the above
mentioned industries. The effects of  agglomeration economies, respectively pools
of  specialized labor and suppliers, knowledge flows, innovation and spillovers
can lead to both foreign and domestic firms colocating in same areas (Autant-
Bernard, 2000; Audretsch & Feldman, 2004; Chung & Kalnins, 2001; Jaffe et al.,
1993). In the context of  foreign entry, when domestic industry agglomerations
already exist, foreign owned firms are often motivated to colocate around the
same regions where industry is already concentrated (Luo, 1999). In the trade
industry, large foreign owned firms follow the same colocation pattern as large
local firms. Foreign firms within the trade industry are colocated according to
local patterns which concentrate them in the regions with access to gateways to
much bigger markets (Hogenbirk, 2002). 
Foreign owned firms mainly agglomerate in provinces with high concentration
of  production factors, good infrastructure, and the presence of  the main
gateways, Rotterdam Harbor and Amsterdam Schiphol. Particularly, they target
provinces of  Noord-Brabant (20.19%), Zuid-Holland (17.23%), Noord-Holland
(16.12%), and Gelderland (12.53%). The region of  Noord-Brabant is also known
for its technological knowledge and innovation potential, which are essential to
foreign owned firms employing resource-seeking motives as shown by Biermans
and Poort (2007). 
With regard to agglomeration blueprints according to home country our initial
expectation is sustained. Foreign owned firms coming from Belgium and the
ones coming from Germany show dissimilar colocation patterns than firms
coming from other home countries, results consistent with Shaver’s findings
(1998). The main arguments for explaining the differences in colocation decisions
according to nationality are associated with agglomeration economies: linkages,
knowledge, technological spillovers and the access to shared pools of  resources
(Krugman, 1991; Rafii, 1995; Glückler, 2007). We can also argue that the degree
of  externalities is contingent upon the composition of  regional networks
according to nationality.  
In the view of  firms’ age, the colocation patterns of  young foreign owned firms
are similar to the ones exhibited by older, more established firms. Our results 
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are consistent with Shaver and Flyer’s findings (2000) and are sustained by the
fact that agglomeration benefits are mutually attractive for both old and young
foreign owned firms. Young foreign owned firms colocate around the geographic
clusters or concentrations of  older, well established firms, as predicted by other
theorists as well (Stinchcombe, 1965). Location in proximity to dominant firms
offers advantages to all enterprises, but it remains particularly attractive to
younger ones due to resource constraints and liability of  foreignness in the host
economy (Britton, 2003; Luo, 1999). This increases the likelihood of  younger
firms seeking to colocate similarly to older, more established firms, as our results
show and as other theorists also sustain (Aldrich & Auster, 1986; Shaver, 1998;
Shaver & Flyer; 2000). 
2.7.    Conclusions and implications
Our study enhances the existing theoretical body of  agglomeration economies
by investigating the colocation patterns or blueprints from a multi-dimensional
view of  firm characteristics. We examine how the interactions of  firm
characteristics relate to the propensity to locate and how different types of  firms
can exhibit similar or dissimilar colocation blueprints. The evidence is coming
from a small open industrialized country, the Netherlands which is part of  a
larger regional entity, the European Union. Our endeavor highlights that various
firm characteristics or types of  firms derive levels of  network externalities that
vary according to firm boundaries, country of  origin, age, size and industry
affiliation. Empirical results illustrate the importance of  firms’ heterogeneity in
determining colocation decisions with respect to whether the firm should
agglomerate and with whom. We contribute to the premise expansion regarding
agglomeration economies, regional and industry cluster research by identifying
the colocation areas and behavior of  various types of  foreign owned firms in the
small open economy of  the Netherlands. Our results represent the first step in
identifying potential regional clusters within the Netherlands. By further analyzing
formal and informal interdependencies and information transfer across the firms
and institutions within the colocation areas, regional clusters can be identified.
The results obtained also help us understand the likely future direction in regional
cluster development in a small open economy. The economic force created by
agglomeration economies is a prerequisite for the locational development. 
The Netherlands, as well as other small open economies, aims to attract FDI due
to the benefits it yields (McCann & Mudambi, 2004), i.e. economic development,
employment, innovation, and an increase in the overall development of  host-
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countries (Netherlands Foreign Investment Agency, 2009; Hogenbirk, 2002).
Therefore, policy makers are increasingly interested in examining MNEs’ location
choices and agglomeration patterns (Crone, 2000; Erken, Kleijn, &
Lantzendörffer, 2004), where their efforts in attracting foreign investments often
result in high inward flows of  FDI. We suggest that regional policies may have a
different impact on large compared to small and mediums sized firms, which
behave differently across industries. Therefore, FDI promotion policies should
target foreign investors at the level of  industries and firms to meet their specific
locational needs at the activity and cluster level, in light of  a country's development
priorities. A critical element or target approach of  such investment promotion
policies is to increase the attractiveness of  particular locations or regions for
potential investors in specific activities. However, such a targeted approach, known
as the development of  geographic ‘brand names’ is difficult, it takes time and it
also requires fairly sophisticated institutional capacities. 
Provinces that are disfavored by the foreign owned firms should develop policies
to attract more domestic firms for the specific industries where they exhibit similar
colocation patterns with the foreign ones. However, when striving to increase the
level of  FDI in relatively unpopular regions, to achieve and sustain regional
economical growth (Anderson, 1994), we suggest policies focusing the efforts on
firms from particular countries. The colocation templates identified in this study
are potential candidates for creating competitive clusters in different regions. In
addition, a policy which increases the share of  industry density in peripheral
regions will drive the largest and most productive firms to move to the core. Such
model of  ‘sorting of  firms’ may explain why the same policies have a different
impact on regional welfare across different areas (Baldwin & Okubo, 2006). 
A number of  further lines of  research deserve attention in future work. Using
more straightforward and detailed data on both domestic and foreign companies
including entry modes, reason for investment, network participation would
strengthen in insight onto the colocation behavior across different groups of  firms.
An interesting avenue would be to study external factors, such as agglomeration,
labor, infrastructure, and geography, and to examine the causality to colocation
blueprints of  these external factors along with the firm internal characteristics.
Future research could also address dynamics matters by looking at evolving
colocation patterns over time or, further longitudinal research. Additional research
into the development and impact of  agglomeration economies in emerging
industries could also prove interesting for enhancing the literature framework as
well as policy development. Studying the impact of  colocation phenomenon on
learning would also enrich the literature stream. 
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ChApter 3
AdvAnCIng the nonmArket envIronment: A
revIew of the lIterAture
The purpose of  this chapter is to offer an extensive literature overview of  the
theoretical corners stones regarding the nonmarket environment. The aim of
this review is to provide insight into the development of  the nonmarket research
agenda which provided incentives for conducting the current study. Therefore,
we firstly present the main perspectives or streams that constituted the genesis
of  the nonmarket field. Thereafter, we employ these perspectives to characterize
the nonmarket environment along the structural lines of  its components,
institutions, issues, interests, and information and the way foreign owned firms
can manage the nonmarket matters given by these components. 
3.1.    genesis perspectives of the nonmarket ﬁeld
The nonmarket field was addressed by Baron (1995); Boddewyn (2003); Hillman
(2004); Marcus, Kaufman, and Beam (1987); Preston and Post (1975); Yoffie
(1987) and others. Particularly, since the publication of  ‘The Great
Transformation’ (Polanyi, 1957), the concepts of  ‘non-economic’ and
‘nonmarket’ successively started to emerge as referring to the internal and external
factors that assist markets, firms and other types of  institutions and organizations
to function efficiently and effectively as well as repair their failures. The versatility
of  the nonmarket concept encouraged Boddewyn (2003) to perform an extensive
literature research from various fields of  study which provide links to the concept.
He summarizes four main perspectives which provide an adequate overture for
this topic. 
The first perspective of  the nonmarket concept is rooted in neoclassical
economics. According to this perspective, nonmarket forces regulate exchanges
between economic actors outside the market system. Neoclassical economics 
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focused on the determination of  prices, outputs, and income distributions in
markets by means of  supply and demand. According to this perspective market
institutions and firms were hereby separated from nonmarket institutions and
the relationship between firms and markets was explained by either exogenizing
nonmarket factors or by neutralizing their effects altogether (Boddewyn, 2003).
Aling this line, nonmarket factors are exogenous from economic models,
assuming that market games are played in isolation from nonmarket factors.
Analyzed from a transaction cost economics perspective, higher hierarchies (i.e.
institutions) complement or often intervene where market mechanisms fail to
manage transactions within or between organizations (Williamson, 1996). Such
higher hierarchies or institutions entail a given set of  political, social and legal
factors which complement economic exchanges. However, neoclassical
economics still largely ignored other noneconomic exchanges beyond those of
hierarchical functions of  institutions. Thus, this first perspective acknowledged
the existence of  nonmarket effects but considered them as separated and neutral
to the market mechanisms and firms. For this reason, a main line of  criticism of
this perspective is that it is deficient to consider the implications of  political,
social, and legal factors on market mechanisms or economic activity.  
A second perspective on the nonmarket environment is embedded in
organization theory. This stream commenced to regard nonmarket matters as
various factors which do permeate economic exchanges of  individual firms, as
well as intra-organizational and inter-organizational. While the neoclassical
inference (first perspective) considered nonmarket issues separated and neutral
from market matters, organizational theory perspective regards nonmarket
mechanisms as cooperating with market endeavors. This cooperation assumes a
socialized or bounded rationality instead of  the simplicity of  market determined
issues assumed by neo-classics. Organization theory presumes that there are
issues regarding exchanges that cannot be completely foreseen or regulated by
market mechanisms or transaction costs economics which are rationally bounded.
This led to the need for nonmarket exchange mechanisms, around two elements
(Boddewyn, 2003). Firstly, nonmarket exchange mechanisms became necessary
for improving the efficiency of  market exchange mechanisms as these are plagued
by information asymmetry, property rights, bargaining and other problems.
Economists regarded inefficiency caused by these problems as market failure in
the transaction cost economics: market versus hierarchy (institutions) dilemma
(Williamson, 1996). This constituted the crucial moment for nonmarket
appeareance, when the problems of  market exchange mechanisms were
prevented of  resolved by means of  (social) institutions or hierarchies, which allow
many exchanges to take place despite these potential problems. Such nonmarket
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institutions have a regulatory purpose as they provide rules, norms and customs
which allow firms to cope with uncertainty, interdependence or transactions
failure (Barron et al., 1994). Forwarding that nonmarket institutions have the
explicit purpose of  regulating transactions and solving market failures, the
(organization theory) field raised the awareness that social behavior is also
involved in market exchanges under the forms of  trust, commitment and
opportunistic behavior (Williamson, 1996) which influence the behavior of  firms
in economic exchange and networking. For this reason, normative rules are
necessary to limit inefficiencies and injustices caused by bounded rationality and
opportunistic behavior within market exchanges. Hereby nonmarket institutions
or mechanisms with a social purpose (like non-governmental organizations)
started to play a key role as potential remedies in market exchanges failure. Where
market mechanisms (competition, price, contracts) fail, nonmarket matters
(mainly institutions) serve to remedy market failure and to act as a higher
hierarchy (party control) for conflict resolution in market exchanges. This
perspective complements neoclassical economics perspective and it gradually
builds the role or function of  nonmarket matters. However, the main critique of
this perspective is that it neglects to consider social aspects involvement in market
activities or exchanges, and it overlooks the informal and formal aspects of
economic activity or market mechanisms. Another point of  criticism on this
second nonmarket viewpoint is the utilization of  economic and sociological
terms which is far from consistent in the literature related to this perspective,
leading to treacherous analogies (Boddewyn, 2003).   
Apart from the nonmarket mechanisms found in organization theoretical
approaches, political mechanisms complements the field by discussing ‘voice’
mechanisms, referring to politics (Hirschman, 1970). ‘Voice’ entails protest,
opposition and mobilizing public opinion so that an improvement or desired
reform can be achieved (Hirschman, 1970). Through voice organizations can also
force a management change by mobilizing public opinion as an alternative way
to market failure (Boddewyn, 2003). As a result, this perspective heavily relies on
Hirschman (1970) and it adds to the organization theory stream which considers
hierarchies as solving market failures. In this case organizations used ‘voice’
mechanisms to appeal to higher hierarchies or institutions. For political scientists
(e.g. Hirschman, 1970), nonmarket refers to the power-based correctives –
primarily political ‘voice’ – used to improve all organizations when competition
fails to repair market mechanisms. Within any economic, political, social or
cultural system, all individuals and organizations are permanently subject to lapses
from efficient, rational, law-abiding, virtuous or otherwise functional behavior.
Due to these lapses, society’s welfare is affected. Society’s welfare would be 
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optimized only when all organizations (mainly market) compete among
themselves. However, inefficient or ineffective organizations may remain
insensitive to competition because they can tap other resources (organizational
slack, public funding, reciprocity, nationalistic preferences, etc.) to survive market
failure. That is why, if  competition does not lead to the ‘exit’ of  inefficient or
ineffective organizations, then political ‘voice’ (petitioning, mobilizing opinion,
protesting) is needed to change objectionable states of  affairs. Therefore, in this
perspective nonmarket is related to the use of  power - rights to exert influence
over others who deploy the same rights to resist such attempts. Nonmarket ‘voice’
repairs market failure or inefficient market mechanisms and political mechanisms
complement the nonmarket environment as related to power. The coercive use
of  power by political institutions strongly differs from the nonmarket concept
in the previous perspective, where it is regarded as cooperative and normative
mechanisms used by institutions capable of  resolving conflicts (regulatory
institutions) (Hirschman, 1970).
Apart from the nonmarket mechanisms found in political approaches, a
perspective from sociology complements the field as it starts reasoning from
the point of  view of  societies. According to functional sociologists like Parsons
and Smelser (1956), economical factors, normative rules, and voice mechanisms
are not enough for societies to survive. For survival in addition societies need
social integration, social institutions, collective interests and motivating values.
Modern societies chose to separate what came to be labeled ‘economy’ from
other subsystems, and they adopted a ‘market’ way of  running it. Nonmarket
aspects are regarded as often conflicting with interdependent market ones. From
this perspective nonmarket institutions were regarded as generating wealth,
power, solidarity, and social order (Parsons & Smelser, 1956; Edwards & Fowley,
1998). Social institutions were regarded as rules and regulations insuring social
welfare and buffering the society from possible consequences of  market failures. 
Sociologists use the term social institutions to refer to complex social forms that
reproduce themselves such as governments, the family, human languages,
universities, hospitals, business corporations, and legal systems. A typical
definition is that proffered by Jonathan Turner (Turner 1997: 6): “a complex of
positions, roles, norms and values lodged in particular types of  social structures
and organizing relatively stable patterns of  human activity with respect to
fundamental problems in producing life-sustaining resources, in reproducing
individuals, and in sustaining viable societal structures within a given
environment.’ However, Anthony Giddens says ‘Institutions by definition are the
more enduring features of  social life’ (Giddens 1984: 24).  The contemporary
philosopher of  social science, Rom Harre follows the theoretical sociologists in
offering this kind of  definition: ‘An institution was defined as an interlocking
double-structure of  persons-as-role-holders or office-bearers and the like, and
of  social practices involving both expressive and practical aims and outcomes’
(Harre 1979: 98). He gives as examples schools, shops, post offices, police forces,
asylums and the British monarchy. Due to the variety that can be considered in
this category, social institutions also need to be distinguished from more complex
and more complete social entities, such as societies or cultures, of  which any
given institution is typically a constitutive element. A society, for example, is more
complete than an institution since a society - at least as traditionally understood
- is more or less self-sufficient in terms of  human resources, whereas an
institution is not. As most comprehensive and accurate manner, the current thesis
regards social institutions as ‘establishments of  relative permanence of  a distinctly
social sort’ characterized by essential elements as: a set of  mores or rules
(consistency) fulfilled by peoples acting collectively, in established complementary
capacities or offices (concert) (Hughes, 1939: 297). The main social institutions
considered in this thesis are organizations such as interest groups and the media
(Scott 2001). 
In summary, for political economists (Baron, 1995; Kindleberger, 1970), social-
systems theorists (Parsons & Smelser, 1956) and some political scientists
(Hirschman, 1970), society is made up of  subsystems – economic, political, social
and cultural – each one having its own set of  institutions. The economic
subsystem is mainly enacted through market institutions and organizations
(firms). In this context, nonmarket refers to exogenous non-economic
subsystems, institutions and organizations – political, social and cultural – and
to their distinct functions, issues and interactions with market ones. The above
perspectives present the nonmarket concept from different stances and
simultaneously complement each other by gradually building the complexity of
aspects involved by this concept. Based on these four perspectives, Boddewyn
(2003, p. 299) also proposed the following general definition: ‘Nonmarket refers
to internal and external organizing and correcting factors that provide order to
market and other types of  institutions and organizations so that they may
function efficiently and effectively as well as repair their failures.’ We will use this
definition for the following chapters of  the dissertation. 
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3.2.    the nonmarket environment: expanding institutions,
issues, interests, and information
After discussing the four generic perspectives of  the nonmarket field, we would
like to elaborate on the components of  the nonmarket environment. We make use
as starting point Baron’s (1995) framework because it offers a rich way of  analyzing
the nonmarket environment as he characterizes this environment in terms of
institutions, issues, interests, and information. In the following sections we will use
Baron’s (1995) classification into the four I’s to describe and clarifie what
institutions, issues, interests, and information entail and how they interrelate on the
nonmarket environment. Our purpose is to thoroughly explain and clarify the
components of  the nonmarket environment as well as how firms can manage this
environment. It is important to give a contour to the components of  the nonmarket
environment before we tap into ways to manage these components. Firstly, it has
to be clear what firms need to manage before we discuss how to manage. 
3.2.1. Institutions
Institutions represent specific designed constraints that structure political,
economic, and social interactions and exchanges. Such constraints may be both
informal – sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of  conduct, and formal
– constitutions, laws, property rights (North, 1991). While the market institutions
are well defined by literature, the nonmarket institutions remain ambiguous. The
nonmarket institutions comprise of  social, political, and legal arrangements which
structure the firms’ interactions outside of, and, in conjunction with markets (Baron,
1995). Together with market mechanisms, nonmarket constraints create order and
reduce uncertainty in exchanges. The apprehensions of  nonmarket institutions
complement the market arrangements but they are additionally concerned with
collective interests and core values that go beyond pure market objectives. These
institutions outline the “rules of  the game” that determine the economic and non-
economic behavior of  firms (Polanyi, 1957). Nonmarket institutions connect
market and nonmarket exchanges and help shape the direction of  economic
exchanges. Organization theory argued that since market exchange mechanisms
are plagued by information asymmetry, property rights, bargaining, bounded
rationality and other problems, nonmarket institutions with a regulatory purpose
(rules, norms and customs) will allow firms to cope with uncertainty and
interdependence (Barron et al., 1994). These institutions regulate and solve market
failures and outline the rules of  the game through various rules and regulations
(Williamson, 1996). 
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Depending on the kind of  issues they tackle, various institutions emerged:
regulatory/ legal institutions (based on neoclassical economics and organization
theory perspectives), political institutions (based on perspective political
mechanisms), and social institutions (based on sociological perspective).
Regulatory institutions are public establishments exercising autonomous authority
over specific areas of  activity with a regulatory or supervisory capacity (Scott,
1995). They cover areas of  administrative law, regulation and rulemaking
(codifying and enforcing rules and regulations and imposing supervision or
oversight). Under the category of  regulatory institutions we find the main types:
national regulatory institutions/ agencies, supranational regulators, and standards
agencies. 
Furthermore, political institutions were built up formerly in the 1960s and they
dared the economic literature through the truism that government institutions
adopt and implement public policies for the public interest (Stigler, 1971). Political
institutions are portrayed by imperfect information, subjective models and high
transaction costs. The firms interacting with political institutions have an
imperfect grasp or knowledge of  the issues affecting them (North, 1990). Firms
can interact with political institutions, face the political arena and even influence
the policy makers’ decisions through nonmarket strategies (Buchanan & Tullock,
1962).The inference is that through nonmarket strategies implemented to manage
interactions with political institutions, firms can influence the policy makers’
decisions.  
However, sociological perspective outlined other types of  nonmarket institutions
necessary for providing social order, namely social institutions that generate
wealth, power, solidarity and respect (Parsons & Smelser, 1956; Edwards &
Fowley, 1998). Accordingly, the main social institutions regard interest groups,
non-governmental organizations and the media. Organized interest groups and
the media can influence firms and manipulate politicians’ policies in order to
maximize their electoral prospects through financial or information resources,
which can, thus, influence electoral outcomes (Aranson, 1990). 
Firms get involved with these institutions when they can significantly affect their
business (Masters & Keim, 1985). Just as in the economic market where industry
attractiveness is fundamental for justifying the entry of  firms into various
markets, firms will engage with nonmarket institutions when nonmarket issues
will affect their activities (Porter, 1980). The various nonmarket issues bridging
the relationship between nonmarket institutions and firms are developed in the
next section.
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3.2.2. Issues 
The issues specific to the nonmarket environment are the matters targeted or
amended by the nonmarket institutions and firms (Baron, 1995). Nonmarket
issues greatly differ from the market issues as they have a collective concern and
regard various societal sub-systems (Parsons & Smelser, 1956). Nonmarket issues
represent a controversial inconsistency based on one or more expectational gaps
involving management perceptions of  changing legitimacy and changing
positions among stakeholders that occur within and between views of  what is
and/or what ought to be firm’s performance. Issues imply an actual or anticipated
resolution that creates significant, identifiable present or future impact on the
organization (Wartick & Mahon, 1994). Thus, without a present or future possible
impact on the organization, there is no issue. Both companies and institutions
can identify, evaluate, and respond to nonmarket issues, namely social, political,
and legal issues which may impact significantly their functioning (Wartick &
Mahon, 1994). Nonmarket issues can challenge the legitimacy of  both firms and
institutions on the nonmarket environment, by creating a gap between the
activities of  firms and societal or institutional expectations caused by business
actions or changing expectations (Sethi, 1979). Nonmarket issues arise from what
is and what ought to be the liaison between business activities and institutional
or societal perceptions (Wartick & Mahon, 1994). 
To better understand the concept of  nonmarket issues we further explain the
issue life cycle. Following Post (1978) we describe a four stage issues life cycle.
Nonmarket issues initially arise when ‘a gap develops between the actual
performance of  a corporation and public expectations about what performance
should be’ (Post, 1978, p. 23). This first stage regards the public or more
concerned interest groups who first become aware of  a problem with the firm’s
performance and then develop the expectation that the performance should
change (gap). The second stage, political controversy, commences when the
expectations become politicized. The interest groups attempt to generate political
interest in the issue. The next two stages, legislative and litigation steps, mark the
movement of  an issue into the regulatory arena for promulgation and
implementation of  regulation. A similar model is presented by Buchholz (1988);
accordingly, issues move from public opinion formation to public policy
implementation. Depending on the life cycle organizations can lose considerable
decision making discretion if  the issue becomes politicized and legislation is
crafted and enforced. Responding to an issue according to its life cycle (further
relates to the issue saliency) is vital for the success of  organizations in resolving
that issue. 
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Saliency is the importance of  a certain issue to a broad segment of  involved
parties whose opinions are coalescing around one or two policy options (Bonardi,
& Keim, 2005). Scholars have identified the saliency of  a certain issue on which
the firm is trying to compete as a key determinant of  the corporate political
strategy success (Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Keim & Zeithaml, 1986; Yoffie, 1987).
We argue that saliency is not only a key determinant for the success of  political
strategies but for the success of  nonmarket strategies also. Saliency is mainly
explained by the interactions between its creators: information cascades and
reputation cascades. Information cascades happen when individuals (followers)
choose to follow others in their behavior after having observed their actions and
ignore the personal information which they possess because they believe that the
others are more knowledgeable. This process is also known as ‘rational ignorance’
(Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, & Welch, 1992). Reputation cascades relate to
individuals who view themselves as specialists on a subject, such as reporters and
experts (Kuran, 1989). Information and reputation cascades offer explanations
on how theses different groups of  individuals can create widely salient issues in
the nonmarket arena. In the case of  reputation cascades actors do not decide to
adopt a certain attitude or decision based on others out of  ignorance, but as a
way to maintain a certain status, to improve their reputation and avoid disproval
(Bonardi & Keim, 2005). When firms choose to follow up on reputation cascades
on their nonmarket approach they should consider: the benefits prone to be
obtained, the punishments (losses) associated with a chosen preference and the
place of  keeping a truthful self-expression within firm’s identity (adapted from
Kuran, 1989). 
Furthermore, regarding the issue life cycle the element of  uncertainty also plays
an important role in the nonmarket issue development. Uncertainty refers to the
unpredictability of  environmental variables which impact corporate strategy and
performance (Miles & Snow, 1978; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) or the inadequacy
of  information about these variables (Duncan, 1978). The emphasis in the
literature falls on particular uncertainties rather than on the treatment of
uncertainty (Miller, 1991). We put forward that nonmarket issues regard various
uncertainties of  the nonmarket environment as related to political uncertainty,
government policy uncertainty, regulatory uncertainty, and social uncertainty.
Political uncertainty entails the rate of  major changes in political regimes and it
mirrors the threats and opportunities associated with potential and actual changes
in the political arena (Ting, 1988). Policy uncertainty entails the instability in
government policies that have an impact on business communities (Ting, 1988).
Some authors view political and governmental policy uncertainty together as
political risk which encompasses both types of  uncertainty (Bunn & Mustafaoglu, 
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1978; Brewer, 1983; Kobrin, 1982). Regulatory uncertainty is given by the pace of
changes of  the regulatory game, the consistency and overall integration with other
societal sub-systems of  the regulatory game (Keim & Baysinger, 1988). Social
uncertainty regards the instability of  the welfare system and the extent to which
nonmarket institutions set up the rules of  the game bridging organizations and
social welfare issues (Ades & DiTella, 1999; Congleton; 1984; Bigelow et al., 1993).
With the potential of  affecting the life cycle of  nonmarket issue we also find the
abuse of  power from both institutional and organizational perspectives which can
be discussed through two main dimensions: pervasiveness and arbitrariness
(Rosenzweig & Singh, 1991). These two key dimensions are independent and they
confine different facets characteristic to the abuse of  power. Pervasiveness is
defined as the average firm’s likelihood of  encountering abuse of  power in its
normal interactions (Bardhan, 1997; Tanzi, 1998; Treisman, 2000). Pervasiveness
relates to the expected degree to which abuse of  power is a regular and significant
part of  economic and non-economic activity (Rogriguez, Uhlenbruck, & Eden,
2005). It affects organizations because it creates opportunities of  internalizing
environmental threats through absorption (Ring et al., 1990) or of  purchasing
facilitating services and favorable regulatory decisions (Boddewyn & Brewer,
1994). Both firms and institutions can make abuse of  their power. According to
organization theory firms can abuse their market power and form various cartels,
trusts, and associations which harms or have implications for both social welfare
and the activities of  other firms. Furthermore, firms are also affected by the abuse
of  power of  other firms in the form of  cartels/ trusts due to contrived deterrence
or artificial/ unnatural entry barriers (Scherer, 1980).
Arbitrariness, another facet regarding the abuse of  power, is defined as the
inherent degree of  ambiguity associated with corrupt transactions in a given nation
or state (Rogriguez, Uhlenbruck, & Eden, 2005). In simple words, arbitrariness
relates to the various degrees of  uncertainty faced by organizations and associated
with abuse of  power. Arbitrariness makes formal and informal rules and
regulations subject to whimsical and varied interpretation (Ahlstrom & Bruton,
2001) and overlapping and feeble jurisdictions lead to ineffectual bribes
(Oldenburg, 1987). Institutional theory focuses on contextual factors and
nonmarket pressures that influence strategic decisions (Davis et al., 2000;
Haveman, 1993; Oliver, 1991). Firms strive for legitimacy by complying with their
institutional context and this legitimacy is influenced by abuse of  power’s effects
on institutions (Glynn & Abzug, 2002). The abuse of  power (caused by either
firms or institutions) is of  nonmarket origins but it can affect firm’s market
transactions. 
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The impact that nonmarket issues may have on the organization business
activities depends to a great extend on the company’s interests on the nonmarket
environment (Wartick & Mahon, 1994). The following section discusses such
overarching interests. 
3.2.3. Interests
In order to explain the common and overarching interests characterizing the
nonmarket environment we need to firstly refer to two main groups of  interests:
interest of  institutions and interests of  firms.  The interests of  the nonmarket
institutions encompass designing, implementing and overseeing the compliance
to various rules and regulations which have collective views and regard for a
common welfare and broader societal interests. These interests are concerned
with core values and go beyond pure market objectives (Baron, 1995). The
collective interests of  nonmarket institutions are often conflicting or they diverge
from the interests of  firms; while the collective interests of  nonmarket
institutions refer to shared values and welfare, the interests of  firms are more
performance oriented. From the perspective of  firms such collective societal
interests often bring additional costs or efforts which organizations would not
otherwise willingly make (Baron, 1995). 
We regard overall nonmarket interests as arising from political, social and cultural
factors (including moral/ ethical) as necessary complements to economic
interests. They help attain societal and organizational effectiveness. Effectiveness
is a complex notion defined in terms of  a conjunction of  interests between a
specific organization and those external ones affected by it, with joined (common)
interests being related to worthy ends and appropriate means (Scott, 1995; Pfeffer
& Salancik, 1978). For sociologists, interests arise from endogenized social,
political and cultural factors that permeate economic exchanges and that are often
necessary to achieve individual, organizational and interorganizational
effectiveness which would not be possible when economic action would be
under-socialized (Granovetter, 1985, 1992). This entails that economic exchanges
are not purely dyadic, rational, self-interested and impersonal because cooperation
is common among exchanging parties which (as they conform to rules, norms
and customs) thereby developing a socialized rationality on account of  the social
embeddedness of  economic action. We take this argument a step further and we
consider that the overall nonmarket interests overarching, characteristic and
common to both institutions and firms to be the social embeddedness of
economic actions. This can be regarded as an overall interest specific to both 
© C.L. Voinea 2011 69
Advancing the nonmarket environment: a review of  the literature CHAPTER 3
© C.L. Voinea 2011
institutions but also firms on the nonmarket environment. Firms have the
nonmarket obligation to consider the appropriateness of  their economic actions
and institutions have the main interest to assure through their rules and
regulations that firms and organizations embed various social interests in their
actions. Depending on their interests or stake in a nonmarket issues, both
organizations and institutions may use information to achieve their goal/interest.
The following section further discusses the information exchanges which
characterizes the nonmarket environment.
3.2.4.    Information
Both nonmarket institutions and organizations can use information to achieve
their goals or interest and through information they can affect the saliency of
the issue depending on its life cycle as information forms the basis for
informational or reputational cascades. An information (or informational)
cascade occurs when individuals or organizations observe the actions of  others
and then make the same choices, independently of  their own private information
signals. Nevertheless, information cascades can sometimes lead to arbitrary or
even erroneous decisions (Bikhchandani et al., 1992). When information is limited
or costly to obtain, the organization will chose to be followers based on
reputation cascades and imitate the actions of  the experts. This organizational
behavior is dependent on the information available to achieve their interest issues.
However, also institutions need to obtain information about and from the
affected parties involved, to assess this information and to reach a decision based
on the evidence presented. They must also publicly provide information about
their decision, rationale and proposed policy changes (McCubbins et al., 1987,
1989). Accessing the information needed in the judging process creates a resource
dependency relationship between these institutions and the firms they regulate
(Pfeffer, 1992; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). For this reason nonmarket institutions
depend on the firms and other interested parties to acquire information needed
during regulatory hearings (Mueller, 2003). If  the information on which the
agency bases its ruling is not substantial, then the regulator runs the risk to have
its rulings rejected or overturned by the courts. Subsequently, this will generate
in a major loss of  legitimacy for the agency. This loss of  legitimacy is closely
related to the abuse of  public power for private (Rodriguez et al., 2005).
Institutional theory generally assumes that government and institutions maximize
the public interest and, consequently, they fail to deem the effects of  abuse of
public power on firms (Dunning, 1993; Lenway & Murtha, 1994; Zahra, Ireland,
Gutierrez, & Hitt, 2000). 
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However, the information exchange between firms and institutions is not always
transparent or complete. Due to the information exchanges on the nonmarket
environment between the two parties, institutions on the one hand, and firms on
the other hand, issues of  insufficient transparency characterizes the information
dependency relationships between the two. Information and interests relate firms
to institutions by means of  the issues tackled by various types of  institutions.
Depending on the firms’ interests in a specific issues they enter in an information
exchange with various institutions. Furthermore, institutions tackle various
interest issues for organizations, promulgating and implementing regulations
regarding these issues. Institutions can also further influence information
exchange on specific issues of  the nonmarket context. 
Social institutions especially the media and interest groups can influence
information exchanges and issues life cycle on the nonmarket arena.
In practice asymmetries of  information characterize the nonmarket framework
as well as the institutions and firms interacting on this environment and further
explain the relationship between firms and nonmarket institutions (Keim &
Zeithaml, 1986; Lewis & Sappington, 1991). Imperfect transparency between the
nonmarket institutions and firms imply that informational asymmetries or
incomplete transparency creates a knowledge gap concerning the policy outcomes
and implications for their operations (Holburn & van den Bergh, 2004). 
3.3.    host nonmarket environment
Due to various nonmarket components, issues and interests, the complexity of
nonmarket environment is further elevated by institutional antecedents and
differences between countries with regard to their political system, legal system,
and social system. Nonmarket issues, institutions, and interests vary across
countries and some nonmarket issues can be less salient in one country, while
public opinion can regard them as more emerging and salient in another host
setting. The institutional systems also fluctuate across countries; in regionally
integrated states there are different institutional systems governing transactions
than in countries which are not members of  supranational entities. Regional
integration refers to the formal transfer of  legal authority and decision-making
power from member states to a supranational institution or international body.
In this context Moravcsik (1991) distinguishes between pooled sovereignty, when
governments agree to make future decisions by voting procedures other than
unanimity; and delegated sovereignty, when supranational actors are given the
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authority to take certain types of  decisions without either a vote amongst affected
governments or the capacity of  states to veto the decision. Although often used
loosely to describe any set of  supranational institutions (institutions above the
state), the term ‘supranational’ refers more properly to a particular characteristic
of  international institutions and international legal authority. This phenomenon
has lead to an increasingly complex set of  institutions and integration processes.
In any region supranational institutions can be seen as part of  a complex system
of  multi-level governance. Regional integration represents a set of  norms,
instruments and institutional arrangements which can be used selectively and in
combination with other approaches. Except in the case of  outright political
unification, it is most unlikely that all spheres of  activity will be covered by some
kind of  supranational arrangement. There are likely to be different combinations
of  supranational and intergovernmental elements in different issue areas,
according to the degree of  sensitivity, the likelihood of  opportunism, and the
need for uniformity in each case.
Furthermore, even within the same type of  institutional settings (regionally
integrated or not), some types of  institutions have more power or exposure
depending on the host country (and independent of  the integration level). Social
institutions are also regarded differently depending on the host setting; in some
countries the media and interest groups have more impact and saliency power
on the public opinion and, implicitly, on business activities than in other countries.
In other host settings social institutions such as the media can maximize the
welfare of  consumers (depending on the extent of  government ownership).
However, the public choice theory holds that a government-owned media outlet
would distort and manipulate information. In other countries, private and
independent media supply alternative views to the public society. Moreover,
competition among media firms assures that voters, consumers, and investors
obtain, on average, unbiased and accurate information (Djankov et al., 2003). 
Therefore information exchanges and nonmarket issues can also vary across
countries. Some host contexts are more prone to social interests or to transparent
information exchanges, while in other host settings more intransparent
information exchange is allowed and characterizes transactions. The multitude
of  differences between the host and the home nonmarket environment amplify
the complexity and goals of  nonmarket strategies (Beck et al., 2001; Hillman,
2003; Hymer, 1976; Zaheer, 2002; Miller & Richards, 2002) and can even cause
foreign firms to under-perform domestic firms due to a wide range of
unfamiliarity costs vis-à-vis economic, social, legal, political and cultural host
institutions and issues (Hennart, 1982; Buckley & Casson, 1976). 
72
Advancing the nonmarket environment: a review of  the literatureCHAPTER 3
3.4.    firms’ actions in the nonmarket environment
While in the previous section we discussed the various components of  the
nonmarket environment, the purpose of  this section is to explain how firms can
manage this environment. We advance that nonmarket strategies entail the
management of  nonmarket issues, the treatment of  uncertainties or influences
from the nonmarket environment, and the achievement of  nonmarket interests
which balance market onjectives. Nonmarket strategies are complementary
strategies to encounter complex influences outside the market spam, to manage
the threats and opportunities from the nonmarket environment and to attain
nonmarket interests that complement market activities (Baron, 1995; Bonardi,
Holburn & Van den Berg, 2004; Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Prakash, 2002). These
nonmarket strategies entail actions carried out in public arenas to manage
nonmarket issues from various institutions and between these institutions and
the firms’ activities (Wartick & Mahon, 1994). Nonmarket actions entail
proceedings employed in public arenas to manage issues related to a wide array
of  institutions, national or supranational, amongst which interest groups, political
institutions, the media, regulatory institutions, standards agencies, which all
constitute the nonmarket framework (North, 1990; Scott, 1995).  Nonmarket
strategies imply an actual or anticipated resolution that creates significant,
identifiably impact on the organization (Wartick & Mahon, 1994). 
Nonmarket strategies fill in the gap between business activities and societal
expectations, between what is and what ought to be ‘social embeddedness of
economic activities’ (Granovetter, 1985; Wartick & Mahon, 1994). Nonmarket
strategies complement market activities but are additionally concerned with
collective interests and core values that go beyond pure market objectives (Baron,
1995). 
Generally nonmarket strategies also serve to monitor public interests in the
institutional environment. To better comprehend the diversity of  forms and types
of  nonmarket actions that foreign owned firms have at their disposal, we employ
a rather widespread description, namely transactional actions and relational
actions (Hillman & Hitt, 1999). Transactional actions involve nonmarket practices
or proceedings which are issue-specific and of  non-repeated nature (Uzzi, 1997).
These actions include reactive deeds or short-term interactions characterized by
arm’s-length-ties and ad-hoc basis (Mahon et al., 2004). Issue-by-issue interactions
leading to self-interest motivated conduct without network building purposes
also characterize this type of  nonmarket actions (Uzzi, 1997). Collective interests
and stakeholder management are not the focus of  transactional actions. Relational 
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actions however, aim to maximize the alignments of  the organizations with
collective interests of  stakeholders. Relational actions include more proactive
practices which serve to minimize surprises and exercise control over institutional
processes (Mahon et al., 2004). This repertoire includes long-term actions and
cooperative processes meant to build relations with various stakeholders (Hillman
& Hitt, 1999). For these nonmarket interactions, the structures and processes of
the relation are of  key importance. This array also includes actions targeted at
development of  social capital and network of  relationships (Nahapiet & Ghoshal,
1998). Information transfer and joint problem-solving arrangements are
important here (Uzzi, 1997). Relational actions can decrease the probability of
opportunistic behaviour or reduce the costs of  monitoring processes (transaction
costs). Also transactional actions are often used by foreign firms to fine-tune or
complement other relational actions. 
Furthermore, firms may adopt and implement actions in the nonmarket arena
individually or collectively. Individual actions entail solitary efforts made by
individual companies outside of  relationships network to affect various
nonmarket interest issues. Collective action however denotes the collaboration
and cooperation of  two or more firms in the nonmarket endeavor (Hillman and
Hitt, 1999). 
Nonmarket strategies can also be either long term oriented and create a certain
in-depth base within the host setting meant to avoid or decrease nonmarket
influences on their activities. They involve a significant commitment of
organizational resources and they are intricate to implement and reverse (Chen,
1996). Such nonmarket strategies entail a careful consideration of  specific
characteristics of  the host nonmarket environment such as diversity and power
institutions, its pluralistic issues, transparency and its most influential means
(Miller & Wanta, 1996). However, firms can also develop short term nonmarket
endeavors mainly based on event-specificity and temporary actions. They are
handy tools for firms to quickly manage the contingencies from the nonmarket
environment without attempting a fit between the organizational strategy and
structure to these contingencies (Donaldson, 1996). 
3.5.    Conclusions
In this chapter we have discussed the main perspectives which contributed to the
development of  the nonmarket concept and employed insights from these
perspectives to further deepen our understanding of  the components of  
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nonmarket environment. As nonmarket constituents we explained the various
nonmarket institutions, issues, interest, and information playing a role on the
nonmarket environment. This discussion serves as a bridge or platform for the
following chapter which empirically explores the nonmarket pressures resulting
from this environment and the way these firms can manage such pressure
through nonmarket strategies. To date the few studies on nonmarket strategies
merely enumerate an inventory of  different actions to be used in diverse
situations. Scholars emphasize the need to understand the dynamics and
determinants behind nonmarket strategies or nonmarket behavior (Bonardi &
Keim, 2005; Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994; Getz, 1997; Hillman & Hitt, 1999;
Hillman, 2003).
Due to these elements host environments become more complex for the firms
operating in a host setting. Therefore, we further focus our inquiry on foreign
owned firms and the way they can respond to influences from nonmarket
environment.  The nonmarket institutions, issues, interests, and information
aspects elaborated in this chapter will be further employed in the next chapter to
explore the nonmarket institutional pressures in relation to the nonmarket actions
of  foreign owned firms. 
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2
ChApter 4
nonmArket InstItutIonAl pressures And
the frequenCy of nonmArket ACtIons
2
This chapter explores the relation and sources of  variation in the strength of
institutional pressures and nonmarket actions.  Based on institutional,
international business and corporate political strategy literature, we explore
institutional factors explaining pressures from six types of  institutions: national
regulators, political institutions, standards agencies, interest groups, the media
supranational regulators, on the frequency of  nonmarket actions undertaken by
foreign owned firms to deal with these pressures in an open regionally integrated
economy. Evidence is provided by a survey sample of  160 foreign owned firms
operating in the Netherlands. Results show that four types of  institutions have
the highest explanatory value for an increase in frequency of  nonmarket actions
are national regulators, standards agencies, interest groups, and the media along
with the specific institutional factors elucidating these effects. Empirical outcome
also indicates a strong dependency of  national level institutions on the
supranational echelon. This study further contributes to the discussion of
plausible explanations for why firms adopt nonmarket actions.
4.1.    Introduction
Institutional theory has widely debated the underlying influence of  institutional
pressures to organizational actions (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan,
1977; Meyer & Scott, 1983). Within this stream research focus has fallen on the 
relationship between market (economic) institutions and organizational actions
or responses. However, the institutional spectrum goes beyond market institutions
and it also includes nonmarket establishments, namely specialized political, social,
and regulatory institutions with supervisory, regulatory, and governing purpose
which provide societies with wealth, coercion, integration, inclusion, and
cooperation (Parsons & Smelser, 1956). 
Such social, political, and legal arrangements structure organizations’ interactions
outside of, and, in conjunction with markets (Baron, 1995). Nonmarket
institutions are indispensable because market institutions are often fraught with
natural failures (e.g. uncertainty, opportunism, monopolistic situations) as well as
with artificial/ structural imperfections (e.g. business collusion and government
intervention) (Scott, 1995: 356; see also Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978: 34; Bell, 1995:
607; Hirschman, 1970). Together with market institutions, nonmarket
arrangements create order and reduce uncertainty in exchanges; they outline the
rules of  the game that determine the economic and non-economic behavior of
organizations (Polanyi, 1957). Both market and nonmarket institutions relate to
organizational actions through what is often regarded as conflicting demands and
factors. Whereas market institutions have fairly economic intents, nonmarket
institutions entail social, political, and legal arrangements that complement market
provisions but are additionally concerned with collective interests and core values
that go beyond pure market objectives (Baron, 1995). While the market types are
well elaborated by literature, the nonmarket institutions and pressures remain
ambiguous (Dean & Brown, 1995). Despite widespread managerial and academic
acceptance that nonmarket components represent an important and complex
branch of  the business environment, the nonmarket literature remains somehow
vague regarding the extent of  nonmarket institutional pressures and the
organizational actions or responses to these pressures. Such institutions can cause
numerous implications that are not related to the market arena but do influence
firm’s market performance (Boddewyn, 2003). While nonmarket institutions have
supervisory and regulatory capacity to remedy market failures, it remains unclear
whether such institutions (through rules and regulations of  governing purpose)
increase the organizational responses or whether, due to the various functions
that they fulfill, nonmarket actions are less needed. Therefore, the purpose of  this
study is to fill in the literature gap regarding the relationship between nonmarket
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institutional pressures and organizational actions or responses to these pressures.
Due to various nonmarket components, issues and interests, the complexity of
nonmarket environment is further elevated by institutional antecedents and
differences between countries with regard to their political system, legal system,
and social system. Nonmarket issues, institutions, and interests vary across
countries and the multitude of  differences (political, cultural, social, and
economic) between countries amplify the complexity of  institutional pressures
and goals of  nonmarket actions (Beck et al., 2001; Hillman, 2003; Hymer,
1976).Moreover, in regionally integrated countries there is a different institutional
set governing transactions than in countries which are not members of
supranational entities. Supranational institutions can be seen as part of  a complex
system of  multi-level governance. Regional integration represents a set of  norms,
instruments and institutional arrangements which can be used selectively and in
combination with other approaches. All spheres of  activity within the integrated
region will be covered by various types of  supranational arrangements. As a
consequence, there are different combinations of  supranational and
intergovernmental elements in different issue areas, according to the degree of
sensitivity, the likelihood of  opportunism, and the need for uniformity. Therefore,
effects and implications of  such supranational and national interplay should be
also considered when studying nonmarket institutional pressures. Therefore, we
conduct our study of  nonmarket institutional pressures and nonmarket
organizational actions among foreign owned firms operating in a host economy
member of  a supranational entity in which we can also explore the pressures of
various levels of  institutions including supranational ones. A suitable research
setting for this study is the Netherlands, a small industrialized country with an
open and integrated economy member of  European Union (EU). It represents
the fifth largest recipient of  foreign investment in the world and, due to its
favorable location and active role within the EU many multinational enterprises
(MNEs) have chosen this host country as strategic orientation. Moreover, in the
case of  the Netherlands, the membership to EU counteracts the adverse scale
effects of  small size by extending the domestic market (Armstrong & Read,
1998). 
Data on the foreign owned firms were obtained through a questionnaire survey.
Results show a positive relationship between four types of  institutional pressures
from national regulators, standards agencies, interest groups, the media and the
frequency of  nonmarket actions of  foreign owned firms. Empirical outcome also
indicates a strong dependency of  national level institutions on the supranational
echelon. 
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The structure of  this study is as follows. In section 2 we offer a more
comprehensive and structured view of  the wide spectrum of  nonmarket actions.
Section 3 explores the nonmarket institutional pressures and their influence to
nonmarket actions along with the proposed hypothesis. Section 4 presents the
sample, method, and data along with structural equations model. Section 5
presents the analysis and empirical results, followed by a discussion of  the results
in section 6. The final section discusses the contribution of  our work and
implications for practice.
4.2.   nonmarket actions
Nonmarket actions entail proceedings employed in public arenas (Baron, 1995;
Schaffer & Hillman, 2000) to manage issues related to a wide array of  institutions,
national or supranational, amongst which interest groups, political institutions,
the media, regulatory institutions, standards agencies, which all constitute the
nonmarket framework (North, 1990; Scott, 1995). Nonmarket actions
complement market activities but are additionally concerned with collective
interests and core values that go beyond pure market objectives (Baron, 1995).
Generally such types of  actions also serve to monitor public interests in the
institutional environment. To better comprehend the diversity of  forms and types
of  nonmarket actions that foreign owned firms have at their disposal, we employ
a rather widespread description, namely transactional actions and relational
actions (Hillman & Hitt, 1999). Transactional actions involve nonmarket practices
or proceedings which are issue-specific and of  non-repeated nature (Uzzi, 1997).
They represent reactive deeds and short-term interactions characterized by arm’s-
length ties and ad-hoc basis (Mahon et al., 2004). Issue-by-issue interactions
leading to self-interest motivated conduct without network building purposes
also characterize this transactional type of  nonmarket actions (Uzzi, 1997;
Kaufmann, 1998). Furthermore, transactional nonmarket activities include issue-
lobbying, temporary grassroots mobilization of  employees, suppliers, or
customers, advocacy advertising, contracting media experts and press
conferences. Collective interests and stakeholder management are not the focus
of  transactional actions. The resources and actors for such actions are
immobilized provisionally to deal with a certain event or target (Hillman & Hitt,
1999). Accordingly, firms identify, educate and motivate action groups or
stakeholders who may be affected by same temporary issues or policies that also
affect the firm itself  (Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Keim & Zeithaml, 1986). 
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Relational actions however, aim to maximize the alignment of  the organization
with collective interests of  stakeholders by using more proactive practices which
also serve to minimize surprises and exercise control over institutional processes
(Mahon et al., 2004). This relational repertoire includes long-term actions and
cooperative processes meant to interact and to build relations with various
stakeholders (Hillman & Hitt, 1999). For these nonmarket interactions, the
structures and processes are of  key importance including actions targeted at
developing social capital and network of  relationships (Nahapiet & Ghoshal,
1998). Thus, transactional actions are aimed at building relations between actors,
issues, contacts and stakeholders in the host environment, where firms are able
to create a certain reputation to avoid becoming targeted by nonmarket actors
(media, interest groups) (Baron & Diermeier, 2007). Relational actions maximize
associations with other host actors; they insure trust, information transfer and
joint problem-solving arrangements (Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Keim & Baysinger,
1988; Keim & Zeithaml, 1986). Inter-organizational collaboration has been linked
to a range of  important outcomes such as sharing critical resources and
facilitating knowledge transfer. The literature also argues that collaboration not
only transfers existing knowledge among organizations, but also facilitates the
creation of  new knowledge and produce synergistic solutions (Hardy et al., 2003).
Relational actions can decrease the probability of  opportunistic behavior or they
can reduce the costs of  monitoring processes (transaction costs). Transactional
actions are often used by firms to fine-tune or complement relational actions.
Relational and transactional nonmarket actions can be concurrently implemented,
thus, firms can make intertwined use of  these actions (Chen, 1996). These two
groups of  nonmarket actions provide a more comprehensive and structured view
on the concept and on the collection of  nonmarket actions. Therefore, the
following sections discuss how different nonmarket institutions can relate to these
actions.
4.3.    nonmarket institutions and nonmarket actions 
Economic matters are no longer sufficient for understanding the complex
institutional influences and their implications for the organizational actions of
foreign owned firms in the host environment. We need to expand the traditional
market framework and further consider non-economic mechanisms and
institutions. Organization theory argues that since market exchange mechanisms
are plagued by information asymmetry, property rights, bargaining and other
problems, nonmarket institutions with a regulatory purpose (rules, norms and 
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customs) will allow firms to cope with uncertainty and interdependence issues
(Barron et al., 1994). Thus, these institutions regulate and solve market failures and
outline the rules of  the game through various rules, regulations, norms, and customs
(Williamson, 1996). Nonmarket institutions are necessary because market
institutions are often fraught with natural failures (e.g. resource rareness,
uncertainty, opportunism, monopolistic situations) as well as with artificial/
structural imperfections (e.g. business collusions, government interventions) (Scott,
1995: 356; see also Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978: 34; Bell, 1995: 607; Hirschman, 1970).
Under the spectrum of  nonmarket institutions, in addition to regulatory types,
Edwards and Fowley (1998) also propose various arrangements of  social types such
as interest groups and nonprofit organizations as achieving social balance and
cohesion between the market and nonmarket activities. Finding a single and
consistent literature stream explaining nonmarket institutions and their relation to
organizational actions has proved problematic. Depending on the kind of  issues
they tackle, various nonmarket institutions emerged: regulatory/ legal institutions
and standards authorities (Polanyi, 1957; Galbraith, 1955; Myrdal, 1968; Swedberg,
1991), political institutions (Simon, 1991; Peters, 1999; Bill & Hardgrave, 1981),
and social institutions, as the media and interest groups (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983;
Scott & Meyer, 1983; Hughes, 1939).
4.3.1.    National regulators
A prime nonmarket institution framing organizational actions is represented by
national regulatory authorities or national regulators; they are public establishments
exercising autonomous authority over specific areas of  activity, with a regulatory
or supervisory capacity (Scott, 1995). They cover areas of  administrative law,
regulation and rulemaking (codifying and enforcing rules, regulations, and imposing
supervision or oversight). Some regulatory agencies also perform audits, and some
are authorized to inflict certain punitive measures to the relevant parties (Kanter,
1999). The business-government interface is also shaped by official rules and
regulations (Suchman, 1995). Due to the fact that national regulators normalize
and supervise also the business setting through normative and regulatory activities
that are outside but complementary to the market spam, they are regarded as
nonmarket institutions. Regulatory authorities are commonly set up to oversee the
use of  public goods, insure social welfare and regulate business activities of
domestic and foreign owned firms (North, 1990; Baron, 1995). However, regulatory
institutions differ across countries and, as a result, foreign owned firms in the host
country often have to manage regulatory systems which differ from their home
arrangement (Aghion & Tirole, 1997; Department for International Development,
2000).
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As perfect transparency, autonomy and consistency of  regulatory matters have
an ideal connotation, in practice deficiencies of  transparency, autonomy and
consistency characterize the regulatory framework (Lewis & Sappington, 1991)
and explain the pressure of  national regulators on foreign owned firms’ activities
(Keim & Zeithaml, 1986). Insufficient transparency of  rules and regulations imply
that informational asymmetries or incomplete transparency of  rules and
regulations create a knowledge gap concerning the policy outcomes and
implications for firms’ operations (Holburn & van den Bergh, 2004). To manage
this gap foreign firms can increase relational nonmarket actions and create
collective networks or participate to business associations. Through networks
with other stakeholders, institutions and firms, foreign companies acquire
knowledge and social capital which decreases their information gap and liability
of  foreignness caused by imperfect transparency of  the regulatory processes
(Zaheer, 1995). Moreover, through collective networks these firms can also insure
trust, legitimacy, information transfer and joint problem-solving arrangements
(Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Keim & Zeithaml, 1986). 
Furthermore, regulatory institutions do not always have complete autonomy in
establishing, promulgating and implementing regulation. Occasionally, input and
priority issues are specified by other (state) institutions (Stigler, 1971). In addition,
in many economies a heritage of  state intervention, government policy, or
excessive regulations still persist and heavily constrain foreign owned firms’
activities (EDD, 2000). This influences the autonomy of  national regulators, in
particular the operation of  effective and uncorrupt courts, which would enforce
proper and consistent regulatory procedures for the foreign owned firms (Stern,
1997). Insufficient autonomy of  national regulators also manifests itself  as the
abuse of  power on behalf  of  institutions confined by pervasiveness - the average
firm’s likelihood of  encountering abuse of  power in its normal interactions
(Bardhan, 1997; Tanzi, 1998; Treisman, 2000). The expected degree to which
abuse of  power is a regular and significant part of  economic and non-economic
activity also affects organizations. It creates opportunities of  internalizing
environmental threats through absorption (Ring et al., 1990) and of  purchasing
facilitating services and favorable regulatory decisions (Boddewyn & Brewer,
1994). In the case of  foreign owned firms managing the abuse of  host
institutional power (or decreasing its effects) becomes a nonmarket target
achieved through various nonmarket actions such as increasing interactions and
collaborations with local and national actors in order to decrease the
pervasiveness in transactions (Rogriguez, Uhlenbruck, & Eden, 2005). 
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The pressure of  national regulators on organizational actions is also augmented
by a rather short term perspective of  regulatory actions and promulgations. A
short term perspective also increases the complexity of  the regulatory framework
in the host country and the grasp for future implications of  certain rules and
regulations for the organizational activity. Foreign owned firms can cope with
possible repercussions of  a short term regulatory outlook by utilizing
transactional nonmarket actions and engaging specialists to gain insight into
certain regulatory aspects specific to the host country. Launching partnerships
with like-minded firms or with host actors can also increase the awareness over
regulatory processes (Stern, 1997; Stern & Holder, 1999). 
Thus, in order to manage the pressure of  national regulators (and their specific
factors) foreign firms make use of  both relational nonmarket actions (collective
networks, business associations’ participation, partnerships with like-minded
firms) and transactional nonmarket actins (contract specialists). We expect that
such actions can compensate for their information gap, liability, can create a
certain in-depth base within the host setting which helps foreign firms to better
cope with the overall pressure of  regulatory institutions (Boddewyn & Brewer,
1994; Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Mahon et al., 2004). Therefore, we formulate the
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The pressure of  national regulators, explained by a) insufficient transparency,
b) insufficient autonomy and c) short term perspective of  rules and regulations, increases the
nonmarket actions of  foreign owned firms.
4.3.2.    Standards agencies
Besides complying with regulatory matters, foreign owned firms must also
comply with various standards, obtain licenses, obey principles and customs
which are imposed in the host country (McCubbins et al, 1987). For this reason,
we regard standards agencies/ authorities as an important nonmarket institution
which functions to watch over social loss abatement and loss abatement for
enterprises (Palmer et al., 1993). Social loss abatement entails minimizing the
foreign owned firms’ activities which generate hazards for health and safety of
the public interest (Congleton; 1984). It also refers to optimizing the degree of
loss with administrative and other compliance costs associated with regulations
(Ogus, 2002). While national regulators establish rules and objectives to be
followed by foreign owned firms and while governments act as mediators
between the two, standards agencies set up and define the measures to be taken 
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by foreign owned firms before entering the regulated business arenas. Standards
agencies frame the activities of  these firms through prior approval requirements,
mandatory standards and information disclosure (input or output prohibitions)
(Rao et al., 2001). Information disclosure imposed by standards agencies demands
foreign owned firms to reveal adequate information regarding quality/safety, on
the basis of  which customers can exercise preference. Information disclosure is
mainly meant to avoid welfare losses from consumers being deprived of  choice
(Shaffer, 1995). Firms have the selective choice about the manner to disclose
information as long as it falls under the regulatory goals of  the host country
(Lenway & Murtha, 1994). As it might prove difficult for foreign owned firms to
reveal the necessary information in a form which is culturally adequate for the
host setting, these firms are granted the freedom to self-regulate their
performance.
However, prior approval obliges foreign firms to obtain a license or permit from
the authorized institutions before they lawfully engage in an activity or supply a
product/ service in the host country. For obtaining such authorizations foreign
owned firms have to fulfill the requirements of  optimal loss abatement or certain
other conditions which might imply extra costs for these firms (Meznar & Nigh,
1995). Such costs to comply with standards, to obtain permits and licenses are
the direct result of  the standards imposed criteria. More than often these costs
are high and various imposed standards seem unjustified (Ogus, 2002). Therefore,
expenditures for fulfilling their requirements are considered by foreign firms as
peripheral and seldom groundless. As a result, firms attempt to decrease such
unnecessary expenditure through transactional nonmarket actions, by lobbying
for the abrogation of  unnecessary standards in the host country (Oliver, 1991).
However, other transactional actions such as constituency building, the temporary
mobilization of  employees, suppliers, customers, advocacy advertising, public
relations, press conferences and political educational programs can also lead to
the abrogation or adjustment of  criteria (Hillman & Hitt, 1999). Foreign owned
firms also try to identify, educate and motivate action groups or stakeholders that
may be affected by same norms ((Itoh, 1993; Keim & Zeithaml, 1986). Hence,
pressures from standards agencies manifested through additional organizational
costs to fulfill with various standards criteria can increase nonmarket actions.
Consequently, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The pressure of  standards agencies, manifested through a) costs made with
permits, licenses, and b) costs to comply with imposed standards, increases the nonmarket actions
of  foreign owned firms.
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4.3.3. Political institutions
Nonmarket arrangements also include the influences generated by political
institutions as instances of  the public authority, entailing public policy related
issues, costs and benefits for companies when getting involved on the political
arena (Weingast, 1995). Political institutions are closely associated with the form
of  government or the regime type (Persson, 2001) and politics become attractive
for foreign firms when the political arena provides opportunities for triumph on
policy outcome which the firm pursues (Grossman & Helpman, 1996; Bonardi,
Hilman, & Keim, 2005). However, foreign owned firms become involved and
highly responsive to the nonmarket political arena when policy outcomes in the
host environment affect their businesses (Masters & Keim, 1985). Similar to the
economic markets, where industry attractiveness is fundamental for justifying the
entry of  firms, foreign owned firms will become involved on the political
nonmarket arena and will interact with political institutions when politics are
attractive or pressure their business operations (Porter, 1980). This pressure is
explained through the saliency of  political issues, and the costs/ benefits of  doing
politics (Bikhchandani et al., 1992). Saliency refers to the public awareness
regarding a specific issue in which the firm also has an interest stake (Bonardi et
al., 2006). If  the issues for which firms aim to obtain a favorable policy outcome
have low saliency (a low public interest), then firms will have a relative advantage
in shaping the final decisions regarding the specific matter (McCubbins et al,
1987). Having greater chances for success in their political endeavors (i.e. obtain
desired policy outcomes) creates incentives for nonmarket political actions.
Political actions are mostly transactional and refer to contracting employees or
specialists with political experience (Buchanan, 1980; Baum et al., 2000). The
efforts to develop actions to mitigate for policies that will develop into a salient
issue are venues taken in the nonmarket arena (Laffont, 1995; Hillman & Keim,
1995). Efforts to respond to an issue before it becomes politicized and widely
salient can be successful in resolving an issue depending on its life cycle (Bigelow
et al., 1993). Organizations which delay to respond to an issue can lose substantial
decision-making discretion because, on longer term, legislation is crafted and
regulation enforced. As policy issues derive also from firms’ agendas, foreign
owned firms can best forward such issues by hiring individuals with government
experience, company members with a political position in governmental bodies
or other sorts of  contributions outside the market spam (Benton & Daly, 1991). 
However, the efforts made by firms for obtaining the desired policy outcomes
are regarded as costs of  politics or political involvement (Laffont, 1995). If  the
policy outcome aimed by foreign owned firms is obtained with diffused costs 
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and brings concentrated benefits, then these firms are more attracted towards
politics and political actions and, therefore, they will increase their political actions
(Glynn & Abzug, 2002). However, due to the lack of  familiarity with host setting,
foreign owned firms find it more difficult to influence existing host political
agendas and, therefore, need to dedicate extra effort/ actions to place new policy
issues on public agendas (Miller & Richards, 2002). Interactions with host
institutions on a regular base, building long term relationship networks can help
foreign firms place policy issues on political agendas. These actions are sometimes
complemented by the presence of  firms’ members in political parties or by
employing people with political experience (Dean & Brown, 1995). We formulate
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: The pressure of  political institutions, manifested through a) the saliency of
political issues and b) the costs of  politics, increases the nonmarket actions of  foreign owned
firms.
4.3.4.    Interest groups 
Interest groups are organized collections of  people habitually motivated by social
and ethical concerns who seek to influence business practices, firm and industry
practices, political and economic decisions (Ades & DiTella, 1999). Such groups
are formed among individuals and organizations with aligned interests and with
same stake interests on the nonmarket arena. They are active mitigators for certain
causes and foundations who aim to achieve their interest usually by gaining
public’s opinion and support (Bonardi et al, 2006; Dasgupta et al, 1979). There
is a wide variety of  active interest groups which focus predominantly on post-
material nonmarket issues such as consumer issues, environmentalism and
minority rights rather than economic issues such as import duties, manpower
training, and farm price support (Haveman, 1993; Fukuyama, 1996). Interest
groups operate by influencing governments, or by directly influencing firms
(Vogel, 1978), consumers and policy discourses (Wapner, 1995). No matter their
motivation, interest groups have become very skillful in obtaining desired policy
outcomes and in pressuring elected and administrative officeholders for various
rules and regulations impinging on foreign owned firms’ activities (Baron, 2006).
The capacity to influence public opinion (or the power of  the interest group) is
a fundamental factor representing the pressure of  the group on decision makers
and its saliency capacity (capacity to induce saliency on a specific matter/issue)
(Buchanan, 1980). If  the interest group has a high influence on the public
opinion, it is likely that the matters of  its concern will become of  large interest 
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and boast strong reactions and support. Habitually, interest groups have collective
concerns/ interests which dictate their wide spectrum of  influence especially
over certain business areas (Mahon et al., 2004). Foreign owned firms often react
to this influence through relational nonmarket actions. i.e. incorporating issues
mitigated by interest groups to their long term commitment or transforming
(core) values to fit contingency interests of  these groups. Such actions can lead
to an alignment of  firms’ activities to some of  (apprehension) collective concerns
of  interest groups issues (Landes & Posner, 1975). In some host settings, interest
groups are concerned with collective issues which are not considered as priority
in other host settings. Accordingly, foreign firms use stakeholder management
to build strong reputations and legitimacy and to manage the possible pressure
of  these groups. Foreign owned firms can also adapt to the main guidelines
mitigated by the interest groups in the host setting before affecting the company’s
image (Bonardi & Keim, 2005); by monitoring specific business functions towards
socially responsible reputations which would avoid being targeted by interest
groups (Baron & Diermeier, 2007). Moreover, foreign owned firms can acquire
knowledge by hiring experts into cultural specific manners of  collaborating with
the groups of  strong influence power in the host country (Itoh, 1993) or potential
business group associations for suitable future cooperations (Becker; 1983).
However, foreign firms can also use transactional and more temporary actions
such as campaign contributions, donations, and support on various platforms to
interact with influential interest groups. Therefore, we advance the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: The pressure of  interest groups, determined by their a) capacity to gain public
opinion and b) collective concerns, increase the nonmarket actions of  foreign owned firms.
4.3.5.    The media 
The media can also pressure organizational activities by affecting firms’ reputation
and legitimacy in the host country. The media alerts the public, activists, interest
groups, and government on market and nonmarket issues; it raises concerns
about firms’ practices and it reduces the costs of  collective nonmarket actions
due to its influence power over public opinion or society at large (Bardoel &
d’Haenens, 2004). The media places firms’ activities under the scrutiny of  other
market and nonmarket institutions. It continuously shapes public opinion and
plays a central role in educating, informing, and empowering the public with
regard to social responsibility and sustainable development (Schaffer & Hillman,
2000). 
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However, the role of  the media is neither fixed nor well-defined, but it is
determined, implemented, and interpreted by legislatures, government
administrative agencies, judicial institutions, public sentiment and ethical
consensus (Rogriguez, Uhlenbruck, & Eden, 2005). These rules of  the game vary
across countries. Credibility is of  central importance for media’s influence on
business and society (Bucy, 2003). Media’s credibility can be identified as
perceptions of  media believability, accuracy, bias, fairness, and completeness of
information (Haley, 1996). Likewise, its concern for public interest is given by
the fact that the media uncovers malpractice and corruption at all levels of  society,
and holds governments and business accountable for their actions on both
market and nonmarket issues (Bardoel & d’Haenens, 2004; Landes & Posner,
1975). 
For foreign owned firms, the media may also amplify or reduce uncertainty by
providing information, presenting facts and events, interpreting changes in
legislation, exploring their potential significance and ramifications, and advocating
possible courses of  action (Miles & Snow, 1978; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The
media generally covers issues of  high societal significance which are characterized
by an increased public interest or concern. Among these issues we find
malpractice and unethical business behavior. Consequently, foreign owned firms
work on more open and transparent business practices, and they address ethical
nonmarket behavior with respect to stakeholder groups such as interest groups,
government, non-governmental organizations, and other institutions (Bardhan,
1997). Therefore, foreign owned firms become aware of  the likelihood of
encountering corruption in its normal interactions within the host country
(Bardhan, 1997; Tanzi, 1998; Treisman, 2000) and the inherent degree of
ambiguity associated with transactions in a given host nation or state (Rogriguez,
Uhlenbruck, & Eden, 2005). When the media has high credibility and strong
influence on the host society then foreign firms are motivated to develop media
related nonmarket actions to maximize/ utilize media’s credibility and influence
for organizational benefit (legitimacy and reputation building). Therefore, we
develop the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5: The pressure of  the media, determined by its a) credibility, b) societal influence
and c) concern for public interest, increases the nonmarket actions of  foreign owned firms.
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4.3.6.    Supranational regulators
Regional integration commonly refers to the formal transfer of  legal authority
and decision-making power from member states to a supranational institution or
international body. The establishment of  economically integrated regions
determined the design/ existence of  supranational regulators which have
increased regulatory competencies over the member states. Overarching the
national level institutions, a central role is attributed to supranational regulators
which promulgate and enforce an important part of  the national legislation and
regulation. For this reason, foreign owned firms not only face various influences
from national level institutions, but they should also consider the influence of
supranational regulators. Such institutions oversee regulatory interests across
member countries and, as a result, the legislation in member states has evolved
to better outline the rules and regulations of  the integrated area (Aghion & Tirole,
1997).  
Recognizing that regulation must take into consideration trade-offs between
equity and efficiency, deter unfair competition, and minimize undue political
intervention, a number of  factors facilitate credible and effective supranational
regulation while also assessing its practical implementation (Luo & Peng, 1999).
Supranational institutions also normalize the activities of  foreign owned firms
in order to achieve a better outlined regulation in the integrated area. However,
due to the multifarious system, the activities of  supranational regulators are not
always consistent and transparent. The practical implementation of  supranational
regulations often exercises additional pressures on the activities of  foreign firms
due to the insufficient transparency and consistency of  the supranational rules
and regulators which normalize the integrated area. Accordingly, a first factor
explaining the pressure of  supranational regulators is the inconsistency of  rules
and regulations between the supranational and national level (Smith, 1997). By
setting merely broad duties and objectives, supranational regulators give a large
degree of  flexibility to member states and business interests (who move at
different regulatory speeds) and allow for regulatory diversity (Lewis &
Sappington, 1991). However, foreign owned firms’ business activities within the
host country are not directly regulated by supranational regulators. These
institutions just establish broad objectives for the host national level, thus they
give contour to the regulatory frame. This phenomenon allows for national
variance and interpretation and it has a rather high level of  political legitimacy
(Smith, 1997), but it suffers from an increasing risk of  multiple-level business
lobbying, problems of  transparency, and the risk of  regulatory competition
between national regulators. Such matters can be either foreseen or managed by 
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the foreign firms through coalition building with like-minded firms and business
associations’ participation to increase collective action and shared interests.
Coalition forming is also intended to shape policy agenda for shared benefit and
interests (Levy, 1989). Such actions also enable firms to increase their bargaining
power by mitigating governmental benefits in the host setting as a way to deal
with pressures created by the multi-layer legislation (Baysinger, 1984). Increasing
nonmarket actions through coalition forming and participation to business
associations leads to a long term commitment of  the foreign firms to the host
setting.
Conversely, this interplay between national and supranational levels of  regulation
also leads to an insufficient transparency of  regulations which only augments the
pressure faced by the firms operating in the host integrated state. In a host
regulatory framework it is often unclear which regulation is imposed by
supranational institutions and to which extent foreign owned firms should
comply. This triggers foreign firms to increase their long-term interactions with
local and national governments and cooperations with other host institutions. By
means of  relational deeds these firms can manage the risks of  information
asymmetries in comparison with domestic firms which are familiar and
understand the multifarious national-supranational interplay (Keim & Zeithaml,
1986). The use of  various relational actions to manage the pressure of
supranational institutions also decreases the probability of  opportunistic
behavior, increases social capital, and reduces transaction costs (Uzzi, 1997).
Consequently, we formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6: The pressure of  supranational regulators, determined by a) insufficient
transparency and b) inconsistency of  rules and regulations between the national and
supranational levels, increases the nonmarket actions of  foreign owned firms. 
Furthermore, under the principle of  subsidiarity, member states are granted
certain discretion in implementing supranational legislation which leads to
multiple tiers of  regulation (Coen & Doyle, 2002). The economic regulatory
regime in host integrated countries is further multifarious by overlapping
jurisdictions, i.e. regulatory commissions, courts of  justice, parliaments, member
state governments and their respective national regulators. This creates interplay
between the two levels of  regulation and a mixed input to the regulatory outcome.
The supranational regulators have to normalize a multitude of  national business
sectors through inputs from the diverging views and interests of  the member
states. 
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Supranational institutions are intended to increase efficiency in the regulated
business sectors; to review current national regulatory frameworks and to oversee
the activity of  national level institutions; to present improvement proposals for
the regulatory framework; to promote competition through a series of  regulatory
rules; to facilitate harmonized application of  rules and regulations across
members states; and to decrease the overall risk of  opportunistic behavior
resulted from gaps in legislation (Martimort, 1996). This phenomenon has lead
to an increasingly complex set of  institutions, integration and regulatory
processes. In any integrated region supranational institutions can be seen as part
of  a complex system of  multi-level (supranational and national) governance.
However, due to the multiple tiers involved by supranational institutions
(horizontal – given by the multitude of  regulated sectors and institutions; vertical
– given by the decision makers across members states) the efficiency and
complexity of  supranational regulatory institutional frameworks is questionable
and under scrutiny. The need for promoting more uniformity, simplicity and
coordination is put forward by institutions, governments and businesses. National
level institutions are overarched by supranational arrangements of  all types. For
every issue area (regulatory, political, and social) different combinations of
supranational and intergovernmental elements govern transactions (Moravcsik,
1991). Consequently, the pressure of  supranational institutions will influence to
a certain extent the national level institutions such as regulatory, political,
standards agencies, interest groups, and the media. Accordingly, we advance the
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 7: The pressure of  supranational regulators influences the pressure of  national level
institutions, i.e. national regulators, standards agencies, political institutions, interest groups,
and the media. 
4.4.    methodology 
4.4.1.    Sample and data
The data for this study were gathered using a postal questionnaire survey
conducted among managing directors of  foreign owned firms in the Netherlands
in the summer of  2009. Initially, we used the Dun and Bradstreet database (2007)
to select the foreign companies in the Netherlands. This database contains
information on their physical and postal address, contact information, names of
executives, number of  employees, country of  origin, SIC codes and sector. Our
initial sample of  900 foreign firms was selected on representativeness criteria of  
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industry and firm size. In order to improve our preliminary survey and assess its
feasibility we firstly conducted seventeen in-depth interviews with these managers
discussing the survey items. Their comments and suggestions for improvements
were used to revise the survey. Subsequently, a pilot survey was carried out to
evaluate the revised survey instrument. The number of  returned response was
in total 180 out of  900 representing foreign owned firms operating in the
Netherlands (with mother companies coming from 21 countries including
Austria, Belgium, Bermuda, Canada, Denmark, England, Finland, France,
Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Norway, Portugal, South-
Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and US). Missing survey data reduced the
number of  usable responses to 160 representing around 18 percent of  the
sampled group. 
4.4.2.    Method
Based on the theoretical discussion, we developed an integrative structural
equation model (SEM) which includes: structural model entailing the hypotheses
for relations among the latent variables; and measurement model for the not
directly observed variables and their relations to empirically measured variables
(Bollen, 1989). Hypotheses 1 to 6 describe the relations among latent variables
(structural model) as well as each latent variable’s manifest indicators (part of  the
measurement model). Figure 4.1 shows the SEM which comprises of  the
measurement model for the exogenous variables, namely the six nonmarket
institutions, and for the endogenous variable, the frequency of  nonmarket actions
undertaken by foreign firms; and the structural model showing how the
endogenous variable is influenced by the exogenous variables. 
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The endogenous variable frequency of  nonmarket actions is posited against
institutional pressures from supranational regulators, national regulators,
standards agencies, political institutions, interest groups, and the media. The
endogenous construct frequency of  nonmarket actions has a formative
measurement model (cause indicators). When constructing formative models, it
has to be accounted for the fact that manifest indicators must cover the entire
scope of  the related latent variable (Diamantopoulos & Winkelhofer, 2001).
Additionally, the number of  formative indicators should be relatively low in order
to avoid multicollinearity problems. For these reasons, each latent variable in our
model is predicted by maximum three formative indicators. 
We tested the SEM by using partial least squares (PLS) and the statistical software
SmartPLS 2.0. SmartPLS 2.0. allows for the simultaneous assessment of
hypotheses and it enables the use of  multi-item reflective scales (White et al.,
2003). The main reason for using PLS is that our SEM includes formative as well
as reflective measurement models which cannot be measured with the
conventional covariance structural-approach (Höck & Ringle, 2006). A formative
indicator measurement approach does not assume that separate measures of
constructs necessarily coincide (correlate). Through PLS the contribution of  each
indicator to the definition of  each construct is specifically determined
simultaneously with the testing of  the theoretical relationships among constructs
(Diamantopoulos & Winklhofer, 2001; Fornell & Bookstein, 1982; Jarvis et al.,
2003). PLS also analyzes moderated relationships using continuous interaction
terms by multiplying the indicators of  the interacting factors rather than
comparing dichotomized groups (Chin, Marcolin, & Newsted, 2003). The use
of  PLS makes the particular contribution of  clarifying the relationships among
esoteric constructs, such as frequency of  nonmarket actions and institutional
factors for each individual institution present in the nonmarket environment
(Höck & Ringle, 2006). The measurement of  these constructs would not be
possible with classical measurement theory. However, to gauge each construct’s
reliability and validity, every construct (along with its indicators) is embedded in
a structure of  theoretically essential relationships. 
4.4.3.    Variables
Endogenous variable: The endogenous variable frequency of  nonmarket actions
represents the number of  nonmarket practices or proceedings and how often
they are utilized by the firm (Svendsen, 1998). Using a 5-point scale ranging from
‘never used’, ‘rarely’, ‘regularly’, ‘very frequently’ to ‘continuously’ we measured
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how often and how many nonmarket practices are undertaken by each firm:
collective networks (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Uzzi, 1997), business
associations’ participation (Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Keim & Zeithaml, 1986),
stakeholder management (Mahon et al., 2004) (relational nonmarket actions);
contracting media experts (Jacomet, 2000), issue lobbying (Giroud & Scott-
Kennel, 2009), press conferences/ releases (Mahon et al., 2004) (transactional
actions). We used both relational nonmarket items (practices) as well as
transactional nonmarket items for the operationalization of  the concept which
is at its commencement stage. As literature lacks in establishing which practices
are included in the nonmarket category, we explore the measurement of  the
concept nonmarket actions by including in its operationalization both nature of
items. 
Independent variables
The exogenous variable pressure of  national regulators has a formative measurement
model and the items used to measure this variable are: insufficient transparency
of  rules and regulations; insufficient autonomy of  regulatory institutions; and
short term perspectives of  rules and regulations.
The exogenous variable pressure of  standards agencies has a formative measurement
model and the items used to measure this variable are: costs for obtaining permits,
licenses, and authorizations; and costs to comply with standards.
The exogenous variable pressure of  political institutions has a formative measurement
model and the items used to measure this variable are: saliency of  political issues;
and the costs of  political involvement. 
The exogenous variable pressure of  interest groups has a formative measurement
model and the items used to measure this variable are: collective concerns; and
capacity to gain public opinion.
The exogenous variable pressure of  the media has a formative measurement model
and the items used to measure this variable are: credibility; societal influence; and
concern for public interest.
The exogenous variable pressure of  supranational regulators has a formative
measurement model and the items used to measure this variable are: insufficient
transparency of  rules and regulations; and inconsistency between supranational
and national regulations.
Control variables
Industry. The institutional factors specific to national regulators insure the
performance of  the reforms in the regulated business industries where foreign
owned firms operate (Keim & Baysinger, 1988). Regulatory authorities also insure
third party control within some industries to avoid or penalize anti-competition 
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alliances. Consequently, the frequency of  nonmarket actions undertaken by
foreign firms can differ between industries. Therefore, we control for possible
industry effects with control variable industry dummies for the three most targeted
industries by foreign firms operating in the Netherlands. The three industries are:
manufacturing, finance and insurance, and services. 
Size. The resources available to deploy for implementing various nonmarket
actions vary among foreign firms according to their size (Hillman et al., 2004).
Additionally, firms with a large resource and employment base have more assets
at risk, reason for which they can be more affected by changes related to
legislation, regulations and standards (Masters & Keim, 1985). Moreover, large
firms are also interdependent on many stakeholders and institutions (Meznar &
Nigh, 1995). The control variable size is measured as the number of  employees
of  each foreign owned firm in the Netherlands. 
Host country experience. The experience within the host country and with host
institutions and actors is an indication of  the networks and social capital available
and of  the relationships established with various stakeholders. An increased
experience within the host country may be a facilitator for implementing certain
types of  nonmarket actions such as building networks with host actors or
cooperations with local and national governments (Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Keim
& Baysinger, 1988; Keim & Zeithaml, 1986). Therefore, the host country
experience of  the foreign firm might relate to the frequency with which the firm
develops nonmarket actions. The control variable host country experience is measured
as the number of  years since the foreign owned firm has established its operations
in the Netherlands.
4.5.    Analysis and results
4.5.1.    Evaluation of the measurement model
Prediction oriented measures were used for the assessment of  the SEM as well
as for the formative and reflective measurement models (Chin, 1998;
Diamantopoulos & Winkelhofer, 2001; Höck & Ringle, 2006). The causal and
the empirical measurement results are illustrated in Figure 4.2. The central
criterion for evaluating the SEM is the rate of  reliability R² of  the latent
endogenous variable frequency of  nonmarket actions with a value of  0.74
suggesting the robustness of  the measurement model. This result indicates that
74.00 percent of  the variance of  the latent endogenous variable is explained by
effects of  the latent exogenous variables (pressure of  national regulators, pressure
of  standards agencies, pressure of  the media, pressure of  interest groups, 
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pressure of  political institutions and pressure of  supranational regulators) with
their respective weights. The six latent exogenous variables in our SEM are
determined by formative measurement models i.e. their respective factors or
items pertaining to each institution that explains its pressure. 
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The evaluation of  the empirical results regarding the formative measurement
model reveals that the theoretically deduced manifest variables are very well suited
as indicators of  the latent variables (Höck & Ringle, 2006; Diamantopoulos &
Winkelhofer, 2001). According to Chin (1998) if  the evaluation criterion for the
manifest variables and measurement model show weight values of  0.02, 0.05,
and 0.35, then the latent variables have a small, medium or large effect-size,
respectively. 
The exogenous variable pressure of  national regulators: The manifest indicator ‘short-
term perspective of  rules and regulations’ has the highest explanatory value
(weight value 0.54) of  the pressure of  national regulators, followed by ‘insufficient
autonomy of  regulatory institutions’ (weight value 0.41) and ‘insufficient
transparency of  rules and regulations’ (weight value 0.29). The R² of  the
exogenous variable national regulators has a value of  0.70 suggesting the
robustness of  the measurement model for this variable. 
The exogenous variable pressure of  standards agencies: The manifest indicator ‘costs
to comply with imposed standards’ has the highest value (weight 0.56) in
explaining the pressure of  standards agencies, followed by the manifest indicator
‘costs to obtain permits, licenses, and authorizations’ (weight value 0.48). The R²
of  the exogenous variable pressure of  standards agencies has a value of  0.72
showing the robustness of  the measurement model for this construct. 
The exogenous variable pressure of  political institutions: The manifest indicators
‘saliency of  policy issues’ has the highest value in explaining the pressure of
political institutions (weight value 0.47), followed by ‘costs of  politics’
(explanatory weight value 0.45). A small explanatory value for the pressure of
political institutions is attributed to the manifest indicator ‘competition on the
political arena’ (weight 0.19). The R² of  the exogenous variable pressure of
political institutions has a value of  0.74 suggesting that the above manifest
indicators represent a good measurement model for this construct.
The exogenous variable pressure of  interest groups: The manifest indicator ‘capacity
to gain public opinion’ has the highest explanatory value (weight 0.68) for the
pressure of  standards agencies, followed by the indicator ‘collective concerns’
which has a smaller value (weight 0.20) in explaining this influence. The R² of
the exogenous variable pressure of  interest groups has a value of  0.74 indicating
the robustness of  the measurement model for this construct. 
The exogenous variable pressure of  media: The pressure of  the media is explained
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by the manifest indicators ‘media credibility’ with the highest value (weight 0.56),
followed next by ‘societal influence’ (weight 0.44). Additionally, the indicator
‘concern for public interest’ (weight 0.24) has the smallest explanatory value for
this latent construct. The R² of  the exogenous variable pressure of  media has a
value of  0.68 suggesting that the above manifest indicators represent a good
measurement model for this variable.
The exogenous variable pressure of  supranational regulators: The manifest variable
‘insufficient transparency of  supranational rules and regulations’ has the highest
weight (value of  0.46) in explaining the pressure of  supranational regulators.
Additionally, the manifest variable ‘inconsistency between supranational and
national level rules and regulations’ is of  high relevance as well (weight of  0.38)
in explaining the pressure of  supranational regulators. The R² of  the exogenous
variable pressure of  supranational regulators has a value of  0.72 suggesting that
the above manifest indicators represent a good measurement model for this
variable. 
The endogenous variable frequency of  nonmarket actions: The nonmarket
actions is a latent variable that can be measured as a construct of  the indicators
‘relational actions’ and ‘transactional actions’. As a latent construct, the variable
explains the variance of  each indicator to a great extend; the increased frequency
of  nonmarket actions manifest itself  through relational actions with a weight of
0.85 as highest explanatory share; and through transactional actions’ -weight 0.67,
medium explanatory share. The rate of  reliability R² of  the latent endogenous
variable frequency of  nonmarket actions has a value of  0.74 indicating the
robustness of  the measurement model. Subsequently, relational actions are
explained through the following items: collective networks (weight 0.46), long
term interactions with local and national governments (0.36), and business
associations’ participation (weight 0.35). All three items provide a high
contribution in explaining the indicator, while the R² value of  this indicator (0.70)
shows the robustness of  the measurement model for relational actions.
Furthermore, transactional actions are explained by the following items: ad-hoc
interactions with local and national governments (weight 0.54), lobbying (weight
0.44), and contracting media experts (weight 0.38). The above weights offer a
high explanatory share for the indicator transactional actions, while the R² value
of  this indicator (0.72) shows the robustness of  the measurement model. 
When applying PLS, additional measures for the assessment of  the measurement
model of  the endogenous variable are the coefficient of  reliability and the average
variance extracted. The coefficient of  reliability has an empirical value of  0.74
Nonmarket institutional pressures and the frequency of  nonmarket actionsCHAPTER 4
© C.L. Voinea 2011100
which indicates a high internal consistency of  the latent construct bundled
indicator-variables (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). The same findings hold for the
average variance extracted from the manifest indicators which has a value of  0.76.
Since we have only one latent endogenous variable in the SEM, the discriminance
validity analysis is not required and the evaluation of  its measurement model is
completed (Cadogan et al., 1999; Hoyle & Panter, 1999). 
4.5.2.    Hypothesized relationships 
The measurement of  both endogenous and exogenous constructs suggests that
the data is robust. Furthermore, correlation statistics between the constructs is
within acceptable ranges (Farnell & Larcker, 1981). Table 4.1 presents the
correlations of  constructs along with construct-level measurement statistics.
Correlation is very low for most variables, indicating that multicollinearity is not
a problem. 
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Further, a test of  significance of  the interrelations between the manifest and
latent variables is also performed through the bootstrapping procedure; results
of  this procedure are showed in table 4.2 (Bollen & Stine, 1993; Efron &
Tibshirani, 1993). 
Table 4.2. Results of bootstrapping procedure
(* = significant 0.1 level; ** = significant at the 0.05 level; *** = significant at the 0.01 level)
This procedure is appropriate to determine the significance of  the interrelations
between the latent endogenous and the latent exogenous variables (Efron &
Tibshirani, 1993). Seeing that the pressure of  national regulators has a significant
positive effect on the increase in frequency on nonmarket actions (undertaken
by foreign owned firms) with a t-value of  2.00 (coefficient 0.35) and its manifest
indicators result in a large explanatory value of  this pressure, Hypothesis 1 is
accepted. 
Subsequently, empirical estimates show that the pressure of  standards agencies
has a significant effect (t-value 2.02; coefficient 0.35) on the increased frequency  
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of  nonmarket actions. Manifest indicators of  this variable also have a high value
in explaining this positive effect, therefore, Hypothesis 2 is accepted.
However, when analyzing the pressure of  political institutions we found no
significant effect on the frequency of  nonmarket actions undertaken by foreign
owned firms (t-value 1.29; coefficient 0.19). Consequently, Hypothesis 3 is
rejected. 
Furthermore, empirical testing shows significant explanatory value for the
pressure of  interest groups and its positive relationship with the frequency of
nonmarket actions (t-value 1.98; coefficient 0.28). This pressure is determined
by the predicted manifest indicators and accordingly, Hypothesis 4 is accepted.
The final institutional pressures predicted to explain  the frequency of  nonmarket
actions is the media. Its manifest variables and results show that the pressure of
media has a significant explanatory value for the increased frequency of
nonmarket actions (t-value 1.95; coefficient 0.29). Therefore, Hypothesis 5 is
accepted. 
Empirical results related to the pressure of  supranational regulators show no
significant contribution of  this variable in explaining the frequency of  nonmarket
actions, therefore Hypothesis 6 is rejected (t-value 1.28; coefficient 0.18). Thus,
foreign owned firms do not increase their frequency of  nonmarket actions as a
direct result of  (or to respond to) pressures from supranational regulators.
Furthermore, inter-institutional weights between the pressure of  supranational
regulators and pressure of  national level institutions (Hypothesis 7) were also
calculated. The pressure of  supranational regulators through to its manifest
indicators show a high explanatory value for the effects on national regulators
(weight of  0.37), on political institutions (weight of  0.38) and on the standards
agencies in the host country (weight of  0.33), leading us to accept Hypothesis 7.
With regard to the control variables, host country experience (weight 0.20)  points
to the fact that the amount of  years the foreign firms operated in the host setting
has a medium explanatory share for the increase in frequency of  nonmarket
actions. Moreover, size and the industry in which the foreign owned firm operates
(weight 0.15 and respectively 0.14) have a very low explanatory share for an
increase in the frequency of  such actions. 
In sum, an increase in the frequency of  nonmarket actions can be explained by
positive effects/ influences from pressure of  national regulators and of  standards
agencies with an equal weight of  0.35 as the largest explanatory share); positive 
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effects of  the pressure of  media and of  interest groups have a slightly lower
weight of  0. 29 and 0.28 respectively, while pressure of  political institutions and
of  supranational regulators (weight of  0.18 and correspondingly 0.19) makes the
smallest contribution to explaining frequency of  nonmarket actions.
Furthermore, pressures from supranational regulators show a high explanatory
value for the effects on national regulators (weight of  0.37), on political
institutions (weight of  0.38) and on the standards agencies in the host country
(weight of  0.33). The robustness of  the SEM reveals that the estimates of  model
parameters are good and that the hypothesized relationships fit the data well,
supporting the soundness of  the proposed model of  the effect of  nonmarket
institutional pressures on the frequency of  nonmarket actions.  
4.6.    discussion 
Our research goal was to explore the pressure of  nonmarket institutions and
institutional factors on the increase of  nonmarket actions undertaken by foreign
owned firms in a host integrated economy. Based on institutional, international
business and corporate political strategy literature, we identified six nonmarket
institutions (national regulators, supranational regulators, standards agencies,
political institutions, interest groups and the media) and specific factors pertaining
to each institution likely contribute to an increase in the frequency of  nonmarket
actions. 
Empirical results confirmed five of  the hypothesized relationships and also
captured interesting effects between national and supranational level institutions.
The pressure of  national regulators provides a high explanatory contribution to
the increase in nonmarket actions through the insufficient transparency of  rules
and regulations, insufficient autonomy, and a short term perspective of  their
regulatory processes.  Due to such factors foreign owned firms increase the
frequency of  both relational and transactional nonmarket actions. This is
consistent with Kanter (1999) and North (1990) who delegate that national
regulators normalize business activities and commonly enforce standards and
safety. The pressure of  standards agencies also increases the frequency of
nonmarket actions, increase determined by the costs to obtain permits, licenses,
and authorizations and costs to comply with imposed standards. In the
Netherlands a vast array of  required permits and licenses restricts and sets
boundaries for business practices and activities. When these costs seem
groundless and unnecessarily too high, firms increase the frequency of  their
nonmarket actions (relational and transactional) in the attempt to decrease these 
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redundant costs. In line with Ogus (2002), various nonmarket actions such as
constituency building, lobbying and press conferences can decrease redundant
expenditure made with certain new imposed standards. 
Furthermore, empirical results show no significant effects of  pressure of  political
institutions and explanatory factors (competition on political arena, issue saliency
and elevated costs of  politics) on the nonmarket (political) actions. This is
explained through one of  the characteristics of  the host environment, namely
that in the Netherlands political involvement on behalf  of  (foreign) firms is not
common practice, nor policy issues agendas are easily set by businesses (Kate,
1994). Interest groups also leave their prints on the business sector by shaping
business processes and outcomes with various purposes ranging from investing
in a safe future and social community to preserving the environment. The
pressure of  these particular groups (through an increased collective concern and
high capacity to gain public opinion) makes foreign firms aware of  harmful
consequences of  certain business practices. Accordingly, these firms increase
their nonmarket actions to monitor business functions towards augmented
accountability within society en route for building responsible reputations (Baron
& Diermeier, 2007). 
The media pressures also determine an increase in the nonmarket actions of
foreign owned firms. This increase is caused by the media’s high credibility, strong
societal influence, and concern for the public. Foreign firms are either affected
by these factors or try to use them to build stronger reputations and legitimacy
in the host setting. The media can make or break the image of  a company in
front of  the public opinion because it empowers the public with regard to social
duty, sustainable growth and various firms’ positions on these matters (Schaffer
& Hillman, 2000). As a result companies increase their nonmarket (relational)
actions with respect to this stakeholder (Miles & Snow, 1978). Pressures from
supranational regulators do not directly contribute to the increase in nonmarket
actions, but they influence national regulators, standards agencies and political
institutions. A possible justification can be found in the fact that, due to the multi-
level governance, supranational regulators establish directives for the national
level institutions while also allowing for a certain degree of  flexibility and national
variance. This substantiates that supranational regulators influence to a certain
extent the other institutions (Smith, 1997). To explain such result we also employ
arguments related to the specificity of  the host setting, the Netherlands. A vast
part of  rules, regulations, directives and policy making is established by
supranational (EU) regulators and members states have to incorporate these to
a great extent. 
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4.7.    Conclusions
This chapter explores the relation and sources of  variation in the strength of
institutional pressures and the frequency of  organizational responses to deal with
these pressures. This paper contributes to the discussion of  plausible explanations
for why firms decide to adopt nonmarket actions. Just as pressures from market
institutions trigger organizations to undertake various market actions/ responses
(Cheng & Kesner, 1997), the current research explored the relationship between
nonmarket institutional pressures and the nonmarket actions or responses to
manage these pressures. Nonmarket actions entail practices or proceedings
utilized to cope with national regulatory institutions, supranational regulators,
political institutions, standards agencies, interest groups and the media (Svendsen,
1998). Empirical evidence shows that the increase in nonmarket actions can be
explained by specific institutional factors as follows: national regulators (due to
insufficient transparency of  rules and regulations, insufficient autonomy, and a
short term perspective of  regulatory processes), standards agencies (due to costs
to obtain permits, licenses, and authorizations, costs to comply with standards),
interest groups (due to increased collectives concerns and high capacity to gain
public opinion), and the media (due to high credibility and societal influence and
increased concern for public interest). 
We advance the field beyond simple presumptions of  nonmarket scattered actions
by pinning down the institutional determinants of  such actions. By applying
institutional, corporate political and international business theory to nonmarket
context, we have developed an integrative framework of  nonmarket institutional
factors which explain why firms undertake nonmarket actions. Accordingly, we
contribute to the existing nonmarket strategy literature by incorporating
institutional players other than the legislature into the analysis, and by addressing
the question of  how foreign firms manage the different influences of  these
actors. Regulatory risk can habitually be handled by domestic firms since, unlike
foreign owned firms, they typically know how to manage the vagaries of  local
regulatory custom and practice (Stern, 1997). Our study elucidates foreign firms’
managerial proceedings by clarifying which are the most relevant institutions that
can exercise certain regulatory, political, or social pressures on their business
activities. Context and level specific influences should be considered when making
strategic choices regarding host institutional environment especially if  the aim is
to develop social capital, establish networks, and increase responsiveness to the
host country; or become embedded in the host country business setting (Collins
& Porras, 1994; Yoffie and Bergenstein, 1985; Shaver, 1998). 
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The discussion over the present research cannot be completed without
considering its limitations. Although we test hypotheses nested in a quite inclusive
model, our study is still exploratory in nature particularly with regard to the
development of  the notion of  nonmarket actions. Formative indicators allow for
glimpses at initial statements about the relative importance of  the indicators
forming the constructs. Our results lay significant ground work for future
investigations, more deterministic procedures and analyses of  similar data.
Employing formative indicators assumes that all pertinent and germane facets
are integrated. However, completeness of  indicator inventory is a goal always
sought, but never really achieved (Chandler & Graham, 2010). This study yields
a rich scan of  the external nonmarket institutional environment in which foreign
firms operate. Our nonmarket institutional framework (SEM) considers the
collection of  institutions pertaining to the national and supranational levels
triggering nonmarket actions. A comparative study conducted in a different
research setting would possibly expand the range of  institutions and factors and
increase the spectrum of  actions and tools which firms can utilize in the
nonmarket context. Future research might also deem appropriate a mixed
nonmarket-economic model which simultaneously includes economic along with
non-economic determinants. The interplay between the market and nonmarket
span would help both scholars and managers to extend state of  mind beyond
the traditional market strategies and advance a new breed which incorporates a
wide range of  constituents and relevant party delegated actions. Since the
literature makes a clear distinction between internal and external stakeholders,
we argue that nonmarket institutions can be regarded as the nonmarket
stakeholders (Freeman, 1984). The literature stream that sustains the benefits of
a stakeholder mindset, also raises the awareness that academic theory grows out
of  the management practice rather than vice-versa (Collins & Porras, 1994). More
specifically, in practice foreign firms do need to cope with a variety of  pressures,
albeit host government interventions, policy makers, interest groups, or the media
through various nonmarket actions that reduce their exposure in the host country
and improves their strategic capabilities and management (Bonardi et al., 2006;
Mezias, 2002; Miller & Richards, 2002). Such institutions cause numerous
implications that are not related to the market arena but do influence firm’s
market performance.
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This chapter explores the types of  nonmarket strategies and characteristics of
foreign owned firms in a small, open and regionally integrated host economy. As
most comprehensive and inclusive nonmarket strategies we propose two
particular forms, namely foreseeing strategy and subsequent strategy. Based on
institutional, international business and corporate political strategy literature, we
have identified the most important firm’s level determinants and resources which
are most likely to affect the predilection for implementing a specific form of
nonmarket strategy. Evidence is provided by a survey sample of  160 foreign
owned firms operating in the Netherlands. The results show that large foreign
owned firms with a market focus on the host economy are more inclined to
implement a foreseeing nonmarket strategy, while firms with a regional
headquarters function and low host country experience prefer more to implement
a subsequent nonmarket strategy in the host environment. Empirical outcome
also indicates that foreign firms with a corporate parent that has established other
subsidiaries within the host country prefer to implement foreseeing nonmarket
strategies.
5.1.    Introduction
Foreign owned firms operating in host environments augment their exposure
and vulnerability to nonmarket uncertainties and pressures (Miller, 1991; Dean
& Brown, 1995). Regardless of  the sources of  these qualms and pressures, albeit
host government interventions, policy makers, interest groups, or the media, they
amplify the competitive disadvantages (or liability of  foreignness) faced by foreign
owned firms vis-à-vis indigenous firms (Hymer, 1976; Zaheer, 2002; Miller &
Richards, 2002). These disadvantages can even cause foreign owned firms to
under-perform domestic firms (Miller & Richards, 2002) due to wide range of
unfamiliarity costs vis-à-vis economic, social, legal, and cultural host related issues
(Hennart, 1982; Buckley & Casson, 1976). Therefore, foreign owned firms should
go beyond formulating host market strategies and thoroughly consider
complementary strategies to encounter complex influences outside the market,
to reduce the liability of  foreignness and to increase their competitive position
in the host environment (Baron, 1995a; Bonardi et al., 2006; Hillman & Hitt,
1999; Prakash, 2002). These strategies entail actions carried out in public arenas
(Baron, 1995; Schaffer & Hillman, 2000) to encounter influences from various
institutions, national or supranational, such as interest groups, political
institutions, the media, regulatory institutions, standards agencies, which all
constitute the nonmarket business environment. Nonmarket exchange
mechanisms are necessary for improving the efficiency of  market exchange
mechanisms. Market exchange mechanisms are plagued by information
asymmetry, property rights, bargaining and other problems, all conflicting the
basic assumptions of  neoclassical economics (Boddewyn, 2003). Foreign own
firms can develop foreseeing nonmarket strategies that are long term oriented
and create a certain in-depth base within the host setting meant to avoid or
decrease nonmarket influences on their activities. However, firms can also
develop and implement a subsequent nonmarket strategy to deal with nonmarket
actors and issues in the host country. This type of  strategy is based on mainly
event-specificity and temporary actions. The preference for the type of
nonmarket strategy to create in-depth relation networks within the host
institutional setting or just sporadic and ad-hoc collaborations with various host
institutions depends on foreign owned firm’s characteristics, their internal
resources and previous international experience. 
To date the few studies on nonmarket strategies merely enumerate an inventory
of  different actions to be used in diverse situations. Scholars emphasize the need
to understand the dynamics and determinants behind nonmarket strategic
implementation (Bonardi & Keim, 2005; Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994; Getz, 1997;  
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Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Hillman, 2003). Diverse determinants of  such strategies
are proposed in a number of  studies, nonetheless barely any have been empirically
tested (e.g. Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Baron, 1995a; Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994). The
field has focused on large countries, such as United States, where different
nonmarket strategies are expected to be used and are considered ethically
appropriate than in small open economies members of  supranational entities
(Getz, 1997). Therefore, this study will focus on the nonmarket behavior of
foreign owned firms in a small open economy. We investigate the type of
nonmarket strategies implemented by foreign owned firms in the small open
economy of  the Netherlands depending on their characteristics. The Netherlands
represents the fifth largest recipient of  foreign investment in the world and, due
to its favorable location and active role within the European Union many
multinational enterprises (MNEs) have chosen the Netherlands as strategic
orientation. This host setting becomes a suitable and worthy example of  a host
economy belonging to a larger supranational entity in which to investigate the
nonmarket activities of  foreign companies. Data on the foreign owned firms
were obtained through a questionnaire survey. The evidence shows that the
implementation of  a certain type of  nonmarket strategy by foreign owned firms
depends on idiosyncratic features of  these firms. 
The structure of  this study is as follows. Section 2 provides an extensive literature
review highlighting the complex nature of  two main types of  nonmarket
strategies. Section 3 elaborates the idiosyncratic features and the nonmarket
strategy types and states our hypotheses. Section 4 presents the sample, data
sources and operationalization of  the variables to test the hypotheses. Empirical
results are presented next, followed by the final section which discusses the
contribution of  our work and implications for practice. 
5.2.    nonmarket strategies
One manner through which foreign owned firms can deal with the nonmarket
complexity of  a host environment entails interacting with host institutions and
actors, building long term relationship networks, shaping the nonmarket host
environment, playing an active role in policy, regulation formation and
implementation. These so called foreseeing actions of  foreign owned firms
enable these firms to preview certain influences before taking place and diminish
their impact on the company’s business activities; they are long term oriented
and create a certain in-depth base within the host setting meant to avoid or
decrease nonmarket influences on their activities. Firms employing foreseeing 
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actions have clearly defined and specific nonmarket objectives (Hillman & Hitt,
1999) translated into minimizing uncertainty risks and exercising control over
host regulatory, politically and socially related (nonmarket) processes (Mahon et
al., 2004). These objectives along with the fact that foreign owned firms become
actively involved in regulatory processes of  the host environment and place policy
issues on political agendas by affecting their saliency, distinguish nonmarket
strategies from subsidiary legitimacy actions. Nonmarket objectives overarch
achieving legitimacy in the host context by influencing regulatory outcomes and
striking for favorable policies. Foreign owned firms acquire knowledge by hiring
experts for specific cultural manners of  collaborating with host institutions, with
interest groups with strong influence power in the host country, and media
institutions. They investigate which are the most potential business group
associations for suitable future co-operations. Through such types of  principally
process-focused and continuous actions they become embedded into the host
environment and decrease their burden or liability of  foreignness. Surprises
coming from the institutional and overall nonmarket environment are minimized
by using early warning systems preventing potential harmful events from
becoming widely salient (Holburn & Van den Bergh, 2004). 
These strategies are mutually macro oriented generally targeting the host
environment, regulation policy outcomes or reputation building amongst the host
institutions. However, foreseeing tactics are also micro sloping aimed at building
relationship networks and social capital. Generally, the resources needed to
influence a nonmarket issue arisen from the host environment affecting the firms’
operations are already in place when these firms implement foreseeing strategies
(Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Uzzi, 1997). Thus, foreseeing strategies also lead to the
development of  social capital; it is considered to be the sum of  the actual and
potential resources embedded within and available through the network of
relationships of  firms with various institutions, contacts or groups (Nahapiet &
Ghoshal, 1998). This social capital is considered to be a valuable and scarce
resource which brings advantages over other institutional arrangements, such as
markets (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). Social capital is a tacit resource and it
cannot easily be traded, therefore, it cannot be offered by hierarchical mechanisms
or markets (Luo, 2001; Uzzi, 1997). It is a scarce resource which is not readily
available to every foreign owned firm but it is an embedded outcome of
relationship networks developed as part of  foreseeing strategies. Foreign firms
undertake a relational approach to the host nonmarket environment and
maximize associations with other host actors; they insure trust, information
transfer and joint problem-solving arrangements (Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Keim
& Baysinger, 1988; Keim & Zeithaml, 1986). Inter-organizational collaboration  
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has been linked to a range of  important outcomes for collaborating organizations.
The strategy literature emphasizes the way in which collaboration between
organizations results in the sharing of  critical resources and facilitates knowledge
transfer. The learning literature argues that collaboration not only transfers
existing knowledge among organizations, but also facilitates the creation of  new
knowledge and produce synergistic solutions (Hardy et al., 2003). 
Reputable reputation is built through repeated relations with professional
nonmarket actors (especially public decision makers and the media) who will
eventually conclude that the firm is (or is not) politically credible, dangerous,
legitimate, trustworthy, etc. This idea is very briefly mentioned by Jacomet (2000).
Through implementing foreseeing strategies with long term perspective and
aimed at building relations between actors, issues, contacts and stakeholders in
the host environment, foreign firms are able to create a certain reputation which
would avoid becoming targeted by nonmarket actors (media, interest groups)
(Baron & Diermeier, 2007). The appease of  critical actors, the stimulation of
long term cooperation, and the anticipation of  future relationships with various
nonmarket actors of  a host setting are all process-focused and continuous
practices. Likewise, lobbying serves the purpose of  positioning the company
mission and image among the issues relevant to the host setting, interest groups,
the media and regulators, contributing to reputation building. Moreover, lobbying
with network partners for a beneficial policy outcome find its average place
amongst foreseeing actions (Giroud & Scott-Kennel, 2009).
While host governments try to maximize the rents captured from foreign owned
firms, bargaining (conflictual and partnership) allow these firms to mitigate host
governmental benefits (Baysinger, 1984). Through bargaining the interactions
between host governments and firms shift from merely transactions towards
continuous relations and cooperation, interdependence and trust (Boddewyn &
Brewer, 1994; Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Hillman et al., 2004). 
Another way for foreign owned firms to cope with the complexity of  nonmarket
influences in the host environment is through subsequent strategies. They entail
that companies act in an ad-hoc manner and remain passive until a nonmarket
issue becomes salient. They do not directly participate in the public policy or
regulation processes and ‘make no attempt to play a role in policy formation or
implementation’ (Hillman & Hitt, 1999, p.827). This type of  strategy implies that
foreign firms show nonmarket behavior after the new legislation or nonmarket
change has occurred in the host market.  
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Foreign firms which follow a subsequent strategy do not undertake any action
and/or plan until a nonmarket issue in the host environment arises and its effects
become noticeble. At this point they acknowledge it and design specific actions
to encounter these issues (Hillman & Hitt, 1999). Issue- or event- specificity and
ad-hoc actions are the most relevant features of  subsequent strategies (Kobrin,
1982). They initiate relatively short-term interactions and relations on an issue-
by-issue basis (Kaufmann, 1998). The substance of  these interactions, more
specifically the nonmarket issue is of  key importance and relevance for
subsequent behavior. The relationships and interactions developed by foreign
owned firms through subsequent strategy are of  non-repeated nature; reciprocity
between exchange partners is not possible which leads to self-interest motivated
actions (Uzzi, 1997). These actions are sporadic, temporary, and subject- specific.
Once the nonmarket issue is solved or its importance has decreased for the firm,
the relationships no longer exist (Keim, 1991; Kiewert &. McCubbins, 1991).   
Foreign firms applying subsequent strategies comply or are satisfied with the
requirements or incentives offered by the host government; they exhibit a sort
of  buffering behavior to minimize the impact on their operations (Boddewyn &
Brewer, 1994). These firms act in accordance with the requirements or changes
imposed by the nonmarket host environment adapting their expectations (Meznar
& Nigh, 1995; Coen & Doyle, 2002). They pursue a transactional approach to
the host nonmarket environment awaiting the development of  a significant public
policy issue before building a strategy to cope with this issue (Hillman & Hitt,
1999). Furthermore, firms could also practice a temporary grassroots
mobilization of  employees, suppliers, customers, advocacy advertising, public
relations, press conferences and political educational programs. The resources
and actors are immobilized provisionally to deal with a certain event or target
(Hillman & Hitt, 1999). Consequently, firms will identify, educate and motivate
action groups or stakeholders that may be affected by same policies that also
affect the firm (Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Keim & Zeithaml, 1986). Moreover,
peripheral costs in the forms of  campaign contributions, various donations or
other honoraria have final expectations for policy choices that are advantageous
for the firm itself  (Hillman & Hitt, 1999). Other peripheral costs are caused by
hiring individuals with host government experience, company members with a
political position in host governmental bodies or other sorts of  contributions
outside the market spam (Benton & Daly, 1991). Nonetheless, such actions are
regarded as ethically inappropriate in most (West-European) nonmarket
environments. 
Nonmarket strategies of  foreign owned firms in a small open economyCHAPTER 5
© C.L. Voinea 2011114
5.3.    firm characteristics and nonmarket strategies 
While it is widely understood that in the current business environment foreign
owned firms should go beyond formulating host market strategies and thoroughly
consider a complementary sort of  stratagems to encounter complex influences
outside the host market spam, there has been very little research that looks
explicitly at the type of  nonmarket strategy followed by foreign owned firms in
a host economy and the determinants or resources associated to these strategies.
The preference for implementing certain tactics is mainly determined by firm
characteristics, their internal resources, experience with the host institutions, and
the differences between their home and host settings (Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994;
Getz, 1997).
Mobilizing specific resources and skills outside the market spam was mentioned
by Mahon et al. (2004) with reference to corporate political capabilities. Wilson
(1980) cited that any resource can be converted into power usable in the political
and nonmarket environment. Yoffie and Bergenstein (1985) spoke of  the
accumulation by the firm of  a ‘political capital’. While Oberman (1993) favored
the term ‘institutional resources’ to describe political resources, Boddewyn (2000)
uses the term ‘nonmarket resources’ in a broader sense than Baron’s (1995)
‘nonmarket assets’.
Host governments and institutions can have a direct or indirect impact on FOFs’
profitability, for example with the passage of  legislation limiting domestic or
foreign entry by competitors into a market place, with agency rulings on final
rates in regulated industries or on the protection of  intellectual property, or with
judicial decisions in litigated disputes (Holburn & van den Bergh, 2004). Thus,
the differences amongst the home countries and what is relevant to the host
economy can also determine the type of  nonmarket strategy by means of  liability
of  foreignness issues (Zaheer, 1995). 
A number of  empirical studies have attempted to identify, with mixed success, a
relationship between various determinants and political strategies (Hillman &
Hitt, 1999; Wan & Hillman, 2006). Drawing on previous theoretical and empirical
research, this section explores the possible relationships of  the type of  nonmarket
strategy developed and implemented by the foreign owned forms and their
idiosyncratic features and resources. 
© C.L. Voinea 2011 115
Nonmarket strategies of  foreign owned firms in a small open economy CHAPTER 5
5.3.1.    Size
A strong held perspective in the literature indicates that firms’ size plays an
important role in their strategic nonmarket behavior or tactics (Hillman et al.,
2004). Foreign owned firms with a large resource and employment base have
more assets at risk, reason for which they are more affected by nonmarket issues
and changes in the host environment. Accordingly, they can benefit or lose to a
greater extent from changes related to legislation, regulations and standards
(Masters & Keim, 1985). Consistently, Bhuyan (2000) designates that large firms
would gain more from beneficial regulation than small and medium sized firms,
which often chose to free ride on the expense of  large corporations. Moreover,
large firms are interdependent on many stakeholders and nonmarket institutions
(Meznar & Nigh, 1995). They are motivated to develop and maintain long term
relations and networks with these stakeholders to solidify trust and reputation;
relations build as part of  foreseeing strategies. Furthermore, large firms enjoy a
higher visibility in the host setting and due to this exposure they are more
vulnerable to the power of  the government, media and other nonmarket related
actors (Getz, 1997). ‘The larger a firm becomes, the more likely it is to catch the
public’s eye’ (Meznar & Nigh, 1995; p. 980). 
Even though size seems to impact nonmarket actions taken, no endeavor
indicates whether large foreign owned firms prefer foreseeing or subsequent
nonmarket strategies. A possible relation can be found in the rationale of  the
organizational resources firms have at their disposal: large-sized firms have more
resources than medium sized firms (Hillman et al., 2004). Companies with more
resources to spent, more employees to assign have more possibilities for
continuous and long term involvement in the nonmarket arena (Bhuyan, 2000).
They also have to consider nonmarket issues related to host governments or
interest groups (such as labor unions) regarding the provisions for their
employees. It becomes relevant for them to develop relationships with
stakeholders, since the employment base presents a larger and more crucial part
of  a firm’s daily activity; consequently they are more likely to pursue foreseeing
nonmarket strategies. Therefore, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The larger the size of  the foreign owned firm, the higher the likelihood that it
will follow foreseeing nonmarket strategies rather than subsequent ones. 
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5.3.2.    Host country experience
The experience of  a foreign owned firm in the host country may also determine
its strategy and practices within nonmarket contexts through liability of
foreignness (Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Getz, 1997; Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994;
Murtha & Lenway, 1994; Baron, 1995). More than often, the experience of  a
foreign firm in the host country is as a proxy for the knowledge accumulated,
and the reputation and credibility it has build in the host setting (social capital)
(Hillman et al, 2004; Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994; Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Hillman,
2003). Liability of  foreignness (competitive disadvantage) can arise from the firm
lack of  experience and unfamiliarity with the local environment; the lack of  roots,
legitimacy and reputation in this setting. The implications caused by liability of
foreignness of  foreign owned companies for the nonmarket context and the
strategic choices to deal with it, vary by firm, industry, host country and home
country (Zaheer, 1995). 
Additionally, credible reputations are intrinsic to social capital, the tacit resource
attained through network building. A limited experience within host country
creates prospects and incentives to acquire knowledge and social capital (Hillman,
2003). Hogenbirk and van Kranenburg (2006) confirm that less experienced firms
have stronger incentives to build solid reputations, credibility and establish
themselves in the host country. Newly established firms with very limited host
experience have to become among others locally responsive. Local responsiveness
entails having knowledge about the host political, social, cultural sets; thus, the
nonmarket host setting (Uzzi, 1997). Therefore, they channelize their capabilities
on creating in-depth relations with policy decision makers and other nonmarket
related actors, on getting involved in nonmarket processes and relationship
networks which embed social capital (Luo, 1999). Consequently, we expect that
the foreign owned firms with low experience in the host country implement
foreseeing nonmarket strategies. Furthermore, we argue that host country
experience is related to foreseeing strategy as the time spend in the host economy
is associated to the intensity and embeddedness of  network relationships (Giroud
& Scott-Kennel, 2009). Therefore, we formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The lower the experience of  the foreign owned firm with the host country, the
higher the likelihood that it will implement foreseeing nonmarket strategies rather than
subsequent ones. 
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5.3.3.    Market scope
Market scope is another firm characteristic which has essential influence on the
approach to nonmarket strategy (Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Marx, 1990). The market
scope dictates whether the firm is focused on a single country or on multiple markets
which entails the specificity and spam of  the nonmarket strategy implemented. A
broad market scope allows firms to exploit opportunities on multiple markets;
however, they have to manage a complex range of  nonmarket
issues and actors dispersed in these multiple markets or countries (Jones & Hill,
1988). Navigating these myriad contexts as well as attempting to shape their public
policy outcomes leads to a complex and diverse nonmarket portfolio which poses
additional challenges for the foreign owned firms (Wan & Hillma, 2006). Firms will
deal with this large assortment of  actors and issues as they develop through time
and when the necessity arises (Marx, 1990). They use constituency building and
momentary mobilize employees, suppliers; temporary become allies of  groups and
stakeholders with shared policy interests (Hillman & Hitt, 1999); or use press
conferences when a nonmarket issue becomes important; overall, they provisionally
manage the nonmarket issue (Keim & Zeithaml, 1986). These potential (subsequent)
actions will be taken when and if  a certain nonmarket issue becomes relevant for
the firm (Kobrin, 1982). Therefore, the policy of  event-specificity and temporary
actions (only when needed) seems more likely to be adopted (Wan & Hillman, 2006).
However, foreign owned firms with narrower market scopes should mainly focus
on the acquisition of  knowledge about and how to deal with a single nonmarket
host setting. They have to focus on a relatively smaller set of  nonmarket issues and
actors. This set of  nonmarket issues, actors and institutions is less diverse; therefore,
it is easier for these firms to mobilize resources and stratagems to tackle them
(Baron, 1995). Furthermore, the activities of  these firms are strongly depending on
the institutional system or low spectrum of  nonmarket actors in the host country.
Consequently, this raises the awareness of  foreign owned firms for a clearly
established plan of  action which would minimize potential risks and threats coming
from the host country setting (Schaffer & Hillman, 2000). This action plan may
involve self-regulation or an internal system of  prevention to insure sound business
practices. Moreover, these firms can develop and refine a strong bargaining
technique, hire external experts, or employees with political expertise who would
craft and use this bargaining technique to negotiate with governments or other
nonmarket institutions in the host country (Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994). Such
foreseeing deeds enable foreign firms to decrease their liability and to maximize
protection against the multitude of  nonmarket actors and issues which may arise
across the narrow market scope.
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Thus, for the foreign firms with a scope on the host country market, the set of
nonmarket issues, actors, the potential risks and threats coming from the low
nonmarket spectrum can easily be reduced by adopting a foreseeing nonmarket
strategy in the host country. However, firms with a broad market scope have to
manage the increased range of  issues and threats which may arise from the broad
spectrum of  nonmarket settings; consequently they are more likely to opt for a 
policy of  event-specificity and temporary nonmarket strategy to deal with the
complexity of  actors and nonmarket issues in the multiple host settings.
Therefore, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The broader the market scope of  the foreign own firm, the higher the likelihood
that it will follow subsequent nonmarket strategies rather than foreseeing ones. 
5.3.4.    Regional headquarters function
The regional headquarters function of  a foreign owned firm establishes the
variety and complexity of  nonmarket actors and issues that its strategy has to
target or deal with. For many regional headquarters activities of  a firm there
corresponds a different set of  nonmarket actors, institutions and issues which
set standards and regulate the specific segment of  that activity. Foreign owned
firms with a regional headquarters function in the host country have diverse
market and nonmarket domains of  interest, policy implications and issues that
they have to manage (Bhuyan, 2000). They need to interact with nonmarket actors
on various production rules and regulations, marketing violations and labor
arrangements (nonmarket issues) since they presumably perform multiple
activities (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998). It becomes difficult to thoroughly consider
and assign actions meant to manage all the nonmarket domains.  For this reason,
they are likely to merely respond to these issues each time it is needed by
momentarily mobilizing resources and actions. This subsequent way is mostly
suited for managing the complexity and diversity of  the various nonmarket
segments. 
However, foreign owned firms with no regional headquarters function interact
with nonmarket actors related to only a few interest domains. They are able to
develop in-depth relations with this limited number of  decision makers specific
to those domains involved with their scope (Birkinshaw & Morrison, 1995).  The
foreign owned companies with no regional headquarters function can only focus
on the limited nonmarket areas and issues in the host country. Therefore, it is
easier for these firms to maintain continuous relations with this limited multitude 
© C.L. Voinea 2011 119
Nonmarket strategies of  foreign owned firms in a small open economy CHAPTER 5
of  nonmarket related actors. Consequently, their way to manage the nonmarket
actors and issues in the host country is a function principally process-focused
and operates on continuous basis, assigning to foreseeing behavior. Therefore,
we advance amid the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: Foreign owned firms with a regional headquarters function in a host environment
are more inclined to implement subsequent nonmarket strategies rather than foreseeing ones.
5.3.5.    Autonomy degree
Many studies refer to the autonomy of  the foreign owned firms from the
headquarters and its relationship to local responsiveness (Birkinshaw & Morrison,
1995; Benito et al., 2003; Taggart, 1997). Specific to the nonmarket field it
becomes investigating how much autonomy do foreign owned firms have to
develop nonmarket strategies and whether this autonomy would lead to
preferences for a particular type of  strategy. Foreign owned firms granted high
autonomy from the headquarters are more responsive to the local host
environment among which we distinguish its nonmarket aspects (Ferner et al.,
2004). They are better coping with unexpected difficulties and seize increased
benefits from opportunities (Taggart, 1997; Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1986). The
headquarters sets the corporate objectives on which foreign firms with high
autonomy have freedom to establish their specific course of  action to achieve
these objectives in the host context (Tagart, 1997). 
However, Shaffer and Hillman (2000) found evidence that only related foreign
owned firms pursue a centralized public policy strategy, whereas unrelated firms
often pursue decentralized manners of  encountering nonmarket issues (Vachani,
1999). Firms with decentralized relationships with the headquarters are granted
the autonomy to respond to nonmarket issues in their own best way (Edwards
et al., 2002). The headquarters cannot oversee nor have a ‘ready-to-use’ design
choice (recipe) for the strategy needed to deal with the different unrelated
nonmarket spectrum (where each of  its firms operates). Firms with restricted
autonomy develop only limited local responsiveness within host nonmarket
environments (Benito et al., 2003; Ferner et al., 2004). Therefore, we expect
foreign owned firms granted high autonomy degree from decentralized
headquarters to pursue foreseeing nonmarket strategies compared to the firms
which are centrally controlled. Though tentative, the following hypothesis can
be formulated:
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Hypothesis 5: The higher the autonomy degree of  the firm, the higher the likelihood that it will
implement foreseeing nonmarket strategies rather than subsequent ones in the host environment.
5.3.6. Country diﬀerence
The home country background of  foreign owned firm impacts the way it
interacts and responds to the host setting due to the psychic distance between
the country of  origin and the host country. This psychic distance is given by the
institutional, political, economical and cultural differences between the two
countries (Miller & Richards, 2002). The institutional distance between the home
and the host country adversely affects the ability of  the foreign firms to
understand and interpret local context standards (Kostova & Zaheer, 2002). For
the characterization of  institutional systems in different countries, Murtha and
Lenway (1994) present the pluralism/corporatism continuum. This continuum
is based on country level characteristics such as governance type (transactional
governance or planning governance), institutional relations and the overall
stability of  the country. Along this continuum there are two types of  countries,
i.e. pluralist and corporatist countries or systems (Murtha & Lenway, 1994).
Foreign owned firms with corporatist background often try to ‘build social capital
and create positive-sum outcomes’ (Hillman & Hitt, 1999, p. 830). They focus
on consensus and cooperation as dictated/institutionalized in their home country
experience (Bonardi, 2008). Foreign owned firms from pluralist home countries
are more selective in their involvement with different nonmarket issues. Since
political and overall nonmarket issues are diverse and constantly changing in
pluralist countries, these firms are inclined to only participate on the public arena
involving no more than issues affecting them (Hillman & Hitt, 1999). Fenton-
O’Creevy et al. (2008) indicate that when host and home country systems
significantly diverge, foreign owned firms will ‘actively resist host country
institutional pressures’ (p. 152) and they will not design a specific strategy targeted
and customized to deal with the host nonmarket context. They will maintain their
home grounded action plan. This expectancy is based on the rationale that MNEs
seek internal consistency with regard to norms and values; pursuing to fulfill
shareholder value or a wider set of  stakeholder interests (Fenton-O’Creevy, 2008).
In this view of  internal consistency, corporate norms and values would also be
enforced on the foreign owned firms in host countries, even though different
norms and values might prevail locally. When host and home country systems
barely differ subsequently the host system does not harm their legitimacy. Thus,
foreign owned firms see low risks and benefits in complying with host country
pressures (Hillman, 2003). They will abide by their own uniform and will not  
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clairvoyantly design new strategies specific for dealing with the host country
setting (Prakash, 2002). Consequently, their way to deal with nonmarket actors
and issues in the host country is mainly ad hoc and sporadic. Therefore, we
formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6: The lower the difference between host and home country background, the higher
the likelihood that the foreign owned firm will implement subsequent nonmarket strategies rather
than foreseeing ones. 
5.4.    methodology 
5.4.1.    Sample
This study uses data from foreign owned firms located in the Netherlands. It is
generally assumed that the Netherlands is among those small economies that
attract FDI due to their favorable geographic location. The data for this study
were gathered using a postal questionnaire survey conducted among managing
directors of  foreign owned establishments in the Netherlands in the summer of
2009. The data collection process consisted of  an initial mailing, a reminder and
a telephone call (where necessary). We used the Dutch Invest database 2007 to
select the foreign owned firms in the Netherlands. This database contains
information on the physical and postal address, contact information, names of
executives, number of  employees, country of  origin, SIC codes and sector. Our
initial sample of  900 firms was selected on criteria of  industry representativeness
and firm size. Van Kranenburg and Burger (2009) show that only medium and
large foreign owned firms in the Netherlands implement nonmarket strategies,
in particular political strategies. As political strategies is one of  the integral aspects
of  nonmarket area we focused our investigation on medium and large firms.
The number of  returned response was in total 180 out of  900 representing
foreign owned firms operating in the Netherlands ( with mother companies from
21 countries including Austria, Belgium, Bermuda, Canada, Denmark, England,
Finland, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Norway,
Portugal, South-Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and US). Missing survey data
reduced the number of  usable responses to 160 representing around 18 percent
of  the sampled group. 
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5.4.2. Variables
Dependent variable
The Dependent variable form of  nonmarket strategy is constructed from the
questionnaire survey. Survey questions measured whether each foreign owned
firm uses a subsequent or foreseeing nonmarket strategy. Based on a 5-point scale
ranging from ‘never used’( indicating various possible actions specific to
subsequent behavior) to “continuously used’ actions, specific to foreseeing
strategies. The inquiring actions ranging from ‘never used’ to ‘continuously used’
are as follows: business associations’ participation; partnerships to influence
political issues; interest groups awareness and networks; lobbying; supply of
technical reports to regulators; press releases; testimonies in expert hearings;
contributions to political parties; presence of  firm’s members in political parties;
employing people with political experience; employee training for trade union
participation; employee training for media relations; develop internal prevention
system; develop internal monitoring system; pro-active self  changing and
regulation; building socially responsible reputations; challenge of  government
regulations; interactions with local governments; interactions with national
governments; active cooperation with Dutch institutions; ad-hoc cooperation
with Dutch institutions; having a clearly established set of  action to deal with
Dutch institutions; providing local or national governments with products or
services. 
For each firm the average score on subsequent was compared to the score on
foreseeing; the firms which had the score for subsequent higher than 0.5 were
coded as implementing subsequent (nonmarket) strategy; the firms with a score
for foreseeing higher than 0.5 were coded implementing foreseeing (nonmarket)
strategy. Interestingly, all respondent foreign owned firms showed the tendency
to fall neatly into one or the other category, thus either subsequent or foreseeing.
In our sample there was no foreign owned firm for which it proved difficult to
establish whether it pursuits one or the other type of  nonmarket strategy.
Consequently, Hillman and Hitt's (1999) supposition that firms could
conceptually use both approaches does not appear to hold for our sample.
Independent variables
The variable Size is measured as the number of  employees at the foreign owned
firm in the Netherland (Hypothesis 1). According to Keim and Baysinger (1988)
the number of  employees relates directly to the ability of  the firm to generate
constituency support and leverage with the nonmarket actors. We rescaled the
variable by dividing by 10. The logged  indicator of  size was used in the analysis.
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The host country experience of  the foreign owned subsidiary is indicated by the
variable host country experience (Hypothesis 2). It is measured by the number of
years since the firm has established its operations in the Netherlands.
To test Hypothesis 3 we created the variable market scope. This measure is based
on the destination of  the foreign firm’s sales from the Netherlands.  We asked
the managing director to indicate which percentage share of  the total sales of
the foreign owned firm is going to the host country market. These shares were
used to create the market scope variable ranging between 0 and 1; whereas the
closer to 0 indicates broad market scope and the closer to 1 narrow market scope. 
The variable Regional Headquarters function indicates whether the foreign owned
firm operates as a regional headquarters (Hypothesis 4). It is a dummy with the
value of  1 if  the firm in the host country has a regional headquarters function
and with a value of  0 if  it has no regional headquarters function. 
Autonomy degree indicates the level of  autonomy of  the foreign owned firm to
make strategic decisions for the market and nonmarket environment in the host
country (Hypothesis 5). We inquired about the following decisions whether they
were made at the headquarters level (corporate parent) or at the subsidiary (FOF)
level: business strategy, marketing and sales activities, manufacturing activities,
logistic activities, research and development activities, industrial relations, relations
with government, with interest groups, with the media, press releases, political
arena involvement, business associations participation, coalition forming,
constituency building, financial contributions of  various types, charity donations
and relations with nongovernmental organizations. The closer the value of  the
index is to 0, the more decisions are made at headquarters level, and thus the
lower the autonomy of  the foreign owned firm in host country. An autonomy
index was created ranging between 0 and 1. The closer this index is to 1, the more
decisions are made at parent firm (headquarters level) level, thus the higher the
autonomy of  the foreign owned firm in the host context. 
Country Difference captures the difference in political systems concerning the
political ideology between the home country of  the foreign firm and the host
country (Hypothesis 6). This variable is based on the difference in Beck’s political
ideology scale between the countries (Beck et al., 2001). Dow and Karunaratna
(2006) showed that Beck’s political ideology scale provides a good indication of
the more general psychic distance measure. 
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Control variables
The decision to follow a foreseeing or a subsequent nonmarket strategy by the
firm can also be affected by the number of  other subsidiaries of  the parent
company in the same host environment. The more subsidiaries the MNE has in
the host environment, the more likely that the MNE enjoys higher visibility in
the host setting and due to this exposure it more vulnerable to the power of  the
nonmarket related actors (Getz, 1997). Therefore, foreign firms with a corporate
parent that has established many subsidiaries within the host environment will
generally prefer the foreseeing strategy over the subsequent nonmarket strategy.
The variable number of  other subsidiaries indicates the MNE visibility in the host
country. It is measured by the total number of  other foreign owned firms with
the same parent company in the host country. 
The preference of  the kind of  nonmarket strategies to follow by a foreign firm
in a host environment can differ between industries. Therefore, we control for
possible industry effects with the variable industry dummies for the three most
favourable industries for foreign firms in the Netherlands. The three industries
are: manufacturing, finance and insurance, and services. 
5.5.    Analysis and results
Table 5.1 presents the descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix for the
variables in this study. Correlation is very low for most variables, indicating that
multicollinearity is not a problem. 
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In addition, variance inflated factors (VIF) were calculated by running “artificial”
OLS regressions between each independent variable as the “dependent” variable
and the remaining independent variables (Maddala, 2000). As all VIF values are
smaller than 1.5, this indicates that there is no multicollinearity between the
variables.
It is worth mentioning that 56.25 % of  the foreign owned firms use foreseeing
strategies to manage the host nonmarket context while 43.75 % of  our sample
follows subsequent strategies. We used a binomial logit model to test our
hypotheses. Given the rather unambiguous nature of  the results, we will only
discuss the results of  the full model. Compared to the other models, the full
model has the expected lowest log-likelihood value.  In terms of  the overall fit
of  the model, the binomial logit model correctly predicts 71.25% of  the
formulated and implemented nonmarket strategies of  firms in the host
environment.  Table 5.2 presents the results of  the binomial logit model by
NLOGIT 4.0. 
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Table 5.2. Estimation results of binomial logit nonmarket strategy
model
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Note: Standard Errors in parentheses, *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, and ***p < 0.01
We also estimated the binomial logit model with the variables size, host country
experience, and number of  other subsidiaries transformed into logarithms. The
estimates of  this model showed similar results as the model with no transformed
variables. Therefore, we discuss only the results of  the model with the variables
that are not transformed. Turning to hypotheses testing, we find clear results for
the independent variables as well as for the control variables. Consistent with
hypothesis 1, the larger the size of  the foreign owned firms, the more they use
their resources for designing and implementing foreseeing actions in order to
manage the host nonmarket context. Also, as suggested by Hypothesis 2, the
lower the experience that they have within the host country, the more foreign 
owned companies will use foreseeing strategies to develop relationship networks
with nonmarket actors and acquire valuable information about nonmarket
specific issues of  the host setting. Based on the results, we can accept Hypothesis
3. As advocated by this hypothesis, the narrower the market scope, when the
operations of  the foreign owned companies target mainly the market and
nonmarket host country environments, the more they prefer to develop
foreseeing strategies to insure credible reputations and prevent possible risks or
threats coming from the nonmarket arena. Furthermore, we also expected that
the foreign firms with a regional headquarters function in a host environment
would prefer subsequent nonmarket strategies over foreseeing nonmarket
strategies (Hypothesis 4). Our results do indicate that firms with regional
headquarters function would prefer to follow subsequent nonmarket strategies
over foreseeing ones. As for the effect of  the degree of  autonomy of  the firm
to decide on its own market and nonmarket strategies (Hypothesis 5), it turns
out that the degree of  autonomy has no significant impact on the choice for the
different forms of  nonmarket strategies. Furthermore, the results indicate that
difference on political systems between the host and home country of  the foreign
owned firm have no effect on the preference for particular forms of  nonmarket
strategies applied by the foreign owned firms. Consequently, Hypothesis 6 is
rejected. 
Interestingly, the result for the control variable number of  other subsidiaries in
the host country indicates that the number of  other foreign firms owned by the
same parent in the host market has a significant impact on the preference for a
particular nonmarket strategy. Foreign firms with the same parent of  a large
number of  other subsidiaries in the host country prefer to follow foreseeing
strategies. Foreign owned firms whose parent is not diversified (as to number of
interactions and firms controlled in the host country) opt for subsequent
strategies. With respect to the industry control variables, the industry dummies
have no effect on the preference for a particular form of  nonmarket strategy. 
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Table 5.3. Estimation results of the marginal eﬀects of the
nonmarket strategy model
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Note: Standard Errors in parentheses, *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, and ***p < 0.01
It is also useful to examine marginal effects that show the change in predicted
probability associated with changes in the independent and control variables.
Table 5.3 presents the marginal effects of  the explanatory variables. An
examination of  the marginal effects indicates the direction of  the impact of  the
independent and control variables on the preference of  the form of  nonmarket 
strategy implemented by foreign firms in a host environment, as well as their
level of  significance. The results show that a one point increase in the number
of  employees increases the probability that a foreign firm in a host environment
will formulate and implement a foreseeing nonmarket strategy with 0.01.
Furthermore, an increase in host country experience of  the foreign firm decreases
the probability that foreign firms prefer a foreseeing nonmarket strategy with
0.01. The result for market scope of  the foreign firm is also interesting. An
increase in sales scope of  the firm on the host country market has a negative
effect of  0.25 on the probability of  the preference of  the firm to implement a
subsequent nonmarket strategy. The evidence also shows that firms with a
regional headquarters function have a higher probability of  0.22 to follow a
subsequent nonmarket strategy than a foreseeing nonmarket strategy. The results
of  the industry dummies show that foreign firms in the manufacturing, service,
and finance and insurance industries do not prefer one form of  nonmarket
strategy over the other. Finally, an interesting result is shown by the number of
other subsidiaries from the same parent in the host environment. An increase in
the number of  another establishment in the same host environment will increase
the probability that the firms with the same partner will prefer to follow a
foreseeing nonmarket strategy. 
Hence, the evidence of  the marginal effects also indicates that the preference for
the form of  nonmarket strategy is not only affected by foreign firm size,
experience and market scope, but also influenced by its function and other firms
with the same parent in the same host environment.
5.6.     discussion and conclusions
Our research goal was to explore the nonmarket strategies implemented by
foreign owned firms in a host small open economy and to identify which firm’s
characteristics and resources determine the preference for the form of  nonmarket
strategy. Nonmarket strategies might also be translated to the management of
institutions, and our analysis departs from institutional theory. As most
comprehensive and inclusive nonmarket strategies we proposed foreseeing vs.
subsequent nonmarket strategy. Based on international business and corporate
political strategy literature, we identified six firm’s idiosyncratic features: size,
host country experience, market scope, regional headquarters function, country
difference and autonomy degree likely to affect the predilection for implementing
a specific form of  nonmarket strategy. As control factors we considered the
number of  other firms from the same parent in the host country and the industry 
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in which the foreign firm operates. 
Results confirm that large foreign owned firms implement foreseeing strategies
while small and medium sized ones follow subsequent strategies. This result is
consistent with Bhuyan’s ideas (2000), and partially consistent with Wan and
Hillman (2006) who also found a positive relationship between firm size and
corporate political strategy. Our nonmarket approach is overarching political
aspects of  the business environment, reason for which we affirm the partiality
in results with the above mentioned scholars. Large foreign owned firms with
substantial employment base in the host country need to consider certain
nonmarket issues regarding the provisions for their employees. Due to their
significance in the host economy, large foreign firms have the capacity to develop
and maintain long term co-operations with diverse nonmarket related actors.
They have more assets at risk; this increases their incentives to foresee and engage
within nonmarket contexts (Masters and Keim, 1985). 
Regarding host country experience our empirical findings show that foreign
owned firms with more experience in the host country are inclined to implement
subsequent strategies while the less experienced firms use foreseeing strategies.
These findings are consistent with the perspectives of  Hillman and Hitt (1999)
and Nahapiet & Ghoshal (1998). Albeit the experience of  a foreign owned firm
in the host country indicates commitment and repeated dealings with host
nonmarket related actors throughout the years, in time the firm develops tacit
knowledge and abilities to deal with the nonmarket host environment and actors.
Likewise, young established foreign owned firms are motivated to implement
foreseeing strategies meant to develop social capital derived from the network
of  relationships (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). These firms with limited
experience, local reputation and credibility, are motivated to make use of
foreseeing strategies to establish themselves among the host nonmarket actors
(Luo, 1999). The liability of  foreignness in a host environment affects young
foreign owned firms more than older, more experienced ones (Zaheer, 1995). 
Foreign owned firms with a narrow market scope prefer to follow foreseeing
nonmarket strategies over subsequent strategies. This result is in line with other
studies (Bhuyan, 2000: Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Marx, 1990; Schaffer & Hillman,
2000). They found that foreign owned firms operating only on local markets are
generally more able to acquire extra knowledge and develop intensified
interactions with nonmarket linked actors. These foreign owned firms are less
likely to uphold continuous in-depth collaborations due to the one host market
focus. The evidence on the type of  nonmarket strategy implemented by the 
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foreign owned firms in a host market depending on firm’s characteristics also
shows that the function regional Headquarters significantly determines the
preference for a particular type of  nonmarket strategic behavior. Foreign owned
firms with a regional Headquarters function subsequently deal with the host
nonmarket context, while the ones with no Headquarters function pursue
foreseeing strategies in the same nonmarket context. Firms with no regional
Headquarters function have the possibility to focus only on host nonmarket
issues and areas, while firms with a regional Headquarters function not only
should focus on the host country but probably also at other host countries. 
When the function of  the firm in the host country is not only to monitor and
coordinate its activities in this market but also the activities of  other firms within
the parent company it will be more incline to implement subsequent nonmarket
strategies.  In general, it is more difficult for these firms to generate knowledge,
to thoroughly build up expertise and collaborations with a few nonmarket actors
relevant to their scopes. Our empirical investigation of  the regional Headquarters
function vis-à-vis nonmarket strategy constitutes a first initiative in the field. 
Even though Hillman & Hitt (1999) found a relationship between difference in
political systems and the choice for political strategies, we did not find evidence
for the same predictions in the case of  nonmarket strategies. Nonmarket
strategies target a higher spectrum of  institutions or linked actors than political
strategies. Moreover, the elements used to categorize a country mainly based on
political systems characteristics are probably too narrow compared to the
nonmarket spectrum. 
Related to the foreign owned firms’ autonomy degree it becomes obvious that
no matter if  the firm enjoys a high or low autonomy from the corporate parent,
this autonomy cannot predict any indication with respect to the specific
nonmarket strategy implemented. Provided that a foreign owned firm would have
high autonomy degree this only shows that it has the freedom to establish/decide
on its own a certain type of  nonmarket strategy. But whether this strategic
behavior would be foreseeing or subsequent, it cannot be further predicted by
its autonomy degree. The same rationale stands for foreign owned firms with
low autonomy. 
The presence and number of  other firms with the same parent in the host
country proved to have a significant impact on the type of  nonmarket strategy.
This finding adds to the perspective of  Marx (1990), Schaffer and Hillman (2000).
The experience within the host country is given by the (numerous interactions)
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with the host context, by the (host country related) knowledge accumulated by
the parent company, by the strength of  involvement and collaborations with
specific actors of  this host setting (Marx, 1990). Numerous interactions with
nonmarket related actors and long term relations increase the knowledge of  the
parent about the host context. Consistently, numerous firms from the same MNE
implies repeated contacts with host actors and more possibilities of  developing
in-depth relationships with these actors among which the nonmarket linked ones.
They can deal with interest groups or gain media coverage; thus, develop a
continuous loop of  various forms of  interactions with a wide range of
nonmarket actors (Bonardi & Keim, 2005). A high number of  firms having the
same parent implied numerous interactions and increased possibilities for
collaborations. Foreseeing behavior is a way to benefit from social capital
development brought by networking and frequent exchanges. Numerous
opportunities to interact with the host political, regulatory, and standards
institutions, deal with interest groups or gain media exposure, thus a continuous
loop of  various forms of  exchanges and contacts.
Scholars generally agree that institutional, industry and firm level variables are
important determinants of  political and nonmarket strategies. By inferring into
these general premises, we further investigate and provide important empirical
evidence which reveal specific firm characteristics, resources and determinants
of  their nonmarket strategic behavior. Research on networks and inter-
organizational politics suggests that collaboration can help organizations achieve
a more central and influential position in relation to other organizations. While
these effects have been identified and discussed at some length, little attention
has been paid to the relationship between them and the nature of  the
collaborations that produce them (Hardy et al., 2003). We advance the field
beyond simple presumptions of  sporadic nonmarket actions. This research shows
the wide spectrum of  nonmarket proceedings which firms have at their disposal
in formulating their strategies and explain the dynamics and idiosyncratic features
leading up to these strategies. We elucidate managers toward both context and
internal resources considered when making strategic choices and the prudent
approach in dealing with nonmarket related actors in their particular situation
(Shaver, 1998); especially if  they aim to develop particular social capital, networks,
and responsiveness to the host country; or become embedded in the host country
business setting. The benefits of  nonmarket strategies should outweigh the costs
of  developing it (Getz, 1997). Firms should thereby also consider the
effectiveness of  alternative actions (Baum et al, 2000). Additionally, firms should
include nonmarket strategies as a solution to issues arising from the institutional
environment because it is already an embedded, integrated part (tool) of  their  
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overall strategy, which they can further start regarding and assessing as separated
strategy, and further expand and refine it (Cyert, 1963). Firms have already started
to institutionalize nonmarket actions by having created a public affairs department
or government relations department taking continuously care of  nonmarket
threats and opportunities (Getz, 1997). In these cases, nonmarket strategies will
obviously often be used as a potential answer to problems arising in the
institutional environment (Bonardi & Keim, 2005). By contrast, the political and
social image of  the firm (which often dresses as a ‘corporate citizen’, pretending
to be ‘socially responsible’) is a perception by the general public. Its memory is
much shorter and its opinion more shaped by the media than the perception of
the interest group.
Conceptualizing nonmarket strategies on the basis of  foreign owned firms in a
host environment begins to tackle this complex but imperative topic. The
strategic management and international business literature has accumulated a vast
amount of  knowledge on FDI over the years. Nonetheless, the nonmarket
strategy topic has received much less attention so far. Given the political,
regulatory and further nonmarket related aspects involved with foreign owned
firms’ activities, a more inclusive approach focusing on both market and
nonmarket aspects shed important light in the understanding of  FDI. Our study
represents an empirical advance in its field however a number of  further lines
of  research deserve attention in future work. Although industry was not
significant in determining the type of  nonmarket strategy, further research may
uncover other collective level variables that may affect such choices. Future
research could also consider the host country influence on the nonmarket strategy
applied. Nonmarket queries are also inherently tied to the rationales of  corporate
action reason for which we suggest for future research to include corporate
relevant factors into the analysis. 
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ChApter 6
when do foreIgn owned fIrms use fIre-
fIghtIng ACtIons to deAl wIth the
medIA? A  resourCe BAsed vIew
This chapter explores the types of  actions chosen by foreign owned firms to
manage the influences of  the host media and to exploit the possible benefits that
this media can convey to their business activities from a resource base perspective.
As most comprehensive and inclusive types of  actions dedicated to media, we
explore two particular forms, namely fire-fighting and strategic actions. Evidence
is provided by a survey sample of  160 foreign owned firms operating in the
Netherlands. Results show that young foreign owned firms with a broad market
focus and with low perception of  media power in the host society are more
inclined to utilize fire-fighting actions; while older foreign owned firms with a
market focus on the host economy are predisposed to employ strategic actions
to manage the media effects. Empirical outcome also indicates that foreign owned
firms from the service industries prefer to employ strategic actions to manage
the influences of  host media institutions and issues.
6.1.    Introduction
In an open economy due to globalization and the development of
communication technologies the media has become a powerful institution within
the broader framework of  social, cultural, political, and economic structures of
society. However, the role of  the media is not fixed nor well-defined, but it is
determined, implemented, and interpreted by legislatures, government
administrative agencies, judicial institutions, public sentiment and ethical
consensus specific to each country. For this reason, foreign owned firms
operating in an unfamiliar host environment augment their exposure and
vulnerability to host media pressures (Miller, 1991; Dean & Brown, 1995). The
variation of  the role of  the media across countries is a process of  cultural  
dependency and it is significantly attributed to the involvement of  any state or
government apparatus consolidating national identity (Hamelink, 1979).
Simultaneously, cultural differences between countries also result in media
functions and impact differences as well; reason for which foreign owned firms
should acknowledge that their practices might be perceived and interpreted
differently by the host media than in the home country (McQuail, 1994). Hereby,
the media becomes a vehicle for cultural expression and cultural cohesion
between the values of  the home country of  the foreign owned firms and the
host values (Bucy, 2003). Given that the media continuously shapes the public
opinion through the content it communicates, firms can use the media’s influence
to craft their image and build civic legitimacy among stakeholders at large.
However, as the media controls the intentions, plans, knowledge, beliefs, or
opinions that is, mental representations that monitor explicit activities, it also
affect firms’ reputation (building) by equipping the society with the tools
necessary to make informed choices over business practices (van Dijk, 1992). As
a result, media can help craft or shatter firms’ image and reputation among society
in general or diverse stakeholders. Furthermore, as the media also influences the
visibility and exposure of  their practices, foreign owned firms should consider
this worthy and multifarious stakeholder (Neuman et al., 1992) and the actions
used to manage it. These actions could serve to either buffer their organizations
from the host media’s impact or to utilize the host media to improve their image,
reputation and legitimacy in the host country (Baron & Diermeier, 2007). One
type of  actions through which foreign owned firms can deal with the intrinsic
complexity of  the host media entails fire-fighting actions - short term, easily
reversible, and adaptive measures. They involve few resources and they are
relatively easy to implement and reverse (Chen, 1996).  Another type of  actions
that foreign owned firms can employ are strategic actions to capitalize on the
information transfer, reputation and legitimacy building (Mahon et al., 2004).
Strategic actions involve a more significant commitment of  resources and they
are more intricate to implement and reverse (Chen, 1996). These actions are long
termed and they entail a careful analysis of  specific characteristics of  host media
(institutions), its pluralistic issues and a clearly established action plan to manage
these issues (Miller & Wanta, 1996). The choice for a certain type of  media
actions depends on how these firms perceive the media power in the host society
and the resources they dispose of  to employ in these actions (Baron, 1995;
Schaffer & Hillman, 2000). 
Therefore, this study explores the types of  actions chosen by foreign owned firms
to manage the media and argues the necessity to understand the dynamics
employed in public arenas to encounter influences from the media. We employ
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a resources based perspective in studying the type of  media actions. Evidence in
brought from the Netherlands. The Netherlands represents the fifth largest
recipient of  foreign investments in the world and, due to its favorable location
and active role within the European Union many multinational enterprises
(MNEs) have chosen the Netherlands as strategic orientation. This host setting
becomes a suitable and worthy example of  a host economy with an intense
presence of  foreign owned firms in which to investigate their media actions. 
The structure of  this exploratory study is as follows. Section 2 provides an
extensive review highlighting the plethora of  fire-fighting and strategic actions
which enable foreign owned firms to manage the media. Section 3 elaborates on
the resource vased view of  the media actions of  firms and states our hypotheses.
Section 4 presents the sample, data sources and operationalization of  the variables
used to test the hypotheses. Empirical results are presented in section 5, while
section 6 discusses the findings, states the conclusions, the contribution of  our
work and the implications for practice.
6.2.    exploring ﬁre-ﬁghting and strategic actions to manage
the media
The media disseminates and presents the stories, ideas and information about
the foreign owned firms’ practices and shape the image, reputation, and legitimacy
of  these firms in the host context (Dean & Brown, 1995). The media also
facilitates debates between foreign owned firms and diverse host institutions and
it poses as an advocate and a social actor respecting and promoting pluralistic
values (McQuail, 1997). Foreign owned firms can interact with the media through
fire-fighting actions usually to achieve short term objectives or to provide an
adaptive response to a specific-event (Chen, 1996). Such actions typically consist
of  incremental and reversible measures utilized to respond to negative media
exposure and to provide immediate needed remedies. Therefore, issue or event-
specificity and ad-hoc actions are relevant characteristics of  fire-fighting practices
(Kobrin, 1982). They are responses initiated as short-term interactions and on
an issue-by-issue basis (Kaufmann, 1998). For the implementation of  fire-fighting
actions foreign owned firms do not need to identify the most influential media
channels and organizations in order to develop specific stratagems to persuade
them over certain reputations. When a specific circumstance arises then foreign
owned firms take temporary action targeted at the organization that caused the
issue. These remedies serve to adjust the image or position vis-à-vis the issue of
dispute and to redeem the company’s stance. Accordingly, fire-fighting actions 
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usually target the media institutions which have caused the impact or spurred the
momentary matters. For this reason, foreign owned firms make use of  fire-
fighting actions when the effects have become perceptible and needed (Hillman
& Hitt, 1999; Mitchell & Blumler, 1994). Generally, fire-fighting actions are easy
to deploy and they do not involve intricate resources and capabilities build within
the organizations. They are handy tools for foreign owned firms to quickly
manage the contingencies from the host media without attempting a fit between
the organizational strategy and structure to these contingencies (Donaldson,
1996). They offer fast solutions to unexpected problems reason for which foreign
owned firms use their public relations, and press conferences for a specific issue
rather than having in-house specialists working on a continuous base to improve
relations with media and reputation building. Such actions do not involve costly
investments such as employee training programs. Thus, resources and actors are
provisionally immobilized (Hillman & Hitt, 1999) and once the issue is solved or
remedied the media awareness reduces its priority (Kiewert &. McCubbins, 1991). 
Another way for foreign owned firms to manage the host media is through
strategic actions which involve a significant commitment of  organizational
resources and they are intricate to implement and reverse (Chen, 1996). This
action type initially entails a careful consideration of  specific characteristics of
the host media such as diversity of  media institutions, its pluralistic issues,
transparency and its most influential means (Miller & Wanta, 1996). According
to this scrutiny, foreign owned firms establish long term objectives aimed to align
foreign owned firms’ way of  doing business with the features detected during
the initial screening. They can used the media to achieve their goals by means of
strategic actions (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). Strategic actions also show the
commitment of  the foreign owned firms to the host environment. However,
these actions require dedication of  specific organizational resources deployed to
analyze the host media institutions, to specialize in communicating techniques
with and through these institutions and to develop long term relations. Such
strategic actions also help foreign owned firms to utilize the media in creating
responsible reputations (public perception of  foreign owned firms mission and
practices) that can further avoid becoming the target of  negative public
perception (Bramson, 2007). Press releases regarding various public matters
highly scrutinized in the host setting or by the host media are also ways to manage
reputations and create a certain stand vis-à-vis interest issues of  the host society.
Nonetheless, the success of  these releases depends on when they are sent,
through which media organizations they are sent, and how they are sent
(Hutchins Commision, 1947; Bertrand, 2000). For this reason strategic action
planning is concerned with finding the most suitable moment to act and the most 
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potential media organizations to interact with (Holburn & van den Bergh, 2004).
Foreign owned firms rationally brush up on the firms’ reputation and media skills
by hiring media experts or by training their employees on media relations.
Strategic actions repertoire also entail a more strategic screening and further
adaptation to the contingencies of  host media and they require resource
allocation for putting into practice this adaptation (Donaldson, 1996). To a certain
extent these actions do attempt a fit between the media contingencies and
organizational strategic adaptation (Reed, 1985, Pennings et al., 1998)
Thus, strategic actions imply plainly defined and precise objectives of  previewing
certain influences before taking place and diminishing their impact on the foreign
owned firms’ business activities (Tanzi, 1998). As media generally covers issues
of  high societal significance and increased audience interest (Baron, 2006; Wanta
& Hu, 1994), foreign owned firms should anticipate which issues will attract
media coverage and how they will be treated. To support such objectives, foreign
owned firms can contract suitable media experts and public relations specialists
for media relations. Whether foreign owned firms prefer to implement strategic
or fire-fighting actions depends on the way these firms perceive the media power
and the resources they have available to deploy for or engage in such actions
(Hillman et al., 2004). Therefore, the following section discusses the perception
of  the media power in the host society and firm’s resources in relation to the
type of  media actions.  
6.3.    resource based perspective on ﬁre-ﬁghting and
strategic actions
This section explores key determinants of  fire-fighting and strategic actions
utilized by foreign owned firms to cope with the media’s pressures and attain
certain advantages within the host economy. The preference for a certain type
of  media actions, fire-fighting or strategic, is discussed in relationship with the
way these firms perceive the media power in the host society and the resources
they dispose of  to employ in these actions (Hodges, 1986; Kiousis, 2004;
Greenberg, 1966). 
When do foreign owned firms use fire-fighting actions to deal with the media?CHAPTER 6
© C.L. Voinea 2011140
6.3.1.    Perceived media power
Media power is a form of  mind control and influence which is indirectly accessed
through mental representations and the content the media communicates. Such
matters require a more explicit insight into the representations of  the social mind.
The fields of  cognitive and social psychology show that the perceived media
power involves aspects of  credibility, public accountability, responsibility, and
answerability (van Dijk, 1992; Fudenberg et al., 1994). In terms of  credibility,
media power indicates the extent to which the media controls the mental
representations of  the public (Haley, 1996). While, accountability is defined as
the capacity and willingness to render account for its own actions, responsibility
has to do with proper conduct (Brummer, 1991). This conduct is contracted or
assigned to the media by governments and legislation, or by social, moral and
ethical consensus, culturally specific to each context. However, McQuail (1997)
discusses media power also as a form of  answerability distinguishing between
two kinds of  liability involved by this power: negative liability, when the media
causes damages for reputation and image and positive liability, when through the
media certain goals are achieved by these firms (answerability) (Bardoel, 1996;
Bardoel & d’Haenens, 2004). Every setting provides formal regulations stipulating
the media’s activities and conduct (Robinson et al., 1997). However, due to the
recent and more commercial media reality, the media is steadily losing its
autonomy to the interests of  management and shareholders. In this view,
shareholders and networks are means of  making use of  media power. In this
situation, its autonomy and the ability to uncover malpractice and corruption at
all levels of  society and to hold governments and business accountable for their
actions is highly skewed. 
As the role and power of  the media are determined, implemented, and
interpreted by host legislatures, government administrative agencies, judicial
institutions, public opinion and ethical consensus specific to each host setting
(Gans, 1998; Rogriguez et al., 2005; Miller & Wanta, 1996), the power of  the
media in the host setting may also differ from the home setting of  the foreign
owned firm. The roel of  power of  media becomes even more complex when
firms have to deal with host settings. Depending on how these firms perceive
the media influence power in the host society, they will decide on the necessity
and depth of  actions to handle this power. If  the foreign firm perceives the host
media as being strongly influential to the public opinion, society and stakeholders,
then they will dedicate specific resources and design actions to manage this
influence. In this case, foreign owned firms see more opportunities from making
use of  the media power to build a certain reputation and legitimacy among the 
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host stakeholders. When the media has strong influence power, then intricate
actions seem worth the effort. Foreign owned firms will try to make use of  this
power to create perceptions and outer representations of  their organizational
image, scope and practices. Thus, they recognize the opportunities from aligning 
and adapting the organization to external media contingencies because of
increased benefits. Firms become motivated to establish a precise action plan and
long term objectives to make use of  this influence power for the benefit of  the
firm itself. Instead of  using sporadic conferences which would serve temporary
purposes, foreign firms should contract media specialists to assist in building
strong reputation and favorable image among host media’s institutions as these
dictate the society perceptions as well (Greenberg, 1966). 
However, when the perceived media power is low, then foreign owned firms do
not see the feasibility of  deploying organizational resources and using higher cost
actions as the media does not have the power to contribute to reputation building
or it cannot highly influence their business activities (Kiewert &. McCubbins,
1991). In this situation foreign owned firms utilize temporary, and easy to
implement fire-fighting actions which provide them with the buffer against
scattered events with low implications for their business activities (Chen, 1996).
This actions repertoire includes sponsorship advertising, ad-hoc press
conferences, and various donations as most suitable and low cost tactics for
contexts of  low media power (Mitchell & Blumler, 1994). Because of  the low
media power, foreign owned firms will not see any benefits from partnering with
the media, nor any opportunities for instant credibility and trust in the host
environment when the media itself  enjoys low credibility in this environment
(Bramson, 2007). In addition, a low media power also entails a low perception
of  media related contingencies, which only de-motivates foreign firms to
strategically devote resources to actions and fit their organizations to these
contingencies (Donaldson, 1996). Therefore, we formulate the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The lower the perceived media power in the host society, the higher the likelihood
that the foreign owned firm will use fire-fighting actions rather than strategic actions to manage
the media in the host country. 
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6.3.2.    Resources 
While perception of  the media impact is an important element in foreign owned
firms’ choice for fire-fighting or strategic actions, these choices are also
determined by their resources as they play an important role in their ability to
implement a certain kind of  actions to manage institutional influences such as
the media (Conner & Prahalad, 1996; Hillman et al., 2004). Resources based view
provides grounds for this relationship. From the resource based view we can
make a distinction between tangible and intangible resources, whereas tangible
resources are those resources like equipment and employment base, and
intangible resources can be corporate images, brands, knowledge and experience
(Hall, 1993). Also resource based elements can be used to further develop liability
of  newness and smallness arguments. Therefore, the relationship with the type
of  media actions can be explained through both tangible and intangible resources
arguments. 
Foreign owned firms with a large tangible resources and employment base are
more visible to host stakeholders, reason for which they become more sensitive
to media’s influence and coverage. As large foreign owned firms enjoy a higher
visibility and exposure, they are also more vulnerable to the power of  the media
(Getz, 1997). ‘The larger a firm becomes, the more likely it is to catch the public’s
eye’ (Meznar & Nigh, 1995; p. 980). Therefore, large foreign firms are more
motivated to design and are able to implement strategic actions, long term
oriented which would insure a solid reputation in the host country. Also due to
a larger employment base and multiple networks with stakeholders, the potential
damages caused by a negative media coverage increase. They will try to prevent
and minimize potential risks by deploying organizational resources for strategic
action planning (Masters & Keim, 1985). In this case, the size of  the firm
becomes not only an incentive for strategic actions but also a means; larger firms
have more organizational resources at their disposal to dedicate to strategic
actions. Large firms are also dependent on many powerful stakeholders (Meznar
& Nigh, 1995) and they are motivated to develop and maintain long term relations
and networks with these stakeholders to solidify their trust and reputation. To
assist with solidifying trust or reputation, other actions might involve contracting
media specialists who possess the skills and local know-how characteristic to the
host country to support them in developing solid reputations (Bhuyan, 2000).
These firms also posses the resources necessary to contract media experts or to
develop in-house training programs for their employees. 
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On the other hand, due to resource constraints small foreign owned firms focus
more on the market stakeholders than the media (Hannan et al., 1995). Because
small firms are restricted in their actions by limited resources they would dedicate
less resources to media actions and give priority to other market related actions
(Mosakowski, 1998). Thus, based on resource based view we argue that due to
limited organizational resources, smaller foreign firms make utilize actions do
not involve intricate resources or specific resource allocation. They are handy
tools for foreign owned firms to quickly manage the contingencies from the host
media without attempting a fit between the organizational strategy and structure
to these contingencies (Donaldson, 1996). Therefore, smaller foreign firms would
employ fire-fighting actions to deal with the media. For this reason, we formulate
the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The less tangible resources the foreign owned firm has, the higher the likelihood
that it will use fire-fighting actions rather than strategic actions to manage the media in the host
country. 
However, intangible resources may also determine the preference for a certain
type of  actions and practices to cope with host media influences as it was proven
to affect the ability to engage in long term strategic actions (Hall, 1993). Liability
of  smallness upholds that smaller firms which lack the influence, endorsement
base, legitimacy and networks to implement strategic actions (Hannan &
Freeman, 1984). This relationship can also be explained by employing liability of
newness arguments (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). Consequently, young, new
established foreign owned firms have different priorities than older firms; these
priorities differences are given by their liability of  newness. Accordingly, young
foreign firms have the organizational resources stretched to the maximum and
they still have to develop organizational roles and routines and learn new roles
as social actors (Stinchcombe, 1965; Hannan et al., 1995). These roles and
routines that younger firms need to learn represent priorities that young firms
place at forefront of  their actions and strategy (Hillman & Hitt, 1999). Young
firms in particular need to develop their knowledge base about market forces
and other market related issues of  the host country; for this reason they would
place fewer accents on institutional influences such as the media. (Hannan &
Freeman, 1984; Hannan & Carroll, 1992). For these firms it is more important
to position themselves in the host market than to use their resources for specific
strategic actions designed for the media. Therefore, matters such as stakeholder
and media management become second priority; they would cope with these
matters in an ad-hoc manner, whenever and if  required. Fire-fighting actions
offer them instant and fast needed remedies as these actions aim more for an 
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adaptation of  the young firm to the matters at hand. Additionally, the lack of
legitimacy, reputation, experience, networks, brands – intangible resources limits
these firms’ possibilities for strategic actions and stakeholder relationships.
However, older and more established foreign owned firms have a higher influence
power, legitimacy and networks required for implementing strategic actions. As
they are present in the host setting for a longer period, their years of  experience
provide them with the knowledge, reputation and networks needed for
implementing strategic actions (Suchman, 1995; Hsu & Hannan, 2005).
Therefore, we formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: The less intangible resources the foreign owned firm has, the higher the likelihood
that it will use fire-fighting actions rather than strategic actions to manage the media in the host
country.
6.4.    methodology
6.4.1.    Sample and data
The data for this study was gathered using a postal questionnaire survey
conducted among managing directors of  foreign owned firms in the Netherlands
in the summer of  2009. Initially, we used Dutch Invest database 2007 and Dun
and Bradstreet database to select the foreign owned firms in the Netherlands.
This database contains information on their physical and postal address, contact
information, names of  executives, number of  employees, country of  origin, SIC
codes and sector. Our initial sample of  900 foreign owned firms was selected on
criteria of  industry representativeness and firm size. In order to improve our
preliminary survey and asses its feasibility, we firstly conducted in-depth
interviews with seventeen managers and discussed the survey items. Their
comments and suggestions for improvements were used to revise the final survey.
Subsequently, a pilot survey was carried out to evaluate the revised survey
instrument. The number of  final returned responses was in total 180 foreign
owned firms coming from 21 countries including Austria, Belgium, Bermuda,
Canada, Denmark, England, Finland, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Luxemburg, Norway, Portugal, South-Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
and USA. Missing survey data reduced the number of  usable responses to 160
representing around 18 percent of  the sampled group. 
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6.4.2. Variables
Dependent variable
The dependent variable is the type of  media actions used by foreign owned firms to
deal with the media’s influences. In order to measure the type of  media actions
each firm implements, we measured various media actions and whether these
actions were used ad-hoc and short-term or continuously, on a regular base. We
inquired each firm if  they undertake a wide variety of  media actions/ practices
as follows: press releases; press conferences; employees training for media
relations; contracting media experts; hiring media specialists; contracting public
relations specialists; contracting external lobbyists; building socially responsible
reputations (Baron, 2006; Bertrand, 2000; Hutchins Commision, 1947; Wanta &
Hu, 1994). Firms had to specify whether they utilize each action ‘never used’
(fire-fighting),, ‘rarely used’ (fire-fighting), very frequently used’ (strategic) and
“continuously used’ (strategic) (Chen, 1996; Hillman, et al., 2004; Kaufmann,
1998). In order to establish which type of  media actions is used by a firm the
average score on fire-fighting was compared to the score on strategic; the firms
which had the score for fire-fighting higher than 0.5 were regarded as
implementing fire-fighting actions and coded 0; the firms with a score for
strategic higher than 0.5 were regarded as implementing strategic actions and
coded with 1. Interestingly, all respondent foreign owned firms showed the
tendency to fall neatly into one category, thus either fire-fighting or strategic. 
Independent variables
The variable perceived media power (Hypothesis 1) in the host society is constructed
from the questionnaire survey through a composite measure indicating several
items as perceived by foreign owned firms.  The perceived media power was
measured through four components, namely accountability, answerability,
credibility, and responsibility.  On a 5-point Likert scale, the following items
measured these components: media fairness, media accuracy, and factuality
(accountability); up-to-date coverage, concern for public interest, concern for
community’s well being, (answerability); confidence in media institutions,
trustworthiness, media saliency (influence capacity) (credibility); report the whole
story, separation of  fact and opinion, and professionalism of  people in media
(responsibility) (Newhagen, 1997; Miller & Wanta, 1996; Bardhan, 1997; Djankov
et al., 2002; McQuail, 1997; Tanzi, 1998; Treisman, 2000). Using the items above,
principal component analysis extracted the score for perceived media’s power for
each foreign firm (table 6.1). The correlation fulfills the requirement condition
for factor analysis.
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Table 6.2 reports the results of  the extraction method principal component
analysis and the Cronbach’s Alpha of  the factors used. All components show a
Cronbach’s Alpha higher than 0.9. This exemplifies that our components are
reliable and should be used in the analysis about the perceived media power. As
all the component factors showed high loadings, thus rather consistent significant
contribution to the media power, no initial factors was excluded from the final
analysis/ computation of  the variable perceived media power.
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Table 6.2. Results extraction method: principal component analysis
Perceived Media Power
Table 6.3 provides the correlation results, square roots, and bootstrapping results
for the constructs used to measure the perceived media’s impact.
Table 6.3. Construct-level measurement statistics & bootstrapping
procedure Perceived Media Power 
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a,b
The square roots of  the average variance extracted and the evaluation of  the
measurement model reveals that items used to measure the various dimensions
of  perceived media power, namely accountability (square root 0.70), answerability
(square root 0.72), credibility (square root 0.74), and responsibility (square root
0.76) are good indicators/ measurement for these dimensions. Based on Chin
(1998), ƒ²-values of  0.02, 0.05, and 0.35 show that latent variables have a small,
medium and respectively large effect-contribution. Our results show that the
most important constructs associated with the media power in the host society
are: accountability (t-value 2.00; coefficient 0.35), answerability (t-value 1.95;
coefficient 0.28), and credibility (t-value 2.02; coefficient 0.35). Furthermore, the
square root for the measurement of  the perceived media power 0.76 also indicates
that the above dimensions represent a good measurement for this variable.
The independent variable tangible resources is measured as the number of  employees
of  each foreign owned firm in the Netherlands (Hypothesis 2). According to
Hall (1993) and Keim and Baysinger (1988) the number of  employees relates 
directly to the ability of  the firm to engage in long term strategic actions and to
generate constituency support and leverage with the nonmarket institutions
among which we distinguish the media. 
The variable intangible resources (Hypothesis 3) is measured by the number of  years
since the firm has been established in the Netherlands. This indicator provides a
fair overview on the experience and knowledge accumulated by the foreign
owned firm about the host setting, stakeholders, and way of  doing business (Hall,
1993). 
Control variables
The preference for the kind of  actions used by foreign owned firms to deal with
the media in a host country can differ between industries due to increased media
exposure of  certain industries. In some industries, firms are more sensitive to
the media impact than in others due to the direct media impact on their activities
(e.g. sales). Therefore, we control for possible industry effects with the variable
industry dummies for the three most targeted industries by foreign firms in the
Netherlands. The three industries are: manufacturing, finance and insurance, and
services. 
Additionally, we consider that other characteristics of  these foreign owned firms
might also relate to their choice for media actions. The control variable regional
headquarters function indicates whether the foreign owned firm operates as a
regional headquarters. It is a dummy with the value of  1 if  the firm has a regional
headquarters function in the host country and with a value of  0 if  it has no
regional headquarters function. Foreign owned firms with a regional headquarters
function are more visible to the public eye and more sensitive to reputation and
legitimacy issues. For these firms the media can play an important role in their
interactions with institutions and interest issues which set standards and regulate
the specific segment of  that activity (Bhuyan, 2000). 
The control variable market scope designates the spectrum of  interactions and
stakeholders involved with the foreign owned firms activities. A broad market
scope entails that the firm has many stakeholders with different and varied
interests or issues to manage, reasons for which it is difficult to develop strategic
actions which are rather used for specific issues. Therefore, it is likely that firms
with a broad market scope will use fire-fighting actions. For the companies witha
narrow scope reputation is more important, therefore it is more likely they will
chose strategic actions to build trusts and reputations among a smaller number
of  stakeholders. This control variable is measured based on the destination of   
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the foreign firm’s sales from the Netherlands. We asked the managing director
to indicate which percentage share of  the total sales of  the foreign owned firm
is going to the host country market. These shares were used to create the market
scope variable ranging between 0 and 1; whereas the closer to 0 indicates a broad
market scope and the closer to 1 a narrow market scope. 
The decision to use strategic actions rather than fire-fighting ones can also be
affected by the number of  other subsidiaries of  the parent company in the same
host environment. The more subsidiaries the MNE has in the host environment,
the more likely it is that it enjoys higher visibility in the host setting and, due to
this exposure, it becomes more vulnerable to the influence power of  the media
(Getz, 1997). Therefore, foreign owned firms with a corporate parent that has
established many subsidiaries within the host country might generally prefer
strategic actions over fire-fighting ones. The control variable number of  other
subsidiaries indicates the MNE visibility in the host country. It is measured by the
total number of  other foreign owned firms with the same parent company in the
host country. 
The control variable Country Difference captures the difference in political systems
concerning the political ideology between the home country of  the foreign firm
and the host country. This variable is based on the difference in Beck’s political
ideology scale between countries (Beck et al., 2001). Dow and Karunaratna (2006)
showed that Beck’s political ideology scale also provides a good indication for
the more general psychic distance measure. 
6.5.    empirical ﬁndings
Table 6.4 presents the correlation matrix for the variables in this study.
Correlation is very low for most variables, indicating that multicollinearity is not
a problem. 
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In addition, variance inflated factors (VIF) were calculated by running “artificial”
OLS regressions between each independent variable as the “dependent” variable
and the remaining independent variables (Maddala, 2000). As all VIF values are
smaller than 1.5, this indicates that there is no multicollinearity between the
variables. It is worth mentioning that 70.5 % of  the foreign owned firms makes
use of  fire-fighting actions to manage the influence of  media on their business
activities and 29.5 % of  the sample implements strategic actions for the same
purpose. We used logistic regressions to test our hypotheses. Table 6.5 shows the
estimation results of  the models.
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Table 6.4. Bivariate correlations for all variables, N=160
Given the consistency of  the results, we will only explain the full model.
Hypothesis 1 stated that the lower the perceived media power in the host society,
the higher the likelihood that the foreign owned firm will use fire-fighting actions
rather than strategic actions to manage the media in the host country. Our results
show that the lower the perceived media power the more foreign owned firms
prefer to utilize fire-fighting actions to manage the media in the host country
instead of  strategic actions. Hence, we can accept Hypothesis 1. 
Furthermore, Hypothesis 2 stressed that the less tangible resources the foreign
owned firm has, the higher the likelihood that it will use fire-fighting actions
rather than strategic actions to manage the media in the host country. The results
indicate that the level of  tangible resources of  foreign owned firms have no effect
on the preference for particular forms of  media actions employed in the host
setting. Consequently, Hypothesis 2 is rejected.
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Table 6.5. Estimation results for determinants of media actions type
However, as stated in Hypothesis 3,  the level of  intangible resources determine
the preference for a certain type of  media actions namely the foreign owned
firms with less intangible resources prefer to use fire-fighting actions to manage
the media in the host country. Empirical results show that we can accept
Hypothesis 3. 
Empirical investigation also shows very interesting results concerning the control
variables. The service (industry) dummy has significant effect on the preference
of  foreign owned firms to use strategic actions towards host media’s influence.
Another interesting finding is the relationship between the market scope and the
type of  media actions. Foreign owned firms with a broad market scope prefer
fire-fighting actions to manage the host media. When the operations of  the
foreign owned firm target mainly the host country, they prefer more to develop
strategic actions to insure credible reputations and prevent possible risks or
threats coming from the media.
With respect to the number of  other subsidiaries from the same parent in the
host country, results estimates do not show significant evidence that foreign
owned firms with a corporate parent that has established more subsidiaries will
generally prefer a certain type of  actions. Likewise, a regional headquarters
function of  the foreign owned firms and differences in political systems between
their home and host countries do not affect the preference for the type of  actions
adjacent to host media.
6.6.    discussion and conclusions 
Our research goal was to explore specific media actions types, respectively fire-
fighting and strategic actions used by foreign owned firms to manage the host
media based on a resource based perspective. Empirical results provide support
for our hypotheses regarding the perceived media power in the host society and
firm’s intangible resources as main determinants of  these actions.
To better understand the perceived media power factor analysis corroborates its
most important aspects. Accordingly, as a priority list, the most important items
that are associated with and contribute to the media power in the host society
are: answerability, accountability, credibility. Our results confirm that foreign
owned firms perceive differently the power of  the media. Foreign owned firms
that perceive host media as having a low impact power do not invest time and
energy to design specific actions for this stakeholder (Fudenberg et al., 1994).
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They perceive it as harmless for their business activities or reputation building;
nor can it help them achieve legitimacy in the host setting. Therefore, they utilize
fire-fighting actions to manage this low impact. However, the foreign owned
firms which perceive the host media as having high impact on the host society
employ strategic actions. They develop in-house employee training programs and
attempt to use this impact power to their own benefits. In this way, they establish
themselves among the host actors and stakeholders, build credible reputations
and increase the transfer of  host specific information. Sometimes, foreign owned
firms even hire external lobbyists to mitigate for a certain issues on behalf  of
the company in order to create a certain public image. When the perceived media
power is high, foreign owned firms try to build networks with this strong
stakeholder in order to gain credibility in the host setting. These findings are in
line with Bramson (2007). 
Furthermore, another determinant for the type of  actions implemented by
foreign owned firms to manage the media is their intangible resources. Results
suggest that, due to their liability of  newness, young foreign owned firms, even
though important for them, do not have the experience or legitimacy to use
strategic actions. Due to their age and constraint resources, they chose fire-
fighting actions to deal with the media (Mosakowski, 1998). They tend to
temporarily contract media experts and public relations specialist, cooperate with
media institutions to compensate for the knowledge gap created by their lack of
(or low) intangible resources. However, older firms with intangible resources and
experience in the host country prefer to implement strategic actions to manage
the media. Older foreign owned firms indeed use strategic actions as they also
have the necessary means, such as experience, knowledge base, reputation and
credibility (legitimacy) and thus, they can gain more by partnering with the media;
results in line with Bramson, (2007). Our results are also close to Yoffie and
Bergenstein’s (1985) ‘political capital’, which stresses the idea of  accumulation
over time. This public image may be a moderating factor in the public decision
makers’ reactions to the firm’s attempt at political influencing (Dahan, 2005).
Our findings are in line with the theory stream which places intangible resources
as a proxy for the knowledge accumulated, the reputation and credibility build
by the foreign firm among other actors or as a proxy for their social capital
(Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994; Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Pennings et al., 1998). 
Additionally, our data show a strong tendency of  foreign owned firms from
service industries towards strategic actions. Reputation and legitimacy is more
important for service industry than other industries, therefore they are more
preoccupied with building networks, solid reputations, and legitimacy among 
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stakeholders ((Hillman & Hitt, 1999). The business activities of  foreign firms
from service industries depend to a greater extend on reputation and legitimacy;
therefore they are more sensitive to the media impact on their image, reputation,
and sales reason for which they dedicate resources and strategic actions to manage
this impact (Keim & Baysinger, 1988). 
Furthermore, results show that foreign owned firms with a narrow market scope
utilize strategic actions and the ones with boarder market scopes employ fire-
fighting actions to manage the media. These results are in line with Chen (1996)
who also sustains that a narrow market scope and market dependence provide
strong incentives for the use of  strategic actions. A broad market scope entails
that the firm has many stakeholders with different and varied interests/ issues to
manage, reasons for which it is difficult to develop strategic actions which are
rather used for specific issues. Therefore, it is likely that firms with a broad market
scope will use fire-fighting actions. For the companies with a narrow scope
reputation is more important, therefore it is more likely they will chose strategic
actions to build trusts and reputations among a smaller number of  stakeholders.
Our exploratory study strengthens the inference that foreign firms regard the
media as an important stakeholder and, therefore, consider specific actions to
manage its magnitude. These actions are not only purposed at buffering the
organization against media negative liability but also serve to utilize the media in
order to build reputations, strengthen legitimacy, and trust among the other
stakeholders in the host environment. This rationale also relates to McQuail’s
study (1997) who discussed the media as entailing positive and negative liabilities.
Intertwining McQuail’s arguments with our findings, we can regard the potential
damages that media can cause to the reputation and image of  the foreign owned
firms as negative liabilities. Whereas, when foreign firms employ the media to
build legitimacy among host stakeholders is regarded as positive liability.  
However, the increasing importance of  the media for foreign owned firms can
be also attributed to the developments in communication technologies and to
media’s globalization. In recent decades, media institutions and professionals have
succeeded in strengthening their position within both market and nonmarket
contexts as the media links up important stakeholders of  the host economy
(Bardoel et al., 2001). 
Given the exploratory nature of  our study a multitude of  future research avenues
come to mind. Future research considerations might regard the role of  host
governments to mediate the relationship between the host media and foreign 
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owned firms. Furthermore, measures and routines feasible when this relationship
goes wrong, also constitutes an interesting endeavor. For this reason interesting
further investigations could place the notions of  interactivity between the
business community and the media. How foreign owned firms perceive these
notions and how they appear in practice might uncover certain techniques
appropriate to manage the influence of  this important actor.  Comparative studies
are equally interesting revealing possible cultural effects and differences between
countries concerning media power and impact. 
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ChApter 7
summAry And ConClusIons
7.1.    summary 
Over the past decades the presence and importance of  foreign owned firms in
the Netherlands has increased considerably and, as a result, it is currently the
fifth largest recipient country of  FDI in the world (UNCTAD, 2009). Despite
the fact that in 2009 the global FDI had dropped with almost 40% due to the
financial crisis, the Netherlands did not experience this sharp relapse in incoming
FDI. Regardless of  its limited market size and lack of  resources, the Netherlands
managed to maintain its position (UNCTAD, 2009). The Netherlands has
increased its location attractiveness for foreign owned firms also through its
membership to the European Union. In this host economy foreign owned firms
generally experience a complexity of  market and nonmarket pressures from both
national and supranational institutions, of  economic, regulatory, or social types.
These institutions also affect their performance through an ample array of  liability
costs with reference to economic, social, legal, and cultural issues, hence matters
outside the market spam but in conjunction with it – nonmarket issues. Therefore,
we attempted to identify which nonmarket issues have a potential impact on
foreign owned firms’ business activities. Furthermore, we explored
complementary strategies meant to manage this impact, to reduce the complexity
of  the nonmarket environment and to improve their competitive position in the
host environment. 
Our exploration commenced with Chapter one which introduced the research
topic and discussed important characteristics of  the Netherlands as a small open
economy and host setting of  the foreign owned firms. 
Chapter two provided an overview of  the market aspects of  foreign owned firms
present in the Netherlands, mainly onto the location choices and colocation
patterns according to various characteristics of  these firms. Before commencing
the study of  nonmarket matters, we found relevant to become acquainted to 
these firms in terms of  their idiosyncratic characteristics, location choices and
colocation patterns exhibited in the host country. While the literature highlights
the development of  geographically concentrated areas of  foreign owned firms
within host countries, however, in small open economies (as the Netherlands)
the agglomerative benefits remained so far unclear. Therefore, Chapter two of
this study investigated the colocation patterns of  foreign owned firms, their
agglomeration behavior vis-à-vis domestic firms and their propensity to colocate
according to country of  origin, size, age, and industry. Empirical results showed
that foreign firms operating in the industries of  mining, construction, transport
and communications, services and trade exhibit different colocation/
agglomeration patterns than domestic firms from the same industries. Moreover,
our results also show that the presence of  foreign owned firms in many regions
leads to the appearance of  agglomeration economies among the foreign firms
populations. This phenomenon can add to the understanding of  the dissimilar
colocation patterns compared to the domestic companies in the sense that the
changes in agglomeration benefits for the foreign companies trigger them to take
a different (co)location decisions. 
However, the foreign owned firms from the industries of  agriculture,
forestry/fishing, and manufacturing (co)locate similarly to Dutch firms. This can
be primarily explained by knowledge spillover effects between competitors in the
same industry which attract them to that region. Furthermore, manufacturing
firms (both foreign and domestic) also colocate in areas with easy access to
imports. If  manufacturing costs, taxation policy and location attractiveness differ
across regions, then foreign owned firms would the tendency to agglomerate
where costs are lower. Nevertheless, in the Netherlands government policy and
taxation regimes are very similar across the twelve Dutch provinces; consequently
taxation does not provide incentives to differentiate in location decisions. For
this reason we argue that the effects of  agglomeration economies, respectively
pools of  specialized labor and suppliers, knowledge flows, innovation and
spillovers are the main reasons explaining the similarity in colocation patterns of
the foreign and domestic firms from the above industries. 
Generally, foreign owned firms mainly colocate in provinces with a high
concentration of  production factors, with good infrastructure, and which access
the main gateways i.e. Noord-Brabant (20.19%), Zuid-Holland (17.23%), Noord-
Holland (16.12%), and Gelderland (12.53%). The region of  Noord-Brabant is
also known for its technological knowledge and innovation potential, both
essential benefits for foreign firms employing resource-seeking motives. When
further examining colocation patterns more specifically by looking home country
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(provenience), empirical results show that foreign firms coming from Belgium
and Germany show dissimilar colocation patterns than firms coming from other
home countries. Firms from these two countries mainly colocate in the provinces
bordering Belgium and Germany. Furthermore, results regarding firms’ age show
that young established foreign owned firms exhibit similar colocation patterns
as older firms. Young foreign owned firms colocate around the geographic
clusters and concentrations of  older, well established firms, as predicted by other
theorists as well. Colocating with dominant firms offers particular advantages to
younger ones due to resource constraints. Regarding firms’ size large foreign
owned firms from the trade industry follow the same colocation pattern as large
local firms, i.e. in the regions with access to gateways to much bigger markets,
i.e. the Central European market or the European Union market. 
Once we have gained insight into the market conduct and formed a perspective
view on the characteristics of  foreign owned firms and their agglomeration
patterns within the host country, subsequent chapters examined nonmarket
matters relating to their activities. The exploration of  the nonmarket subject
started with chapter three by discussing the four main perspectives which
contributed to the development of  the nonmarket concept. Thereafter, we
employed insights from these perspectives to further deepen our understanding
of  the components of  nonmarket environment. We acknowledged the
framework drawn by Baron (1995), and we further developed this framework
with the nonmarket perspectives in order to explore and to gain deeper insights
into what constitutes the nonmarket environment. More specifically, as
constituents we discussed the various nonmarket institutions, issues, interest, and
information playing a role on the nonmarket environment and how firms can
manage this environment. This discussion served laid the grounds for the
following chapter which empirically explored the nonmarket pressures resulting
from this environment and the nonmarket actions utilized by foreign owned firms
to manage such pressures.  
Accordingly, chapter four studies the relation and sources of  variation in the
strength of  institutional pressures and the nonmarket actions of  foreign owned
firms to deal with these pressures in an open regionally integrated economy.. We
explored the most relevant nonmarket institutional pressures which influence the
frequency of  nonmarket actions undertaken by the foreign owned firms. Results
show that pressure of  national regulators can increase the frequency of
nonmarket actions through the insufficient transparency of  their rules and
regulations, insufficient autonomy, and a short term perspective of  their rules
and regulations.  This is consistent with Kanter (1999) and North (1990) who 
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delegate that national regulators normalize business activities and commonly
enforce standards and safety. 
Furthermore, pressures of  standards agencies also contribute to an increase in
the frequency of  nonmarket actions; this input is explained through the costs to
obtain permits, licenses, and authorizations and costs to comply with imposed
standards made by the foreign firms in the host country. In the Netherlands a
vast array of  required permits/  standards restrict and set boundaries for business
practices and activities. In line with Ogus (2002), foreign various nonmarket
actions such as constituency building, lobbying and press conferences can
decrease redundant expenditure made with certain new imposed standards.
Interest groups also leave their prints on the business sector and foreign owned
firms along by shaping their processes and outcomes for various purposes
ranging from investing in a safe future and social community to preserving the
environment. They increase the nonmarket actions due to their increased
collective concern and high capacity to gain public opinion which make foreign
firms aware of  harmful consequences of  certain business practices. A final
institution that explains the increase in frequency of  nonmarket actions is the
media due to pressure and effects of  high credibility, strong societal influence,
and increased concern for the public interest in the host country. As a result
companies increase their nonmarket (relational) actions with respect to this
stakeholder (Miles & Snow, 1978). 
Additionally, pressures from supranational regulators though do not directly
contribute to the increase in nonmarket actions of  foreign owned firms in the
host country, but they show effects on national regulators, standards agencies
and political institutions of  that host member country. Due to the multi-level
governance, supranational regulators establish directives for the national
institutions while also allowing for a certain degree of  flexibility and national
variance. This substantiates the influence of  supranational regulators on the
national level institutions (Smith, 1997). Additionally to explain such result we
can also employ arguments related to the specificity of  the host setting, the
Netherlands. A vast part of  rules, regulations, directives and policy making is
established by  supranational (European Union) regulators and members states
have to incorporate these to a great extend. 
As a result of  all these nonmarket institutional influences, chapter five explored
nonmarket strategies implemented by foreign owned firms in order to manage
these influences. We indentify how firm’s characteristics and resources determine
the preference for a certain strategy type. As most comprehensive and inclusive
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nonmarket strategies we proposed foreseeing vs. subsequent nonmarket strategy.
Six idiosyncratic determinants: size, host country experience, market scope,
regional headquarters function, country difference and autonomy degree of  the
foreign owned firms were anticipated to affect the predilection for implementing
a specific type of  nonmarket strategy. 
Empirical investigation showed that large foreign owned firms implement
foreseeing strategies while small and medium sized ones follow subsequent
strategies. Large foreign owned firms with substantial employment base in the
host country need to consider certain nonmarket issues regarding provisions for
their employees. They also posses the capacity and resources to develop and
maintain long term co-operations with diverse nonmarket institutions. As large
foreign owned firms have more assets at risk, this increases their incentives to
foresee and engage within nonmarket contexts. Likewise, results show that
foreign owned firms with more experience in the host country are inclined to
implement subsequent strategies while the less experienced firms use foreseeing
strategies. Albeit the experience of  a foreign owned firm in the host country
indicates commitment and repeated dealings with host nonmarket related actors
and institutions, in time the firm develops tacit knowledge and abilities to deal
with these matters. 
However, young foreign owned firms are motivated to implement foreseeing
strategies meant to develop social capital derived from the network of
relationships in order to compensate for their limited experience, local reputation
and credibility, and to establish themselves among the host actors. A plausible
explanation could be the liability of  foreignness in a host environment which
affects young foreign owned firms more than older, more experienced ones. 
On the other hand, foreign owned firms with a narrow market scope prefer to
use foreseeing strategies over subsequent strategies. Foreign owned firms
operating only on local markets are generally able to acquire extra knowledge and
develop intensified interactions with nonmarket linked actors. They are more
likely to uphold continuous in-depth collaborations due to the one (single) host
market focus. 
Empirical results also show that the function regional Headquarters significantly
determines the preference for a subsequent strategy. Foreign owned firms with
no Headquarters function have the possibility to focus only on host nonmarket
issues and areas and, as a result, they pursue foreseeing strategies in the same
nonmarket context. 
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Out of  the plethora of  nonmarket institutions affecting foreign owned firms’
business operations, a reputable significance is attributed to the media. Therefore,
chapter six explored specific strategic and tactical actions used by the foreign
owned firms to handle the complex influences from the media on their business
activities and to maximize the possible benefits seized through the means of  the
media’s functions (such as information transfer and reputation building) from a
resource base perspective. Empirical estimates provide support regarding the
perceived impact of  the media in the host society and host country experience
as main determinants of  these actions. Subsequent testing through factor analysis
confirmed that the perceived media’s impact in the host society is explained by
several components along the lines of: media fairness; accuracy; concern for
community’s well being; objectivity; up-to-date coverage; factuality; independence
of  media’s institutions; trustworthiness; concern for public interest; media’s
credibility; professionalism of  people in the media; and confidence in media’s
institutions. Results show that foreign owned firms perceive differently the impact
that media has in the host society and the benefits of  reputation building and
information transfer it can convey. Foreign owned firms which perceive the host
media as having a high impact, develop in-house employee training programs,
use press releases and conferences to take advantage of  this impact. Through
these strategic actions they establish themselves among the host actors, build
credible reputations and increase the transfer of  (host specific) information.
Foreign owned firms also hire external lobbyists to mitigate for a certain issue
on behalf  of  the company in order to create a public image reflecting the foreign
owned firms’ position on the certain issue. 
With regard to the resources of  the foreign owned firm, the experience and
knowledge base reversibly relate to the types of  actions used to benefit from
media’s functions or to deal with its influence. When their experience with host
media institutions is deficient, foreign owned firms tend to contract media experts
and public relations specialist, cooperate with media institutions to compensate
for the knowledge gap created by their lack of  experience. However, the foreign
owned firms performing operations within services industries interact with a
wider spectrum of  stakeholders than other industries. As a result, they are more
preoccupied about building networks and solid reputations for these stakeholders.
The same rationality can be employed to explain the significant relationship
between the (narrow) market scope of  foreign owned firms and their preference
for strategic actions. A narrow market scope is an indication for a lower range
of  stakeholders and interests involved with the business activities of  the firm,
which increases its incentive for accountable reputations and networking amongst
these stakeholders. 
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Overall, the nonmarket behavior of  foreign owned firms is explained by
nonmarket institutional pressures which influence the frequency of  nonmarket
actions and by the specific nonmarket strategies implemented to deal with these
institutions depending on firm’s characteristics, their internal resources and
previous international experience. Nonmarket strategies entail the management
of  nonmarket issues, the treatment of  uncertainties or influences from the
nonmarket environment, and the achievement of  nonmarket interests.
Nonmarket strategies are complementary strategies to encounter complex
influences outside the market spam, to manage the threats and opportunities
from the nonmarket environment and to attain nonmarket interests that
complement market activities (Baron, 1995; Bonardi, Holburn & Van den Berg,
2006; Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Prakash, 2002). These nonmarket strategies entail
actions carried out in public arenas to manage nonmarket issues from various
institutions and between these institutions and the firms’ activities (Wartick &
Mahon, 1994). Nonmarket actions entail proceedings employed in public arenas
(Baron, 1995; Schaffer & Hillman, 2000) to manage issues related to a wide array
of  institutions, national or supranational, amongst which interest groups, political
institutions, the media, regulatory institutions, standards agencies, which all
constitute the nonmarket framework (North, 1990; Scott, 1995).
7.2.    Concluding remarks
There is a myriad of  ways in which host governments and nonmarket institutions
can (directly or indirectly) affect foreign owned firms’ business activities. Even
in industries where government has little or no direct role, government control
over the pedals of  macro- and micro-economic policy is closely tied to policy
decisions. Consequently, nonmarket strategies that influence public policy
outcomes can potentially improve firms’ overall performance. In contrast to the
voluminous competitive market strategy literature, however, the ways in which
firms formulate and implement nonmarket strategy has received relatively little
academic attention. This study attempts to reduce this gap and the deficit caused
be the lack of  a theoretical framework that links nonmarket outcomes to the
complex interplay between political and institutional actors, such as regulators,
political institutions, standards agencies and the media.  Additionally, the implicit
assumption in many nonmarket studies is that public policy is determined
primarily by the legislature in isolation from other policy institutions or actors.
Hereby, we also focused on nonmarket strategy formulation in the context of
network relationships between the firms and legislators. More generally, we argue
that firms need to understand the broader public policy game (as defined by the 
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sequence of  play, decision-making rules and players’ preferences) in order to
identify where their nonmarket activities will have the greatest leverage. 
We advance the literature field by contending that an organization obtains a
favorable regulation by its capacity to mobilize three kinds of  nonmarket
resources: financial (political campaign financing; interest groups campaign
financing), human (the use of  lobbyists and lawyers; media experts; public
relations specialists), political (coalition-building; constituency building;
bargaining). This further sustains the idea of  connecting the firms’ nonmarket
demands with broader societal goals in order to gain wider support (see also
Mahon & Murray, 1981; Yoffie & Bergerstein, 1985; Oberman, 1993; Boddewyn,
2000; Baron, 1995; Jacomet, 2000). The institutional approach adopted in this
thesis is wider than the usual political resource approach. We include political
institutions and companies but also public decision makers, regulators,
supranational institutions, standards agencies, interest groups and the media.  This
approach is on the same line with Boddewyn’s (2000) distinction between internal
and external resources. An increased insight into foreign owned firms’ location
choices, as well as the strategic impact of  these choices, helps policy development
regarding agglomeration economies, industrial development, and international
business. 
The discussion over the present research cannot be completed without
considering its limitations. Our study is still exploratory in nature particularly
with regard to the development of  the notion of  nonmarket actions. Our results
lay significant ground work for future, more deterministic procedures and
analyses of  similar data. However, completeness of  indicator inventory is a goal
always sought, but never really achieved (Chandler & Graham, 2010). This study
yields a rich scan of  the external nonmarket environment in which foreign owned
firms operate. Our nonmarket institutional framework considers the collection
of  institutions pertaining to the national and supranational host environment and
their factors explaining the frequency of  nonmarket actions. A comparative study
conducted in a different research setting would maybe expand the range of
institutions and factors and increase the understanding of  actions which foreign
firms can utilize depending on the necessity. Future research might also deem
appropriate a nonmarket-economic model which simultaneously considers both
economic and nonmarket determinants of  the nonmarket actions and strategies
implemented by foreign owned firms. The interplay between the market and
nonmarket span would help scholars and managers extend beyond the traditional
market strategies and advance a new breed between the two which incorporates
a wide range of  constituents and relevant party delegated actions. 
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This study also provides further research opportunity to study and offer a general
outline on the process going from nonmarket activity to superior economic
performance, granting a central role to the notion of  public-policy advantage.
Moreover, this raises other pertinent investigation directions, such as when and
how should firms lobby agencies or use the courts in order to affect public policy
outcomes. While data are usually more readily available on inputs than outputs,
a natural drawback is that it becomes impossible to assess empirically the
effectiveness of  particular strategies. This is a reputable suggestion for future
investigation. Another suggestion for improvement would be to include the
activity of  organizing various events to cement relations with nonmarket
institutions and actors. The literature has not explicitly acknowledged this practice
while being extremely common. Indeed, in the context of  rather cooperative
governmental and media relations, many companies can organize such events to
provide unique opportunities to get the undivided (and more open-minded)
attention of  public decision makers and journalists (Dahan, 2005). This practice
is so widespread that it could be said that organizations compete in terms of
originality and quality to provide such services, with very significant budgets in
order to attract key actors. Dahan (2005) debates that this leads to the idea of  a
‘recreational skill’ provided by the firm, and valued by both public decision
makers and journalists, which will often be part of  a wider public relations
campaign. This resource is a useful way to get a privileged access to a nonmarket
actor (Dahan, 2005). Inferring into the integration level of  market and nonmarket
strategies would also reveal interesting insights into the practical efforts and
importance assigned to the former. 
Another important idea for future research  is validated by the growing literature
advocating the integration of  market and nonmarket strategies and the effect on
firm performance (Shaffer et al., 2000, Levy & Egan, 2003; Ma, 2004; Bonardi
et al., 2006). The need to combine these nonmarket strategies with market factors
into an overall corporate strategy has been stressed out in order to contribute to
a firm’s competitiveness. Such a combined strategy offers opportunities for firms
in general and foreign owned firms in particular, who face a liability towards
domestic firms in the host country due to their foreignness (Hymer, 1976; Miller,
1991; Zaheer, 2001; Miller & Richards, 2002).
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summAry
Over the past decades the presence and importance of  foreign owned firms in
the Netherlands has increased considerably. As a result, the Netherlands is
currently the fifth largest recipient country of  foreign direct investment (FDI)
in the world (UNCTAD, 2009). Despite the fact that in 2009 the global FDI had
dropped with almost 40% due to the financial crisis, the Netherlands did not
experience this sharp relapse in incoming FDI. Regardless of  its limited market
size and lack of  resources, the Netherlands managed to maintain its position. In
this host economy foreign owned firms generally experience a complexity of
market and nonmarket pressures from both national and supranational
institutions, of  economic, regulatory, or social nature. These institutions affect
the performance of  foreign owned firms through an ample array of  liability costs
with reference to economic, social, legal, and cultural issues, hence matters outside
the market spam but in conjunction with it – nonmarket issues. The current
research attempted to identify which nonmarket issues have a potential impact
on foreign owned firms’ business activities. Accordingly, we explored
complementary strategies meant to manage this impact, to reduce the complexity
of  the nonmarket environment and to improve the competitive position of
foreign firms in the host environment. 
Our exploration commences by introducing important characteristics of  the
Netherlands as a small open economy and suitable host setting for the foreign
owned firms as well as presenting the research topics in Chapter one. 
Chapter two provided an overview of  the market aspects of  various types of
foreign owned firms present in the Netherlands, their location choices and
colocation patterns according to various characteristics of  these firms. Before
commencing the study of  nonmarket matters, we found relevant to become
acquainted to the foreign firms in terms of  their idiosyncratic characteristics,
location choices and colocation patterns exhibited in the host country. While the
literature highlights the development of  geographically concentrated areas of
foreign owned firms within host countries, however, in small open economies
(as the Netherlands) the agglomerative benefits remained so far unclear.
Therefore, Chapter two of  this study investigated the colocation patterns of
foreign owned firms, their agglomeration behavior vis-à-vis domestic firms and 
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their propensity to colocate according to country of  origin, size, age, and industry.
Generally, foreign owned firms mainly colocate in provinces with a high
concentration of  production factors, with good infrastructure, and which access
the main gateways i.e. Noord-Brabant (20.19% of  the total population of  foreign
firms), Zuid-Holland (17.23% of  the total population of  foreign firms), Noord-
Holland (16.12% of  the total population of  foreign firms), and Gelderland
(12.53% of  the total population of  foreign firms). The region of  Noord-Brabant
is also known for its technological knowledge and innovation potential, both
essential benefits for foreign firms employing resource-seeking motives. When
examining colocation patterns according to home country (provenience of
foreign firms), empirical results show that foreign firms coming from Belgium
and Germany show dissimilar colocation patterns than firms coming from other
home countries. Firms from these two countries mainly colocate in the provinces
bordering Belgium and Germany. Furthermore, results regarding firms’ age show
young foreign owned firms colocate around the geographic clusters and
concentrations of  older, well established firms, as predicted by other theorists as
well. Collocating with dominant more experienced firms offers particular
advantages to younger ones by helping them overcome certain resource
constraints. Regarding firms’ size, large foreign owned firms from the trade
industry follow the same colocation pattern as large local firms, i.e. in the regions
representing gateways to much bigger markets, i.e. the Central European market
or the European Union market. 
When comparing the agglomeration behavior of  foreign firms with their
domestic counterparts, empirical results showed that foreign firms operating in
the industries of  mining, construction, transport and communications, services
and trade exhibit different colocation/ agglomeration patterns than domestic
firms from the same industries. Our results also illustrate that the initial presence
of  foreign owned firms in many regions attracts the appearance of  agglomeration
economies among populations of  foreign firms. This phenomenon can add to
the understanding of  the dissimilar colocation patterns compared to the domestic
companies in the sense that the changes in agglomeration benefits for the foreign
companies trigger them to take a different (co)location decisions. 
Conversely, the foreign owned firms operating in the industries of  agriculture,
forestry/fishing, and manufacturing (co)locate similarly to Dutch firms. This can
be primarily explained by knowledge spillover effects between players in the same
industry which attract them to that region. Furthermore, manufacturing firms
(both foreign and domestic) also colocate in areas with easy access to imports.
If  manufacturing costs, taxation policy and location attractiveness differ across
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regions, then foreign owned firms would have the tendency to agglomerate where
costs are lower. Nevertheless, in the Netherlands government policy and taxation
regimes are very similar across the twelve Dutch provinces. Consequently,
taxation issues do not provide incentives to differentiate in location decisions.
For this reason we argue that the effects of  agglomeration economies, respectively
pools of  specialized labor and suppliers, knowledge flows, innovation and
spillovers are the main reasons explaining the similarity in colocation patterns of
the foreign and domestic firms operating in the manufacturing industry,
agriculture industry, and forestry/ fishing industries.  
Once we have formed a perspective view on the characteristics of  foreign owned
firms operating in the Netherlands, and gained insight into their market conduct
and agglomeration patterns, subsequent chapters examined nonmarket matters
relating to their business activities. The exploration of  the nonmarket topic
started with the four main theoretical perspectives which contributed to the
development of  the nonmarket concept (chapter three). We acknowledged the
framework drawn by Baron (1995), and we further developed this framework in
order to explore and to gain deeper insights into what constitutes the nonmarket
environment. More specifically, as main constituents we discussed various
nonmarket institutions, issues, interest, and information playing a role on the
nonmarket environment and how firms can manage this environment. This
discussion laid the grounds for the following chapter which empirically explored
the nonmarket institutional pressures on the activities of  foreign firms and the
nonmarket actions utilized by these firms to manage such pressures.  
Accordingly, chapter four studies the relation and sources of  variation in the
strength of  institutional pressures and the nonmarket actions of  foreign owned
firms to deal with these pressures in the open regionally integrated economy of
the Netherlands. We explored the most relevant nonmarket institutions which
influence the frequency of  nonmarket actions undertaken by the foreign owned
firms. Results show that pressure of  national regulators can increase the
frequency of  nonmarket actions through the insufficient transparency of  their
rules and regulations, insufficient autonomy, and a short term perspective of
rules and regulations. This is consistent with Kanter (1999) and North (1990)
who delegate that national regulators normalize business activities and commonly
enforce standards and safety. 
Furthermore, pressures of  standards agencies also contribute to an increase in
the frequency of  nonmarket actions. This input is explained through the costs
to obtain permits, licenses, and authorizations and costs to comply with imposed 
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standards made by the foreign firms. In the Netherlands a vast array of  required
permits/ standards restricts and set boundaries for business practices and
activities. In line with Ogus (2002), foreign firms can utilize various nonmarket
actions such as constituency building, lobbying and press conferences to decrease
redundant expenditure made with certain new imposed standards. Interest groups
also leave their prints on the business sector and foreign owned firms along. For
various purposes ranging from investing in a safe future and social community
to preserving the environment, interest groups shape their business processes
and outcomes. These groups increase the frequency of  nonmarket actions
through a high capacity to gain public opinion which makes foreign firms aware
of  harmful consequences of  certain business practices. A final institution that
explains the increase in frequency of  nonmarket actions is the media. Due to its
high credibility, strong societal influence, and increased concern for the public
interest in the host country, foreign companies become aware of  the potential
influence of  this institution and increase their nonmarket (relational) actions with
respect to this stakeholder (Miles & Snow, 1978). 
Overarching, supranational regulators do not directly contribute to the increase
in nonmarket actions of  foreign owned firms in the host country. Due to the
multi-level governance, supranational regulators establish directives for the
national institutions while also allowing for a certain degree of  flexibility and
national variance. Thus, supranational institutions show effects on national level
institutions; more specifically they influence national regulators, standards
agencies and political institutions (Smith, 1997). To further explain such result
we can also employ arguments related to the specificity of  the Dutch host setting.
A vast part of  rules, regulations, directives and policy making is established by
supranational (European Union) regulators and, at national level, members states
have to incorporate these to a great extent. 
After exploring nonmarket institutional influences, chapter five indentified how
firm level characteristics and resources determines the preference for a certain
strategy type to manage these influences. As most comprehensive and inclusive
nonmarket strategy types we proposed foreseeing vs. subsequent nonmarket
strategy. Six idiosyncratic determinants: size, host country experience, market
scope, regional headquarters function, country difference and autonomy degree
of  the foreign owned firms were anticipated to affect the predilection for
implementing a specific type of  nonmarket strategy. 
Empirical investigation showed that large foreign owned firms implement
foreseeing strategies while small and medium sized companies follow subsequent
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strategies. Large foreign owned firms with substantial employment base in the
host country need to consider certain nonmarket issues regarding provisions for
their employees. They also possess the capacity and resources to develop and to
maintain long term co-operations with diverse nonmarket institutions. As large
foreign owned firms have more assets at risk, this increases their incentives to
foresee and engage within nonmarket contexts. 
Likewise, results show that foreign owned firms with more experience in the host
country are inclined to implement subsequent strategies while the less
experienced firms use foreseeing strategies. Albeit the experience of  a foreign
owned firm in the host country indicates commitment and repeated dealings with
host nonmarket related actors and institutions, in time the firm develops tacit
knowledge and abilities to deal with these matters. 
Regarding market scope as a determinant for a certain type of  nonmarket strategy,
foreign owned firms with a narrow market scope prefer to use foreseeing
strategies over subsequent strategies. Foreign owned firms operating only on local
markets are generally able to acquire extra knowledge and to develop intensified
interactions with nonmarket linked actors. They are more likely to uphold
continuous in-depth collaborations due to the one (single) host market focus. 
Empirical results also show that the function regional headquarters significantly
determines the preference for a subsequent strategy. Foreign owned firms with
no headquarters function have the possibility to focus only on single/ fewer host
nonmarket issues and areas and, as a result, they pursue foreseeing strategies in
the same nonmarket context. 
From previous analysis conducted in chapter four it resulted that out of  the
plethora of  nonmarket institutions affecting foreign owned firms’ business
operations, a reputable significance is attributed to the media. Therefore, chapter
six took a deeper insight into this important institution by exploring, from a
resource base perspective, specific strategic and tactical actions used by the
foreign owned firms to handle the complex influences from the media on their
business activities and to maximize the possible benefits seized through the means
of  the media’s functions (such as information transfer and reputation building).
Empirical estimates illustrate that the perceived impact of  the media in the host
society and host country experience are the main determinants of  these tactical
or strategic actions. Furthermore, factor analysis confirmed that the perceived
media’s impact in the host society is explained by several components along the
lines of: media fairness; accuracy; concern for community’s well being; objectivity; 
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up-to-date coverage; factuality; independence of  media’s institutions;
trustworthiness; concern for public interest; media’s credibility; professionalism
of  people in the media; and confidence in media’s institutions. Foreign owned
firms perceive differently the impact that media has in the host society and the
benefits it can convey (reputation building and information transfer). Accordingly,
firms which perceive the host media as having a high impact, develop in-house
employee training programs, use press releases and conferences to utilize this
impact to their advantage. Through these actions they establish themselves among
the host actors, build credible reputations and increase the transfer of  (host
specific) information. Foreign owned firms also hire external lobbyists to mitigate
for a certain issue on behalf  of  the company in order to create a public image
reflecting the foreign owned firms’ position on the certain issue. 
With regard to the resources of  the foreign owned firm, experience and
knowledge base reversibly relate to the types of  actions used to benefit from
media’s functions or to deal with its influence. When their experience with host
media institutions is scarce, foreign owned firms tend to contract media experts
and public relations specialists; cooperate with media institutions to compensate
for the knowledge gap created by their lack of  experience. However, foreign
owned firms operating within services industries interact with a wider spectrum
of  stakeholders than other industries. As a result, these firms are more
preoccupied with building networks and solid reputations for and with their
stakeholders. The same reasoning can explain the significant relationship between
the foreign owned firms with a narrow market scope and their preference for
strategic actions. A narrow market scope is an indication for a lower range of
stakeholders and interests involved with the business activities of  the firm, which
increases its incentive for accountable reputations and networking amongst these
stakeholders. 
Overall, the nonmarket behavior of  foreign owned firms is determined by
nonmarket institutional pressures which dictate the frequency of  nonmarket
actions and specific strategies implemented to deal with these institutional
pressures. Nonmarket strategies are complementary strategies to encounter
complex influences outside the market spam, to manage the threats and
opportunities from the nonmarket environment and to attain nonmarket interests
that complement market activities (Baron, 1995; Bonardi, Holburn & Van den
Berg, 2006; Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Prakash, 2002). These nonmarket strategies
entail actions carried out in public arenas to manage nonmarket issues from
various institutions and between these institutions and the firms’ activities
(Wartick & Mahon, 1994). Nonmarket actions entail proceedings employed in 
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public arenas (Baron, 1995; Schaffer & Hillman, 2000) to manage issues related
to a wide array of  institutions, national or supranational, amongst which interest
groups, political institutions, the media, regulatory institutions, standards agencies,
which all constitute the nonmarket framework (North, 1990; Scott, 1995). Main
predictors of  these strategies and nonmarket actions result from firm’s
characteristics, their internal resources and previous international experience.
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tegen de stroom in: Niet-marktgerelateerde strategieën van
buitenlandse bedrijven
Ondanks het feit dat Nederland relatief  klein is in omvang, is Nederland in de
afgelopen decennia toch een interessant land geweest voor buitenlandse bedrijven
om in te investeren. Zelfs toen in 2009 het wereldwijde totaal aan directe
buitenlandse investeringen (FDI) door de financiële crisis met bijna 40% daalde,
was de daling in Nederland aanzienlijk minder. Nederland staat momenteel vijfde
op de wereldranglijst van landen die de meeste directe buitenlandse investeringen
(FDI) ontvangen (UNCTAD, 2009). Een belangrijke reden voor de
aantrekkelijkheid van Nederland voor buitenlandse bedrijven is dat Nederland
een open economie heeft en dat Nederland ook een van de belangrijkste
toegangspoorten is tot de grote Europese markt. Nederland is een van de
grondleggers van de huidige Europese Unie en speelt nog steeds een actieve rol
in de verdere ontwikkeling van de Europese integratie. De unieke positie van
Nederland creëert interessante mogelijkheden voor buitenlandse bedrijven om
zaken te doen in Nederland of  elders in de Europese Unie. Echter doordat
Nederland onderdeel is van de Europese Unie is de context waarin bedrijven
opereren ook ingewikkelder dan wanneer bedrijven opereren in landen die geen
onderdeel zijn van een regionale samenwerking. Buitenlandse bedrijven in
Nederland hebben niet alleen te maken met binnenlandse instituten zoals
mededingingsautoriteiten, reguleringsautoriteiten, media, landelijke en locale
overheden en belangenorganisaties, maar worden in hun functioneren ook
beïnvloed door internationale instituten zoals de Europese Commissie, het
Europees Parlement en buitenlandse overheden. De invloed van deze instituten
bestaat uit een breed scala aan kosten, gerelateerd aan economische, sociale, legale
en culturele zaken; zaken die buiten de markt op zich liggen maar er wel mee in
verbinding staan – de zogenaamde niet-marktgerelateerde zaken. Dit
promotieonderzoek heeft getracht te identificeren welke niet-marktgerelateerde
zaken mogelijk invloed uitoefenen op de activiteiten van buitenlandse bedrijven
in Nederland.  Wij hebben de strategieën bestudeerd die bedoeld zijn om deze
invloeden in goede banen te leiden, om de complexiteit van de niet-
marktgerelateerde invloeden te reduceren en om de concurrentiepositie van
buitenlandse bedrijven in de gasteconomie te versterken.
© C.L. Voinea 2011
sAmenvAttIng
221
Onze verkenning begint in het eerste hoofdstuk met een introductie van enkele
belangrijke eigenschappen van Nederland, met zijn kleine, open economie en zijn
geschiktheid als gastland voor buitenlandse bedrijven en met een uiteenzetting
van de onderzoeksvragen voor deze dissertatie.
Het tweede hoofdstuk biedt een overzicht van de marktaspecten van verschillende
soorten buitenlandse bedrijven die actief  zijn in Nederland en hun locatie- en
colocatiekeuzes in verband met de verschillende karakteristieken deze bedrijven.
Enkel met dit inzicht is het mogelijk vervolgens de niet-markt gerelateerde zaken
te bestuderen. Hoewel de literatuur zich met name heeft gericht op het ontstaan
van een geografische concentratie van buitenlandse bedrijven binnen een groot
land zoals de Verenigde Staten van Amerika, zijn de agglomeratieontwikkelingen
in kleine, open economieën (zoals Nederland) in het algemeen onderbelicht
gebleven. Het tweede hoofdstuk van dit onderzoek gaat daarom in op de
colocatiekeuzes van buitenlandse bedrijven, hun agglomeratiegedrag met
betrekking tot binnenlandse bedrijven en hun neiging om zich te vestigen bij
bedrijven uit het zelfde land, van het zelfde formaat, van de zelfde leeftijd en/of
uit de zelfde sector. In het algemeen vestigen buitenlandse bedrijven zich in
provincies met een hoge concentratie productiefactoren, met een goede
infrastructuur en met goede toegankelijkheid van hoofdknooppunten, zoals
Noord-Brabant (20,19% van het totaal aantal buitenlandse bedrijven is hier
gevestigd), Zuid-Holland (17,23% van het totaal aantal buitenlandse bedrijven is
hier gevestigd), Noord-Holland (16,12% van het totaal aantal buitenlandse
bedrijven is hier gevestigd) en Gelderland (12,53% van het totaal aantal
buitenlandse bedrijven is hier gevestigd). De provincie Noord-Brabant staat
bekend om de concentratie van technologische kennis en het innovatievermogen,
beide zijn essentiële elementen voor een buitenlands bedrijf  dat nieuw
technologische kennis zoekt. Nader statistisch onderzoek van het colocatiegedrag
naar land van herkomst (van het buitenlandse bedrijf) laat zien dat buitenlandse
bedrijven afkomstig uit België en Duitsland afwijkend gedrag vertonen ten
opzichte van bedrijven afkomstig uit andere landen. Bedrijven uit deze twee
landen vestigen zich voornamelijk in de provincies die aan België en Duitsland
grenzen. Verder valt het ook op dat jongere buitenlandse bedrijven zich
voornamelijk vestigen rondom de geografische clusters waar oudere, gevestigde
bedrijven zich hebben gevestigd, zoals ook is aangetoond door de bevindingen
uit andere onderzoeken. Colocatie met dominante, ervaren bedrijven helpt
jongere bedrijven om eventuele beperkingen met betrekking tot resources en
capaciteiten te overwinnen. Wanneer gekeken wordt naar de omvang van de
bedrijven, is te zien dat grote buitenlandse bedrijven de zelfde locaties kiezen als
grote Nederlandse bedrijven.
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Wanneer de geografische spreiding van buitenlandse bedrijven die zich
bezighouden met mijnbouw, bouw, transport en communicatie, dienstverlening
en handel, wordt vergeleken met die van binnenlandse bedrijven in deze sectoren,
dan valt op dat zij een ander vestigingsgedrag tentoonspreiden. De resultaten
laten ook zien dat de aanwezigheid van een aantal buitenlandse bedrijven in
verschillende provincies een agglomeratie van buitenlandse bedrijven in gang
hebben gezet. Buitenlandse bedrijven die zich bezighouden met land-, tuin- en
bosbouw, visserij en industriële productie laten echter wel een vestigingsgedrag
zien dat overeenkomt met dat van Nederlandse bedrijven. Dit vestigingsgedrag
is voornamelijk te verklaren door het belang van kennisoverdracht tussen
verschillende gelijksoortige bedrijven om hun prestaties te handhaven of  te
verbeteren. Zowel binnenlandse als buitenlandse bedrijven in de industriële
productie kiezen bovendien locaties met een goede ontsluiting voor import.
Wanneer de productiekosten en de (fiscale) wet- en regelgeving regionaal
verschillen, dan hebben buitenlandse bedrijven de neiging om zich te vestigen
waar de kosten het laagst zijn. In Nederland is de (fiscale) wet- en regelgeving in
alle provincies echter vrijwel identiek. Fiscale belangen zullen dus nauwelijks
meespelen in de besluitvorming wanneer een locatie gekozen moet worden. De
belangrijke redenen van de overeenkomst in geografische spreiding van
buitenlandse en binnenlandse bedrijven in de industriële productie, land-, tuin-
en bosbouw en visserij zijn dus de effecten van agglomeratie-economieën,
respectievelijk de concentratie van gespecialiseerde mankracht en leveranciers en
overdracht van kennis en innovaties.
Nadat de eigenschappen van binnen Nederland actieve buitenlandse bedrijven
in perspectief  zijn gezet en er inzicht is verkregen in hun marktgedrag en
geografisch spreidingspatroon, gaan de volgende hoofdstukken in op de niet-
marktgerelateerde zaken van buitenlandse bedrijven in Nederland. Het verkennen
van het vraagstuk niet-marktgerelateerde (nonmarket) zaken begint met de vier
belangrijkste theoretische perspectieven die hebben bijgedragen aan de
ontwikkeling van het niet-marktconcept (hoofdstuk drie). Het kader dat is
opgezet door Baron (1995) is verder uitgewerkt om de wereld van de niet-
marktgerelateerde zaken te onderzoeken en er een beter inzicht in te krijgen. De
hoofdcomponenten van het kader zijn de niet-marktgerelateerde instituten, zaken,
belangen en informatie. Dit hoofdstuk vormt de basis voor het volgende
hoofdstuk, waarin empirisch onderzoek wordt gedaan naar de invloeden van niet-
marktgerelateerde organisaties/instituten op de activiteiten van buitenlandse
bedrijven en naar welke niet-marktgerelateerde acties door deze bedrijven worden
gebruikt om de invloeden te beheersen of  te reduceren.
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In overeenstemming daarmee bekijkt hoofdstuk vier de relatie en bronnen van
variatie van institutionele invloeden en de niet-marktgerelateerde acties van
buitenlandse bedrijven om met deze invloeden om te gaan in een open economie
die onderdeel is van een groter economische geheel. We hebben de meest
relevante niet-marktgerelateerde instituten die de frequentie van de niet-
marktgerelateerde acties van buitenlandse bedrijven beïnvloeden onderzocht. De
resultaten laten zien dat invloed van de nationale wetgever de frequentie van niet-
marktgerelateerde acties van buitenlandse bedrijven kan verhogen door
onvoldoende transparante wet- en regelgeving, onvoldoende autonomie en door
een korte-termijn-perspectief  van wet- en regelgeving. Deze bevinding komt
overeen met Kanter (1999) en North (1990) die hebben laten zien dat nationale
overheden zakelijke activiteiten moeten normaliseren en gezamenlijk standaarden
en veiligheid moeten handhaven.
Toenemende invloed van instituten die verantwoordelijk zijn voor standaardisatie
dragen ook bij aan een toename van de frequentie van niet-marktgerelateerde
acties door buitenlandse bedrijven in Nederland. Deze relatie is te verklaren door
de kosten die de buitenlandse bedrijven moeten maken om vergunningen,
licenties en toestemmingen te verkrijgen en om te voldoen aan opgelegde
standaarden. In Nederland worden bedrijven en zakelijke activiteiten begrensd
en beperkt door een zeer breed scala aan verplichte vergunningen en standaarden.
Buitenlandse bedrijven kunnen verschillende niet-marktgerelateerde strategieën
gebruiken zoals het creëren van draagvlak, lobbyen en persconferenties in een
poging om de uitgaven voor nieuwe verplichte standaarden te beperken.
Belangengroepen drukken ook hun stempel op de zakelijke wereld en daardoor
ook op de buitenlandse bedrijven. Voor redenen die uiteenlopen van investeren
in een veilige toekomst en een sociale samenleving tot milieubescherming, kunnen
belangengroepen direct en indirect de bedrijfsprocessen en -resultaten van de
bedrijven beïnvloeden. Deze belangengroepen beïnvloeden vaak de publieke
opinie waardoor bedrijven zich bewust worden van mogelijke schadelijke
gevolgen van bepaalde bedrijfsprocessen- en besluiten. Om de publieke opinie
te beïnvloeden zullen bedrijven als reactie meer gebruik maken van niet-
marktgerelateerde acties. Een laatste instituut die de toename van
niet-marktgerelateerde actie verklaart, zijn de media. Door de grote
geloofwaardigheid van de media, hun sterke invloed op de samenleving en hun
groeiende bezorgdheid over het publieke belang van het gastland, beginnen
buitenlandse bedrijven zich te realiseren hoe groot deze potentiële invloed is en
zullen daarom meer gebruik maken van niet-marktgerelateerde acties om daaraan
recht te doen (Miles & Snow, 1978).
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Overkoepelende, supranationale autoriteiten dragen niet direct bij tot de toename
van niet-marktgerelateerde acties van buitenlandse bedrijven in het gastland. Door
hun gelaagde organisatie, stellen supranationale autoriteiten richtlijnen op voor
nationale instituten, met een zekere mate van flexibiliteit die lokale variaties
toelaat. Supranationale instituten hebben dus effect op instituten op landelijk
niveau; zij beïnvloeden landelijke wetgevers, standaardiserende en politieke
instituten (Smith, 1997). Het gebrek aan invloed wordt nader verklaard door
aspecten die te maken hebben met de specificiteit van de positie van Nederland
als gastland. Een groot deel van de wetten, regels, richtlijnen en politiek wordt
op supranationaal niveau (Europese Unie) bepaald en wordt door de lidstaten op
nationaal niveau zeer ver doorgevoerd.
Nadat de niet-marktgerelateerde institutionele invloeden zijn onderzocht, gaat
het vijfde hoofdstuk in op hoe de voorkeur voor een bepaald soort strategie om
met deze invloeden om te gaan wordt beïnvloed door de specifieke
eigenschappen van het bedrijf  en door de beschikbare resources en vaardigheden.
Als meest uitvoerige niet-marktgerelateerde strategieën dragen wij een indeling
in proactieve (vooruitziende) en reactieve niet- marktgerelateerde strategieën aan.
Er wordt onderzocht of  de grootte, ervaring in het gastland, marktomvang,
functie als regionaal hoofdkantoor, landsverschillen en mate van autonomie van
de buitenlandse bedrijven invloed hebben op de voorkeur voor een van de twee
hoofdgroepen niet-marktgerelateerde strategie.
Empirisch onderzoek laat zien dat grote buitenlandse bedrijven proactieve
strategieën ten uitvoer brengen, terwijl kleine en middelgrote bedrijven het
houden bij reactieve strategieën. Grote buitenlandse bedrijven met een flink aantal
werknemers in het gastland moeten bepaalde niet-marktgerelateerde zaken in
ogenschouw nemen met betrekking tot voorzieningen voor hun werknemers. Zij
hebben ook de capaciteit en de middelen om een langdurige samenwerking op
te bouwen en te onderhouden met verschillende niet-marktgerelateerde instituten.
Omdat grote buitenlandse bedrijven meer risico lopen met betrekking tot hun
investeringen in het gastland, zijn zij ook meer bereid om een proactieve houding
aan te nemen met betrekking tot niet-marktgerelateerde zaken. De resultaten
tonen ook aan dat buitenlandse bedrijven met meer ervaring in het gastland de
neiging hebben om vaker reactieve strategieën te gebruiken terwijl bedrijven met
minder ervaring juist een voorkeur hebben voor proactieve strategieën. Hoewel
de ervaring van een buitenlands bedrijf  in het gastland een zekere verbintenis en
herhaalde interactie met niet-marktgerelateerde instituten in het gastland
impliceert, ontwikkelt het bedrijf  in de loop der tijd onderhandse kennis en
ervaring over hoe met zulke zaken omgegaan moet worden.
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Met betrekking tot de marktomvang als bepalende factor voor een bepaald soort
niet-marktgerelateerde strategie, blijkt dat buitenlandse bedrijven die zich
voornamelijk richten op de binnenlandse markt eerder proactieve strategieën
gebruiken dan reactieve strategieën. Buitenlandse bedrijven die zich concentreren
op alleen de binnenlandse afzetmarkt kunnen extra kennis vergaren en intensieve
contacten opbouwen met de relevante niet-marktgerelateerde instituten. Het is
waarschijnlijker dat zij diepgaande samenwerkingsverbanden aangaan vanwege
hun focus op slechts een enkele afzetmarkt.
Empirische resultaten laten ook zien dat de functie als regionaal hoofdkantoor
van het buitenlandse bedrijf  in het gastland sterk gerelateerd is aan de voorkeur
voor een reactieve strategie. Buitenlandse bedrijven zonder (regionale)
hoofdkantoorstatus hoeven zich slechts op een of  enkele activiteiten te richten
waardoor ze eerder een proactieve strategie met betrekking tot deze niet-
marktgerelateerde zaken kunnen implementeren. Bedrijven met een
hoofdkantoorfunctie moeten zich richten op meerdere activiteiten en vaak ook
in meerdere landen waardoor het vaak complexer is om zich proactief  op te
stellen op alle zaken en in alle landen.
Uit eerdere analyses in hoofdstuk vier is tevens aangetoond dat aan de media een
groot belang wordt toebedeeld. Het zesde hoofdstuk gaat daarom verder in op
dit belangrijke instituut door vanuit  het ‘resource-based’ perspectief  de specifieke
strategische en tactische acties te onderzoeken die het buitenlandse bedrijf
gebruikt om vat te krijgen op de complexe invloeden van de media op hun
bedrijfsvoering en prestaties en om de mogelijke voordelen ervan maximaal te
benutten (bijvoorbeeld door informatieoverdracht en het opbouwen van een
reputatie). Allereerst wordt bekeken hoe de waargenomen impact van de media
in het gastland is opgebouwd. Factoranalyse heeft laten zien dat de waargenomen
impact van de media op het gastland te verklaren is door verschillende
componenten zoals: eerlijkheid; correctheid; bezorgdheid over het welzijn van
de samenleving; onpartijdigheid; recentheid; aandacht voor feiten;
onafhankelijkheid van media-instituten; betrouwbaarheid; bezorgdheid voor
publieke belangen; geloofwaardigheid; professionalisme van het personeel in de
media; vertrouwen in de media-instituten. Buitenlandse bedrijven hebben een
andere waarneming van de impact die de media in het gastland hebben en van
de voordelen die eruit kunnen voortvloeien (het opbouwen van een reputatie en
informatieverspreiding). In overeenstemming hiermee ontwikkelen bedrijven, die
de media in het gastland als heel belangrijk zien, interne trainingsprogramma’s
en maken ze actief  gebruik van de pers en persconferenties om die impact in
hun voordeel te gebruiken. Hiermee creëren zij een plaats voor zichzelf  tussen
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de instituten in het gastland, bouwen een geloofwaardige reputatie op en
vergroten de stroom van informatie (specifiek aan het gastland). Buitenlandse
bedrijven huren ook externe lobbyisten in om bepaalde problemen voor het
bedrijf  op te lossen en om een publiek imago te creëren dat de positie van het
buitenlandse bedrijf  met betrekking tot dat specifieke probleem verbetert.
Met betrekking tot de resources en vaardigheden die ter beschikking staan aan
het buitenlandse bedrijf, staan ervaring en kennis in omgekeerde relatie met de
soort actie die ondernomen wordt om voordeel te halen uit media-aandacht of
om met de invloed van de media om te gaan. Wanneer buitenlandse bedrijven
weinig ervaring hebben met de media in het gastland, dan hebben ze de neiging
om een beroep te doen op media-experts en public relation-specialisten om
samen te werken met mediabedrijven om het gebrek aan kennis te compenseren
dat wordt veroorzaakt door hun gebrek aan ervaring. Dienstverlenende
buitenlandse bedrijven werken echter samen met een breder scala
belanghebbenden dan andersoortige bedrijven. Deze bedrijven houden zich meer
bezig met het bouwen van netwerken en een degelijke reputatie voor hun
belanghebbenden. De zelfde argumentering kan verklaren waarom er een sterke
relatie is tussen buitenlandse bedrijven met een kleine afzetmarkt en hun voorkeur
qua strategische acties. Een kleine afzetmarkt is een indicatie van weinig
differentiatie van belanghebbenden en interessegebieden die te maken hebben
met de activiteiten van het bedrijf, waardoor het bedrijf  zich meer geroepen voelt
om een goede reputatie en een goed netwerk onder deze belanghebbenden op
te bouwen.
In zijn algemeenheid wordt het niet-marktgerelateerde gedrag van een bedrijf
bepaald door niet-marktgerelateerde institutionele invloeden, die de frequentie
van de niet-marktgerelateerde acties bepalen evenals welke specifieke strategieën
worden gebruikt om met deze institutionele invloed om te gaan. Niet-
marktgerelateerde strategieën zijn aanvullende strategieën om om te gaan met
complexe invloeden van buiten de markt, om risico's en kansen vanuit de niet-
marktgerelateerde omgeving te beheren en om niet-marktgerelateerde doelen te
bereiken die de marktgerelateerde activiteiten aanvullen (Baron, 1995; Bonardi,
Holburn & Van den Berg, 2006; Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Prakash, 2002). Deze
niet-marktgerelateerde strategieën behandelen acties in publieke omgevingen om
niet-marktgerelateerde zaken afkomstig van verscheidene instituten en tussen
deze instituten en de activiteiten van het bedrijf  te beheren (Wartick & Mahon,
1994). Niet-marktgerelateerde acties houden in: acties in het publieke domein
(Baron, 1995; Schaffer & Hillman, 2000) om zaken te beheren die gerelateerd
zijn aan een breed scala nationale of  supranationale instanties, waaronder 
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belangenverenigingen, politieke instituten, de media, wetgevende instituten,
standaardisatieorganen, die allemaal deel uitmaken van de niet-marktgerelateerde
omgeving (North, 1990; Scott, 1995). De belangrijkste voorspellers voor deze
strategieën en niet-marktgerelateerde acties worden bepaald door de specifieke
eigenschappen van het bedrijf, hun interne resources en hun internationale
ervaring.
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